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SU1-1~IARY 
Essay I suggests that the context in which the enquiry con-
cerning kerygma is being made is dominated by the rise of the 
historical-critical method. The hypothesis that theological 
language is an insoluble compound of historical and eschatological 
language is explored, then rejected in favour of the hypothesis 
that historical language is paradoxically identical lvi th 
theological language. 
Essay II explores what it means to speak historically of the 
resurrection, finds it necessary to define God, to assert that the 
past is present and that my acts and words, like the acts and 
words of Jesus, are the acts and words of God, though these b" ~~ 
are qualified by sin. ~
It 
Essay III assumes that the words of Jesus and the words of 
the early church were the words of God; that, if the words of the 
early church were kerygma, so too then were the words of Jesus 
kerygma. What differentiates kerygma from other language-games 
. that deal with history is not that what they speak of remains past, 
lvhereas the kerygma makes present, but that in the kerygma he is 
present whose acts and words were, without the qualification of 
sin, God's acts and words. 
Essay IV summarises the position so far, with a parenthesis 
on the inseparable relation of narration and proclamation; 
suggests that the New Testament includes not one kerygma, but 
many, some of which"merely differ from one another, some of which 
contradict one another. It is further suggested that kerygma 
is created by men, or theologically speaking, by the Spirit, at 
the point where tradition and the present situation interact. 
As this interaction should be creating something new, it is not 
possible to test whether a new kerygma is true or false, as 
traditional norms cannot entirely measure what has gone beyond 
tradition. 
Essay V outlines the presuppositions that have been accumu-
lating throughout the essays and suggests that they, or something 
like them, are necessary for' a comprehensive and consistent 
explanation of what kerygma is. 
ii. 
FOREWORD 
A thesis may concentrate on exposition or on criticism. 
If it concentrates on the former, it will endeavour to set 
forth what an author 'has said, perhaps in many places in _ 
his writing, and to this exposition will append some 
criticisms. If it concentrates on criticism, it will see 
its task to ask why criticism has been undertaken at all, 
will enquire whether the criticism perhaps i~volves a set 
of presuppositions that can be distinguished from the 
authors under examination and will undertake the work of 
exposition only where it isooen to be necessary. In the 
following.thesis the latter method was chosen. 
In his History of New Testament Times R. H. Pfeiffer 
prefaces his foreword with the quotation: 'If you steal 
from oneo-author, it's plagiarism; if you steal from many, 
it's research.' The footnotes here give some indication 
of the extent to which I have borrowed. The most important 
ideas I have taken from others are the theory of history of 
Collingwood, the analysis of 'the present moment' of 
Kierkegaard and Bultmann and the latter's doctrine of 
'paradoxical identity'; and I have widely used the 
historical conclusions of the Bultmannian school of New 
n . 
Testament critics. And in my appropriation of all these 
I have everywhere b~en influenced by the views of my 
iii. 
theological teachers in Glasgow, Professor Ian Henderson 
and, before ail, my &upervisor, Professor Gregor Smith. 
I can only apologise where a debt has gone unacknowledged. 
Where so much has been borrowed it is somewhat 
impertinent to talk of originality. No doubt I could 
claim that the definitions of a Christian and of God are 
original, though the former is influenced by Ebeling, to 
mention no others, and the terms of the latter are taken 
from a saying of Wittgenstein~ And I dare say that the 
It 
terms 'ancillary norm' and 'kerygmata' have not been used 
before, though the facts they denote are spoken of widely. 
But it might be of some use if I said something about 
the form of the thesis and something of my aims. It is an 
example of thinking in actu, endeavours to be something of 
a 'Programmschrift' rather than a closed system and 
represent~ hoW far I have been able to think on these 
matters: Ibis hieher ist das Bewusstseyn gekommen'. 
It is something of a pity that the thought which forms 
the backbone of this thesis is the thought of the later 
Collingwood, when, as Sir Malcolm Knox was kind enough to 
point out to me in conversation and as he records in his 
Preface to The Idea of History, Collingwood was· declining 
into both dogmatism and scepticism. But perhaps I may 
assume, for Collingwood, as Collingwood assumed for others, 
that if his thinking is -not 'a body of truths to be blindly 
iv. 
accepted"neither is it 'a mass of errors to be repudiated 
wholesale, but a mixture of good thing and bad'. 
Among the 'specimina philosophandi' in An Essay on 
Hetaphysics, Collingwood has an essay on what the pro-
position, 'God exists', means for a theory of nature. What 
I would like to have done here is to have said what the same 
proposition might mean for a theory of history, that is, for 
Collingwood's theory of history; and, further, to have made 
an essay in theological metho~; and, further, to have 
sketched a theology that was able to cope with change, in 
short, a theology of the Spirit. These aims are less 
temerarious if I do not claim that they have been realised. 
But, however unrealised these aims, what I was thinking 
did appear to involve certain criticisms of Dodd and 
Bultmann. Hy 'a priori imagination' was unable to COlTI-
prehend what Dodd had written on the resurrection and, as I 
was concentrating more directly than Dbdd on the essential 
foreignness of the New Testament way of thinking from our 
own, and so more directly on the problems of hermeneutics, 
I was led to distinguish history from eschatology at a 
different juncture. Plato says somewhere that to philoso-
phise is to 'divide reality at its joints'. Dodd's 
anatomy differed from mine. And I was further persuaded 
.. ' 
to lay K~semann's stress on the variability of the kerygma 
and to account for this variability in terms of Collingwood's 
v. 
view of historical process. 
As regards Bultmann, many people think - and it is 
certainly thought by those who are engaged on the 'New 
QUest' - that it is insufficient to hold that Jesus was a 
Jew and that what he said is not Christian theology but 
'belongs to its presuppositions'. I am of the opinion that 
these problems may be solved by transposing the kerygma into 
the life of Jesus - though without denying the undoubted 
differences between what Jesus said and what was said later. 
" The differences are, I suggest, to be explained historically, 
but not theologically in such terms as relegate Jesus to 
Judaism. No doubt that transposition would Inean a 
structural alteration in Bultmann's theology. 
The definition of ~erygma and the theology that these 
criticisms imply I have endeavoured to adumbrate in the last 
essay. That theology is set down as concisely and con-
sistently as I was able, with only that comprehensiveness 
that I considered necessary to answer the question what 
kerygma is. For it was with that question alone that I was 
here concerned. For the rest, what Wittgenstein wrote in 
the Foreword to his Philosophische Bemerkungen is true for 
this, as it is perhaps true for all, that 'dieses Buch ist 
fUr solche geschrieben, die seinem Geist freundlich 
, .. 
gegenHberstehen'. 
" ' 
vi. 
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1. 
PROLEGOMENA 
Definitiones 
The history of modern Protestant theology is the history 
of its engagement with history. All the major problems for 
theology as a science have been raised for theology by the 
science of history. Whether the actual beginnings of the 
struggle l are to be found in the work of Strauss and Baur, 
who were in turn giving sUbstance to the adumbrations of 
Michaelis and Semler, or whether the problem is already 
implicit in the Reformation valuation of scripture as against 
tradition, or, more fundamentally, if more unconsciously, as 
over against scripture itself, in the corrosive influence of 
Christ, or whether, by, as it were, a regressus ad infinitum, 
the problem is not rather rooted in the Entd~monisierung, or 
de-divinisation, of the world in the Gospel of Mark, is 
interesting genetically; under consideration here is not 
the origin, only the fact. 
That the theologian be permitted to pursue the science 
of history, if not always to the bitter end, is a battle 
. ·2 
waged over the displacement of Strauss and the some-time 
1. v. K~mmel, Das Neue Testament, p. 147. 
2. After the pUblication in 1835/36 of Das Leben Jesu, 
kritisch bearbeitet, Strauss was dismissed from his 
teaching post in Tfibingen. He introduced the 'mythical' 
interpretation as one that would avoid the defects of 
the 'conservative' and 'rationalist' interpretations. 
2. 
professorship of Robertson Smithl which is already won, if 
the anachronistically active pockets of resistance be 
ignored. In another sense, however, the science of history 
lies still undigested in the theologian's maw; and here the 
matter is by no means settled. That is to say, that 
history as an autonomous science may be legitimately pursued 
by the theologian is, with the above qualification, accepted. 
But the specifically theological problems raised by the 
activity of historians 'are not by any means solved or 
settled. Broadly speaking, this is the so-called problem 
of hermeneutics. That these specifically theological 
problems are still in full sail can be documented from 
Kllmmel's history of New Testament research, where .the era of 
history with no holds barred is followed by history of 
religions and then terminates, if not culminates, in the 
2 theological question in its relation to the historical. 
It is with the concept 'kerygma', which is an attempt to 
solve these problems, that the following study is concerned. 
1. In 1881 Robertson Smith was removed from the chair of 
oriental languages and Old Testament exegesis at the 
Free Church College, Aberdeen, as a result of his articles 
in the 9th edn. of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which 
were held by the General Assembly of the Free Church to 
undermine belief in the inspiration of the bible., 
2. The ~omenclature·in Kllmmel, op.cit., is as follows: 'die 
konsequent geschichtliche', 'die religionsgeschichtliche' 
and 'die geschichtlich-theologische'. 
1 
I 
i 
\ .. , 
I 
I 
J. 
To say so much is to place the problem in its widest 
setting. The problem could be made more precise in an 
infinite variety of ways and has indeed been defined as 
variously as the theologians concerned. Again, in the 
widest possible terms, the problem is the relat~on of history 
and faith, or, alternatively, the relation of historical 
speech to theological speech. 1 Kierkegaard formulated the 
problem in terms of the relation between 'contingent' and 
'absOlute', between (Lessingt~) 'accidental historical 
truths' and 'eternal truths of the reason', between 
'historical knowledge' and 'eternal happiness'. 
has formulated the problem in terms of history and 
2 Bultmann 
eschatology and sought a solution in their paradoxical 
identity. Bonhoeffer,3 in an ethical context, in terms of 
the relation between penultimate and ultimate. 
The following remarks will be an attempt, based on some 
of these theologies, to make a preliminary sketch of the 
problems that are involved in the question 'What is . 
kerygma?' • For one thing is at any rate clear, that there 
can be no Verstehen (understanding) without a Vorverst&ndnis 
(pre-understanding), nor answer without a question, however 
much any answer may modify the question. Accordingly the 
1. e.g. in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
2. History and Eschatologx, The Gifford Lectures, 1955. 
3. Ethics, pp. 79ff. 
4. 
attempt will be made to formulate a preliminary hypothesis 
to act as a Fragestellung, or position from which to ask 
questions, for without such a preliminary procedure the 
problem cannot be' grasped at all. 
But, first, a general word on theological method. It 
was in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries that history as the study of the past gained the 
1 
'sichere Gang einer Wissenschaft'. Somewhat later, and 
yet perhaps more fundamentall~, came the recognition of the 
historicity of the historian, that the historian himself is 
2 qualified by his past and responsible for his future. 
For the theologian in this situation either of two 
consequences may follow. His nerve may fail before what 
Mircea Eliade3 calls 'the terror of history', or he may be 
1. In The Idea o~ History p. 232, Collingwood writes: 
'Since the' time of Descartes, and even since the time of 
Kant, mankind has acquired a new habit of thinking 
historically. ' But great precision is not possible in 
an estimate of this kind. 
2. e.g. Bultmann, Kerygma'und Mythos, VI, p. 20 {my tr.}: 
tIt has nowadays become increasingly recognised that there 
is no such opposition (sc. between history and the 
observer), since to perceive historical process is itself I 
a~historical event.' And cf. Heidegger, Being & Time, tr. 
Macquarrie & Robinson, para. 76, pp. 444ff., 'The ' 
Existential Source of Historiology in Dasein's 
Historicality'; and Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 
114: 'In the kind of history I am thinking of, ••• 
historical problems arise out of practical problems. We 
study history in·order to see more clearly into the 
situation in which we are called upon to act.' 
3. The Myth of the Eternal Return, tr. Trask, pp. l39ff. 
5. 
braced by the cold but wider winds of possibility. In other 
(tJ-\.J.. 
words, the theologian stands between the past the the 
future, between tradition and the arising situation. 
Failure of nerve may lead him to throw himself into the arms 
of a tradition which, once vocal but now dumb, he is doomed 
drearily to reiterate, or, breaking quite loose from 
tradition, to subject himself to every wind of fashion. As 
so often, a solution is not to be so simply found. An 
adequate theology must be measured by its ability to be 
Janus-faced, by its ability to keep simultaneously in view 
the demands of tradition and the demands of the situation. 
But any science must be clean and certain root terms 
must be defined. The attempt must be made to distinguish 
as cleanly as possible between two different modes of 
speaking, namely: the historical and the theological. 
History will be here defined as by Collingwood in The 
Idea of History. 
historian, studies 
According to him, history, or the 
1 
'the actions of men in the past'. 
definition, it must be clearly seen, excludes the New 
Testament. On such a definition the New Testament is 
This 
. 2 
'theocratic history', that is, the story of God's act or 
1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 9: .•• history is 
the science of res gestae, the attempt to answer (I have ',.1
1 
questions about human actions done in the past.' 
2. 
apparently included 'the object of history' in its : 
il defini tion, which is 'a kind of research or inquiry'.) .Ii 
til 
ibid., pp. 14-17. 
I 
i 
6. 
acts in the past. And theocratic history, despite the 
attempts of pannenbergl in Germany and Richardson2 in 
England to re-introduce mythology in history's persona, is 
not history, but something else. The historian can, of 
course, recognise the influence on their actions of the 
beliefs of men, but when he investigates the truth of the 
belief itself or seeks to demonstrate that God had acted, he 
leaves history and turns theologian, and, in the latter case, 
2. 
Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 104, writes 
(my tr.): 'But the end of history has already happened 
to Jesus, when he ~as raised, though it has still to 
happen to us.' It is, in my view, historical nonsense 
to suppose that history will have an end; nor do .I 
think it theologically necessary to assert it. Bultmann, 
too, it i$ true, frequently uses the phrase 'the end of 
history', as, indeed, he continues to use many' 
mythological expressions, but, despite the confusion this 
causes, Bultmann attaches to the phrase his own peculiar 
meaning. According to him, if I understand him aright, 
the Word. brings my history till now to an end and allows 
me to set off on a new course. Far from being its end, 
Jesus of Nazareth is then its very motive force. I 
have tried to express this,' deriving it from Ki~rkegaard, 
by the 'doctrine of the absolute moment' (v. the end of 
Essay II). 
Richardson in History, Sacred and Profane takes, in my 
view, too broad an understanding of historical fact. 
Neither does he concede that some ~hings are 
statistically impossible, nor does he sufficiently 
inquire into the literary genres of the period in which 
certain New Testament tales were composed. 
,,' 
7. 
a bad one at that. l 
History, then, studies the. actions of men in the past. 
Theology, on the other hand, studies eschatology in its 
relation to history. It is true that as the term 'history" 
is common to both disciplines, confusion may easily arise, 
but this is just the point where the one must be carefully 
held apart from the other. For though history is common to 
both disciplines, the term history is in each case used,in 
a different context and thus with a subtle shift in meaning 
which is decisive. In the one instance we are dealing with 
simple hist6ry, in the other with complex, with monopolar 
1. Haying assumed Collingwood's definition of history, 
whether or no he 'was trying ••• to erect his philosophy 
on the foundation of human credulity', and despite its 
'affinities with Kierkegaard and even Karl Barth' 
(T. M. Knox, in his preface' to The Idea of History, 
pp. xvif.), I have gone on to assume his definition of 
metaphysics ~s 'the science of absolute presuppositions', 
which was set forth in An Autobiography and developed in 
An Essay on Netaphysics, esp. chaps. IV and V. But it is 
true that, if 'nothing could be a completer error 
concerning the history of thought than to suppose that 
the historian as such merely ascertains 'what so-and-so 
thought', leaving it to someone else to decide 'whether 
it was true', and if 'all thinking is critical thinking' 
(The Idea of History,pp. 2l5f.); a,nd yet if 'the 
distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply 
to absolute presup~ositions at all' (An Essay on 
Metaphysics, p. 32), then it is hard to see how 
metaphysical thinking. can be critical thinking. It 
would be worth enquiring furth~r what Collingwood means 
by att~~buting changes in metaphysical beliefs to 'a 
modification (se. "of strains') not consciously devised 
but created by a process of unconscious thought' (ibid., 
p. 48, note to chp. V). 
8. 
and bipolar, with non-dialect~cal and dialectical, with 
non-paradoxical and with paradoxical. This might be put 
more simply by saying that the historian is concerned with 
man, the theologian with God and man in relation. This is 
not, of course, to deny that an anthropological transcript 
of theology is possible, but only to say that such a 
transcript, if adequate, will always also be implicitly a 
theological transcript with the poss~bility of explication. 
But the other term in the compound language of theology, 
eschatology, remains undefined. Since Schweitzer's Quest 
1 
of the Historical Jesus eschatology has moved from the 
eccentricity of a tifue-conditioned error to the centre of 
theological concern. Jewish apocalyptic eschatology is the 
mythological, of which the contemporary term, eschatology, 
is the demythologised expression. The assertion is that in 
each case the existential meaning is the same - and 
assertion it must remain, for demonstration is excluded. 
Or, if man's historicity is to be taken really seriously, it 
would be wiser to say that the modern term, eschatology, is 
not identical with, does ~ot repeat, but corresponds to the 
Jewish understanding. It is not ~ 'Wiederholung', something 
,that repeats, but an 'Entsprechung', something that 
correspond~. to. 
1. Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1906; first English ed~: 1910. 
9. 
Eschatology will here be defined as the situation of 
total or absolute responsibility. It is absolute in that 
it matters how I with my whole being respond to the 
situation before me, be it tree o~ man, nature or history. 
Whether this situation is merely anthropological, rather 
than an anthropological situation simultaneously and 
identically a theological situation, I shall bother to ask, 
but shall not bother to ,answer. I shall merely suppose 
that it is so, which, as 'theistic conviction in general 
as an element in man's understanding of the world is on the 
wane, and waning ever more rapidly,l and in the absence of 
that indispensable background of learned monographs which 
might have dealt with the specific problem of putting God 
on a scientific basis,2 is the only course that is open to 
the conscientious student. 
There are two ways in which this situation of absolute 
responsibility may be avoided, in classical terms, the 
method of the pharisee and the.method of the publican and 
sinner, or, the nomistic and the antinomian. The latter 
1. Ebeling, Theologie und VerkHndigung, p. 25 {my tr.}. 
,.2. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, '\vas, to my 
mind, the first to face the problem directly, if nalvely. 
One might also cite Bultmann's essay in Glauben und 
Verstehen, IV, pp.' l13ff., 'Der Gottesgedanke und der 
moderne Mensch', which now appears in World Come of Age, 
ed. Gregor Smith,·pp. 256ff., 'The Idea of God and 
Modern Man', and I am told that Ebeling has recently 
written on the subject. 
10. 
re~uses the terror o~ responsible historical decision and 
chooses something less, the ~ormer (unspeakably the more 
dangerous) attempts to create ~or himsel~ and so bring 
under his own control, or 'Ver~Hgbarkeit', the situation 
be~ore it arises; that is, ~or him the coming situation, 
or 
1 
'der kommende Gott', the God, who comes, is always 
assimilated to the pattern o~ the past, as his legal cunning 
has codified it. Thus he too, in Angst, seeks to avoid the 
2 terror, though precisely in the terror lies his .freedom. 
And it is at this point that the situation o~ the 
categorical imperative su~~ers the religious metamorphosis. 
Con~ronted by total demand the victim is shown to have been 
and to be irresponsible; in traditional terms, a sinner. 
~ 
Accepting the irresponsibility o~ the past ~ deciding to 
respond to the demand o~ the present, he ~inds himself no 
longer repelled by the situation, but held by it, no longer 
so much under responsibility as in freedom, under demand 
as receiving a gift, under judgement as in grace. Utterly 
detached ~rom his past, taken out o~ the world (entweltlicht), 
he is free to be ~ully concerned with the coming present. 
1. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, III, p. 90; 
p. 121. 
c~. ibid., 
2. cf. Fuchs, ~, 1956, p. 217 {cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, 
p. 18 (tr. Gregor 'Smith - privately, ~or·Seminar use): 
I ••• that la man has found in the same God whom he 
otherwise flees, 'or should ~lee, a refuge which he now 
loves l .' 
11. 
Such a situation may be approximately created in many 
ways. It is created par excellence when it is qualified 
by Jesus of Nazareth, or, more precisely, qualified by the 
verbum, or verbum visibile, in which Jesus Christ is 
preached. And this is such a way that the many ways are 
radically negated, . then radically affirmed. By the 
ultimate communication, or act, the penultimate ways are 
totally destroyed and completely made. Along these lines 
what Christianity is is this: that by the existence of 
Jesus of Nazareth my existence is decisively qualified in 
such a way that my responsibility for others is radicalised; 
this responsibility is freedom. 
The term existence in the above definition includes 
both word and act. So that speaking of present existence 
it would be as true to say that my existence is decisively 
qualified by the acts of my fellow Christians as to say by 
the words, or 'Yord, of my fellow Chri stians. For I am 
qualified neither by the acts alone nor by the words alone, 
but by both. Or, my existence (act and word) is qualified 
by the existence (act and. word) of others. 
It would be inadequate to say that I am qualified by 
'. the acts alone, for acts are in themselves ambiguous. In 
order to understand an act I must know what the person who 
acted meant, or, in Collingwood's terms, I must know not 
only the 'outside' of an act but its 'inside,.l An act 
1. The Idea of History, p. 213. 
12. 
of itself requires words to explain it. At the same time 
to speak alone of a word is an abstraction. A concrete 
Word, if the term be accepted, can only occur in the 
context either of a completed act or an act to be completed. 
Thus to avoid the danger of speaking either of an act alone 
Which, 't"li thout words to explain it, is ambiguous, or of a 
word alone, which is an abstraction, the term existence has 
been chosen to cover both. In the context of Christian 
eXistence the words, or kerygma,. are the expression of such 
It 
acts as have been done or are to be done. This is to 
fOllow the lead of Macmurray in his sUbstitution for the 
self as thinker of the self as agent - though not to go so 
far as he does when he describes thought as the 'negative' 
a t t o 1 spec of ac 1on. It could also be maintained (pace 
Ebeling)2 that Bonhoeffer too tends in this direction, away 
from the primacy of word to the primacy of act. Or is it 
that there is some more fundamental reason for the stress 
on 'word' in Protestantism, 'word' usually with capital 
letter? 
Such is a brief and skeletal sketch of the root terms 
''{hich are necessarily involved in an examination o:f the 
-
.. 
1. The Self as A~ent and Persons in Relation, The Gif:ford 
Lectures, 1953. For 'thought as the 'negative' aspect 
of action', v. The Self as Agent, p. 89. 
2. In Wort und Glaube, 'Die 'nicht-religiBse 
Interpretation biblischer Begriffe", pp. 90f:f. 
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concept of kerygma: history as the study of the actions of 
men in the past, theology as the study of those actions of 
men which can simultaneously be regarded as acts of God, 
or, in Dultmann's terms, that history which is paradoxically 
identical with eschatology; that is to say, that history 
which is decisively qualified by the existence of Jesus of 
Nazareth, or, more precisely, qualified by the acts of the 
believing community or, respectively, by the language in 
which those acts are expressed, i.e. kerygma. 
~hypothesis dogmatically stated 
If the Gospels are not simply history, but language 
about God's act in history, a 'Veranschaulichung', or 
illustrating, of the lvords: eeo, nv €;V XPLO'ttp, I the language 
of' Kierkegaard's 2 'absolute paradox', then, in so far as the 
New Testament critic works merely historically, he is 
stepping outside of the paradox. He may do this, of course, 
as a deliberate scientific restriction. Then blessed is 
he, if he knows what he is doing. 
'vi thin these two language-games, there are appropriate 
~ays of talking which must not be confused. Within the 
historical, it is legitimate to speak of historical facts. 
~ithin the theological it is appropriate to speak of beliefs. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-1. 2 Cor. 5:19. 
2. Philosophical Fragments. 
14. 
The object about which the believer speaks is not accessible 
to the historian qua historian, for the God himself must 
give the condition. l In Collingwood's terms in his Essay 
on Netaphysics, the metaphysician's statements must always 
be prefaced by 'the metaphysical rubric: I bel~e 
that ••• ,.2 Such statements are not inferred from 
evidence. They are posited, or 'absolutely presupposed'. 
If the language of the Gospels is not simply 
historical, nor on the other hand is it simply 
eschatological. The catalyst of faith has produced a new 
insoluble compound. The attempt to speak either simply 
historically or simply eschatologically ends either in 
Ebionitism or in Docetism. In other words, the apparently 
Contradictory, paradoxical, absurd opposition of infinite 
and finite, ultimate and penultimate, eschatology and 
history, however the opposita be expressed, are united in 
the 'Verkfindigungsakt', in the kerygma, in a new 
Coincidentia. It is precisely this attempt to break the 
compound, to divide the coincidence, into which Dodd falls 
Vlhen he speaks of 'the facts. of the death and resurrection' 
Or 'the historical section of the kerygma,3 (the attempt to 
1. Cf. Kie!kegaard, op.cit., pp. l26f. 
2. p. 187. The notion of. 'the metaphysical rubric t is 
introduced on p. 55. 
3. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 13 and p. 47, 
respectively. 
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1 
walk over seventy thousand fathoms with one's feet on a 
sandbank) • 
The language of the Gospels, from the historian's 
point of view, is, as it were, the language of an inflated 
balloon. The historian, when he is quite clear about the 
distinction between historical facts and theological 
beliefs, can emerge from engagement with the Gospels only 
with a few scraps of rubber. 'Once a man has been deified, 
he has forfei ted his humani ty for. good and all.' 2, 
Historically his results can only be minimal. 
But there are two valuable results of a historical 
examination of the Gospels. In the first place, such a' 
procedure proves quite conclusively that history is not the 
theologian's task. In the second place, it proves quite 
conclusively that the Jewish language-game is a time-
conditioned jest, for their language of paradox is not ours. 
The superb hyperbole of myth and legend leads more surely 
,to confusion than to the clarification of \vhat existence 
l11eans. 
According to this analysis by which mythology has been 
introduced, we are now concerned with three language-games: 
1. Kierkegaard, 1, 111, A, 161 (Cit. Lowrie, Kierkegaard, 
Vol. 2, p. 317). ' 
'2. Strauss, Der alte un'd der neue Glaube, 1872, 2nd edn., 
p. 76 (cit. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkftndigung, 
p. 22) (my tr.). 
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the historical, the mythological and the theological. Each 
o£ these requires some explanation. 
First, the historical. The fact that the language of 
the Gospels is not historical can be demonstrated by the 
paucQUS remains that are left after a thoroughgoing 
critical examination of the documents as historical evidence. 
Certainly, not all scholars find only paucous remains, but 
the question arises here as to whether these scholars 
manage to retain what they do because they are working with 
~ . 
such theological presuppositions as prevent them from 
treating the evidence with a critical faculty that, being 
absolutely unreserved, is prepared to be led where it has no 
wish to go. This ~udgement is based on the fact that form-
criticism has for the most part found in the Anglo-Saxon 
world no place where it can lay its head, apart from. 
tentative beginnings, not in the Gospels (apart from 
Nineham)l but in the Epistles. 2 In the Bultmannian wing 
o£ New Testament scholarship, when the theology of the early 
ChUrch and mythical and legendary accretions have been 
SUbtracted, the average remainder of genuine logia amounts 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 .• e.g. The GOs}e1 or St. Mark (The Pe1ican Gospe1 
Commentaries. v. esp. Nineham's Introduction. 
e.g. Moule, The Birth of the New Testament. I am 
indebted to Prof. K~semann for this observation. 
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to some tenl and o£ actions o£ Jesus the insubstantial 
shadows outlined by Bultmann. 2 Those who hesitate be£ore 
form-criticism see only too clearly that to make a start 
here is to set one's £eet on the primrose path that leads 
by a £acilis descensus to the 'mere that,.3 The meagre 
results obtained £rom the attempt to treat the Gospels 
historically, to say nothing o£ their uncertainty, has 
every right to raise the question whether the attempt is not 
, ., ~ 4 
misconceived, not a ~e~a~aaL' eL, [XXo y~vo" whether 
It 
history is not the wrong £orm o£ thought. 
Second, the mythological. Negatively, the de£inition 
of the language o£ the Gospels as mythological creates 
Space for the assertion that myth is not historical event. 
1. This is said to be the estimate o£ K~semann. When I had 
occasion ~o put the question to him, he did not deny it, 
nor yet, it is true, con£irm it. 
2. In SAH, 1960, p. 11. 
3. For a reference to the 'mere that' v. Bultmann, ibid., 
p. 9. Re£erences to the 'blosse Dass' occur frequently 
in Bultmann's writings. Cf. also the similar phrase of 
Conzelmann there cited (f.n. 10): 'das nackte 
Dagewesensein Jesu', which occurs in EQQ, 3, Sp. 651, 
in Gonzelmann's now famous article 'Jesus Christus'. 
But Henderson, Rudolf Bultmann (Makers of Contemporary 
Theology), p. 46, appeals - rightly, to my mind - for 
what may be called a 'blosse Wie' and supports his plea 
wi th evidence from Bultmann' s own '\vri tings. I follow 
this view by insisting (v. infra) not only that Jesus 
was, but that he was· for others. For the latter 
£ormulation v. f.n. ad loc. 
4. Aristotle, Analyt.Post., 1, 7. 
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Accordingly it is misplaced to sound for sandbanks in the 
Sea of Galilee,l on the other hand pertinent to search for 
the dead man's bones. 2 Positively, it points the way to 
a religious language which is appropriate to the present 
situation. For mythology in the Gospels is merely the 
eXpression of first-century syncretistic religiosity. 
And the question: tHow did they speak]' cannot be allowed to 
suppress - as in Biblical Theology - the question: 'How am 
I to speak!' 
Third, the (contemporary) theological. The first 
POsition here to be maintained is that the language of God 
and man can be expressed with complete adequacy either 
anthropologically or theologically. That is, that the 
same event which can be expressed physically, psycho-
logically, historically or philosophi?a11y is at the same 
time and identically open to be understood as act of God, 
as miracle. 3 This is Buif:mann's'stark assertion,4 that 
1. 
J. 
4. 
I allude to such explanations as that of Paulus, author 
of Das Leben Jesu als Grundlage einer reinenGeschichte 
des Urchristentums, 1828, whose explanation is 
summarised by Schwatzer, The Quest of the Historical 
Jesus, p. 52, as follows: 'Jesus walked along the shore, 
and in the mist was taken for a ghost by the alarmed and 
exci ted occupants of the boat •. , 
Cf. Gregor Smith, Secular Christianitx, p. 103. 
i. e., in the terms o·f Bul tmann' s essay, Glauben und 
Verstehen, 1, pp. 2l4ff·., 'Zur Frage des 'vunders', 
'Wunder', not 'Mirakel'. 
Macquarrie, The Scope of Demytholorising , p. 43 (cit. 
Ogden, Christ without Nyth, p. 203 • 
· 19. 
'the question of God and the question of myself are 
identical.',l which, as Ogden insists, does not mean (as 
Macquarrie understands it) that 'if religion always 
involves human existence then a religious question must be 
at least in part an existential question'. As Ogden 
P . 2 olonts out: 'He (Bultmann) does not say that the 
religious question is in part an existential question, but 
that the two questions are in fact one and the same'. 
Further, if one, in answer to Bultmann's statement that, 
because 'every assertion about God is simultaneously an 
-assertion about man and vice versa', Paul's theology 'is 
~~ appropriately presented as the doctrine of man',3 
accepts Ogden's counter-statement that 'one might equally 
Well conclude that Paul't theology may best be presented as 
the doctrine of GOd',4 then the possibilities of religious 
language are twofold, theology in the strict sense and 
anthropology as a theological transcript without remainder. 
That is, as it were, human existence or existential 
analYsis as reverse, God or theology as obverse. 
But before this point is developed, an insertion should 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
.. 1.. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 53. 
2. of. ci t. ~. _ p. 203. 
3. Theology of the New Testament, Vol. 1, p. 191, tr. 
Grobel. 
4. op.cit., p. 173. 
" . 
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here be made. If Ebeling is right in observing that 
theistic conviction is on the wane, if Bonhoeffer's plea for 
1 
'the non-religious interpretation of religious concepts' 
is 'zeitgemAss', and if such attempts as those of van 
Buren, Braun and others to understand faith anthropolo-
gically and. historically have a particular relevance for 
the contemporary situation, then, on the one hand, one must 
recognise the legitimacy of Bultmann's 'most appropriately 
as the doctrine of man' and, on the.other, that this is an 
It 
axial point where our own situation differs both from that 
of the reformers and of Kierkegaard, for whom the concepts 
of God, the infinite and eternal happiness could with less 
impossibility be presupposed. Atheism is no new phenomenon, 
but the 'atheist theologian' is. And the atheist 
theologian has been called into being by the death of God, 
obsequies celebrated not alone by a group, like the 
sophists, but by a Civilisation. This is the differential 
mark which gives our Olffl historical situation its peculiar 
Character. 
But what is the consequence of an anthropological or 
historical understanding? Does this not abolish the 
----,---------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Cf. Letters and Pa ers from Prison, p. 156, where 'die 
Formel klingt zum erstenmal' Ebeling, 'fort und Glaube, 
p. 91, f.n. 2.) For further information v. Ebeling's 
footnote. 
I 
I 
i 
i 
distinction that was claimed above to be nodal between 
history as 'the actions of men in the past' and theology 
as a non-mythological 'G8ttergeschichte', the act or acts 
o~ God in history? 
S 
lfuat faith asserts il that the apparently hair-line 
difference between history and theology or alternatively 
between history and an implicitly theological anthropology 
is the straw that breaks the back of the world or changes 
the shirt of Nessus into the assertions of Lady Julian of 
Norwich,l or transposes history into law and Christian 
existence into freedom, or ontological possibility into a 
possibility in fact. The substitution by Paul for ~~ 06 
eyw of ~lil oe OV')(~'t L eyw 2 turns as i t were morali ty on .i t s 
head and religion takes its place. So that the last word 
to man is not what he does or should do, but what is done 
to him. Thus Bultmann's statement: 'Only those who are 
loved are capable of 10ving;3 becomes the articulus stantis 
et cadentis theologiae. 
But would it still not be enough to say that Jesus of 
Nazareth had loved with a love still active according to 
1." I allude to T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, Faber & Faber, 
pp. 4lf • 
.. ' 
2. Gal. 2: 20. And cf. 1 Cor. 15:10. 
3. Kerygma and Nyth, 1, tr. Fuller, p. 32. 
" . 
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Croce's 'all history is contemporary history,l or 
2 Collingwood's doctrine of a 'living past'? This would be 
the simple historical vie~, a Christocentric humanism. 
The counter-question is to ask whether it is adequate to 
the sources to remove Jesus from the paradoxical context 
of the (30.0 C, At;' a.. In other words, the history of Jesus can 
be demythologised and written 'etsi deus non daretur' (as 
if God were not given), but can it be written without 
Bonhoeffer's concluding coram Deo?J. 
That is: the Heideggerean and Christian understandings 
of existence do not differ :in their ontological analyses, 
but in that the Christian claims that the ontological 
possibility becomes an ontic possibility, or possibility in 
fact, only because it is firmly anchored in a history which 
is paradoxically sUpposed to be identical with an act of 
GOd. A Christian anthropology in terms, negatively, of 
'radikale Unverfagbarkeit', a radical acceptance that 
things .are not 'in one's own control; and, positively, of 
'radikale Offenheit far die Zukunft', radical openness to 
1. The phrase is Collingwood's (The Idea of History, 
p. 202) in his summary of Croce's thought. 
2. e.g. An Autobiography, p. 97. 
. 3. 
t •. 
op.cit., p. 196: 'And w'e cannot be honest unless we 
recognize that we have to live in the world etsi deus 
non daretur. And this is just what we do recognize -
before God!' 
ir 
j: 
1 the future, cannot divorce itself from the decisive 
existence of the Jesus who stood paradoxically related to 
the fJa.a c, 'Ae Co.. Thus ontologically the Christian and 
philosophical analysis are without remainder. The 
difference is ontic. And it is all important. 
So much having been said about the anthropological 
obverse, the question now arises concerning the theological 
reverse. 
The language of the Gospels, regarded theologically in 
the stricter sense, is analogical language. By the 
language of the Gospels is meant here not how it is, for 
that is mythology, but how it is to be interpreted. That 
is, analogy is not used to describe historically, but is 
chosen as Mhermeneutic tool. That is, the transition has 
been made from the Dogmengeschichte of early Christianity 
to the appropriate method of a modern dogmatic. Further, 
as the term analogy is being used within Christian 
discourse the analogia is analogia fidei, not analogia 
I 
entis. Whichlatter contention requires further explanation. 
I 
1. The thought, if not this precise terminology, is 
H Bultmann's; cf. Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 172: 'der 
Mensch ist nicht sein eigener Herr; so hat auch der 
Christ sich nicht in der Verfllgung ••• 1; and ibid., 
p. 148: IIm .. Glauben wird das Jetzt dadurch, da;;-wir die 
Offenbarung anerkennen, "frei von der Vergangenheit, vom 
Tode, wird die ZUkunit er6ffn~t.1 But the idea occurs 
passim. 
24.' 
Regarding the Gospels in their aspect as analogy, one 
could say, for example: 
so God lodges with men. 
1 As Jesus lodged with Zacchaeus, 
This is, however, apparently, to 
draw an analogy not from a possible human situation (ol' av 
~4~OL~O), as the story of the Prodigal Son, but from what 
did happen (~d yev6~eva)~ the actions of anhistorical 
person, Jesus. For if one says: 'As Jesus lodged with 
Zacchaeus', is this not to fall back into historical speech, 
so that one would have, on the one hand, an historical' fact 
(Jesus lodged with Zacchaeus), from ~hich on the other hand 
one could then draw an eschatological analogy: 'So God 
lodges with men'? And this would be to break what was 
above called the insoluble compound of theological speech 
into Dodd's dualism of 'eschatological interpretation' and 
'the facts of the ministry of Jesus,.3 
Once again, however, one is saved by form-criticism 
from the threat of aohistorical fact. The story is not 
1. Lk. 19: 1 - 10 • 
2. Aristotle, Poetics, l45lb. 
3. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 45. I find myself, later 
in this essay, after the hypothe:sis of the 'insoluble 
compound' of historical and eschatological speech has 
been dropped, asserting precisely the same 'dualism' 
(which I then call 'paradox'). It is later, esp. in 
Essay 11, made clear that Dodd and I do not disagree 
that there is a 'dualism', but on where the distinction 
"between eschatology and 'the facts' is to be drawn. 
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history but 'clearly anfl 'ideal scene', a further developed 
variant of Mk. 2:14,.1 The historical difficulty, however, 
goes a stage further, for by treading, with some vigour, 
the wax fruit of 'ideal scenes', there is distilled_after 
all the unadulterated wine of history - unless the 
metaphorical confusion of created kinds does not after all 
suggest a more profound confusion of forms of thought. 
For, though 'with some caution', Bultmann himself admits 
'fellowship ~ith outcasts like tax-gatherers and fallen 
women' • 
2 Thus the argument moves~ill sway from the 
analogia fidei in the direction of an analogia entis, or, 
better, as historical, an analogia facti. 
We have at any rate ~historical fact on our hands. 
The question is whether this historical- fact is 
theologically relevant. 
But (in parenthesis to the main argument) supposing 
the theologian does make historical statements, then they 
must be judged by normal historical criteria. Theological 
talking may to a historian be absurd. But the theologian, 
if he talks history, must talk historical sense. That is, 
if he leaves his own proper form of thought, he is then 
subject to the canons of the t~XAO Y6YO,' he has adopted. 
",1. Bultmann, Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition, p. 34 
(my tr.). 
2. Bultmann,~, 1960, p. 11 (tr. Gregor Smith). 
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Thus if the theologian supposes that an Iranian myth is the 
record of a historical event, the historian can well point 
out the historical absurdity. It is in this sense that 
'science should. be to religion and the Church like the 
waters of the sea in Keats' Sonnet, 
" at their priestlike task 
of pure ablution round Earth's human shores.",l 
It is, then, possible to treat the Gospels as historical 
evidence. Where in this process historical facts are 
discovered they are subject ~o historical criteria. But 
2 
whereas the Gospels may be 'tortured', in Bacon's phrase, 
to reveal historical facts, they were not written as 
historical accounts, but as kerygmatic documents. They were 
not written as Geschichte and must be treated as 
Dogmengeschichte. What Collingwood writes of Sumerian 
historiography, could apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Gospels: 
'The knowledge furthered by such a record is not, or at any 
rate is not primarily, man's knowledge of man"but man's 
knowledge of the gods,.3 The problem of theology, as he 
writes elsewhere,4 is relating ~ a finitefact to the 
infinite - or, perhaps better, it is not his problem, for 
1. von HUgel, Selected Letters, Editor's Memoir, p. 38. 
2. Bacon's metaphor is recorded, without reference, by 
Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 237. 
3. ibid., p. 12. 
4. I cannot now locate this reference. 
27. 
1 this would, in Bonhoeffer's terms, be to fall back from 
the question 'Who' to the question 'How', but his 
presupposition; it is something from which he argues, not 
2 to which he argues. 
But to return; when the Gospels speak analogically, 
are they drawing analogies from what Jesus did (history) or 
from what God did in Jesus (theology)? And, of course, 
this theological statement is complicated by the twofold 
nature of theological method. For theology may either 
(a) study what God did in Jesus - theology in the strict 
sense, or (b) - the anthropo1ogi6a1 transcript - study and 
explain the believed fact that Jesus, being wholly free from-
the past and so ,completely open for the future was free to 
act in total responsibility to situations as they arose, or, 
more simply, as van Buren, that Jesus was a 'remarkably 
free man,.3 
The analogy that is spoken of here is not analogia 
facti (what Jesus did in the past) but analogia fidei (what 
God did in Jesus, or, anthropologically, on the basis of 
1. Wer ist und ~er war Jesus Christus? pp. llff. Esp. 
- p. 14: 'Die Frage nach dem 'Wert ist die Frage nach der 
Transzendenz. Die Frage nach dem 'Wier ist die nach 
der Immanenz. I 
2~ Cf. Dodd, op.cit., p. 12: 'It is not something for which 
Paul argues, but something from which he argues ••• 1 
J. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, p. 121. 
28. 
the fact that Jesus was a remark~bly free man}. It is 
analogy not based on historical facts, but on the dentral 
paradox of faith. And it is analogia fidei for this reason, 
namely that the statement is not as such historically 
demonstrable, either in its theological or in its 
anthropological form. That God acted in Jesus could be 
historically proven only apparently as when the Gospels 
speak in the objectifying language of demonstrable epiphany. 
But this is mythology. In the case of the transcript, the 
problem is somewhat more difficult. What the historian 
could prove with some caution is that in comparison with 
contemporary Judaism such logia as Mk. 2:27 (if genuine) and 
7:15 (if genuine) suggest a singular freedom of action. 
What he could not prove is that the fact is certain, the 
freedom absolute and by Jesus not created but received. 
But if no historically certain instance can be given, 
has the theologian not left the dust and heat of history for 
the hygienic but unliving room of abstraction? On the 
contrary, the central theological assertion is precisely 
that God £!2 act, in concreto, in terms of blood and bone, 
that Jesus, who existed once, was a remarkably free man. 
It is~not that the statement is not concrete, but that it 
is not demonstra,ble. Illustrations of the statement are 
... abundant. Evidence of its truth there is none. 
Accordingly the appropriate qu'estion to address to the 
29. 
Gospels is: what does the central paradox mean, as 
illustrated by this pericope? - and not: did what is 
recounted in this pericope take place in fact? The Gospel 
peri copes are then analogies or parables to illustrate the 
central paradox, and it is inappropriate or at any rate 
irrelevant to theological discourse to ask of any peri cope 
'But did it happen?' For this presupposes the separability 
of the two elements of theological language, the historical, 
that is, and the eschatological, which, in fact, never " 
appear separately, but only in the compound form created by 
the 'Verkfindigungsakt', the act of preaching. 
Christian faith is faith in the paradox that the 
historical event of Jesus of Nazareth is identical with the, 
eschatological event, that Jesus' historical existence was 
God's historical existence, And religious language, it 
was suggested, and it is especially the language of the 
Gospels that is here under consideration, can be either 
analogy based on this paradox or existential/anthropo-
logical interpretation, existen~e being again understood 
paradoxically as 'I .. yet not I, but Christ,.l 
A further complex of problems, connected with the 
religious language of paradox 'and analogy, may, in 
parenthesis, be a~luded to here. There is the question of 
the relation of analogical speech to the central paradox, 
1. Gal. 2: 20 • 
30 •.. 
the question in what way analogy can be based on a paradox. 
Further, is it enough to speak alone ~ the central 
paradox, for ~he paradox has, so to speak, many particular 
concretions: 'the blind see and the lame walk ••.• 1 - but fh~ 
blind and lame did not and do not; the walking on the. 
water, interpreted as: 'though Nero threaten, even burn 
2 
me, yet am I safe' - how is this to be understood in the 
light of the emperor's garden?3 Or, as eminent instance, 
the resurrection. Does this mean something like 
Wittgenstein's remark: 'the experience of feeling absolutely 
safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is inclined to 
. 4 
say "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens."'? 
Thus there remains outstanding how the analogies are related 
to the central paradox, how the 'little paradoxes' are 
related to the central paradox and the problem of 
determining the scope and limit of each kind of speech. 
! stated hypothesis dogmatically replaced 
In what sense are historical facts relevant or 
irrelevant to theology? It was asserted above that 
theological language is an insoluble compound 'of the 
1 • M t· • 11: 5 f • 
2 •.. Rawlinson, 
Commentaries , 
accordin to St. Mark (Westminster 
cit. Nineham, op.cit., p. 181). 
3. Tacitus, Annals, XV, 44, 6-7. 
4. Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p. 70, f.n. 
31 •. 
historical and the eschatological, a compound created by 
the 'Verktlndigungsakt'. But it is rather difficult to see 
just what kind of language this would be. The suspicion 
arises that there is merely being asserted an illegitimate 
chimaera, whose foreparts are historical, whose hindparts 
are eschatological and ,,,hose middle parts are a 
'Verktlndigungsakt' which connects 'the beast and gives it 
some sort of unity. But is the hypothesis zoologically 
viable? 
Another hypothesis, however, suggests itself, namely 
that theological language does not appear as an insoluble 
compound, but as a dialectical compound. This would mean 
that theological language does not appear as a unity, but 
as the apposition of two seemingly contradictory statements, 
a simple historical statement, the statement of anhistorical 
fact and an eschatologica~ interpretation - which however 
is not the same as an historical interpretation, if 
eschatology be understood as in some, not yet clarified, 
sense as the 'end' of 'history. In this case the admittance 
or historical facts within theological discourse would not 
but merely an abstraction 
-, 
Or an irrelevance if made outside an eschatological context. 
Thus one would s~y, what Jesus did (historical statement)l 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------). By 'historical' is not meant - and within this easay never 
is meant - the 'brute facts' of positivistic historio-
graphy, but an understood fact, in the sense of Dilthey 
and Collingwood, a fact, which has not only an 'outside', 
but an 'inside'. I regard positivistic historiography as 
a problem that nas been already settled. 
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was what God did (eschatological statement). Accordingly 
one would not say, as Kdhler, that historical facts and 
faith 'flow apart like oil and water',l but that being 
dialectically, or. paradoxically related they become not one 
simpliciter, but paradoxically' one in faith. Or, putting 
the matter with somewhat greater complexity, as the 
historical- Jesus was related paradoxically to the Kingdom 
of God (i.e. the historical facts concerning Jesus 
themselves stand in a paradoxical relation), so the history 
~ 
of the believer stands paradoxically related to God, or, 
my acts are, paradoxically, God's acts. 
If, on this new basis, the question is asked: in what 
sense are historical facts relevant to theology, an answer 
might run as follows. (a) If historical research could 
show that Jesus of Nazareth had never existed, then the 
centre of Christianity would be touched. (b) If historical 
research could show that Jesus' life were not, in any 
2 intelligible sense, a 'being there for others', then the 
centre of Christianity would be touched. This is to say 
that, ,in its aspect as historical, the Christ-event does 
not, like the Epicurean gods, or KHhler,s Chri~t, lie in a 
1. I am indebted to Prof. Gregor Smith for bringing this 
remark of Kghler to my notice. It is to be found in 
Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, 
biblische Christus, p. 51. 
2. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 209. 
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storm-free region beyond the 'flammantia moenia mundi',l 
but is indeed vulnerable to these two historical criteria. 
These criteria are, of course, negative; 
falsify, but could not verify. 
they could 
The first proposition could in principle be proven, 
though it must be admitted that the fact of Jesus' existence 
ought to be tolerably certain except to the most solipsist 
student. The second offers more ground to the sceptic. 
It might be with greater credibility suggested not only that 
Jesus, as Bultmann tastefully puts it, 'liked -to eat and 
drink a glass of wine· 2 but that he is to be identified 
more with the milieu of The Power and the Glory3 than as the 
practitioner of the sinlessness of orthodox doctrine; or, 
alternatively, that he was a paranoid fanatic. Whatever 
be thought of the eccentricity of these proposals, it is 
still in princip1e possible historically to demonstrate 
their truth and, if so, the centre of faith, it is claimed, 
would then be touched - unless to take the second objection 
seriously is to presuppose a Donatist conception of 
revelation. 
Despite the paucity of history in the Gospels, however, 
critical consensus suggests that neither of these proposals 
1. "Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1, 74. 
2. SAH, 1960, p. 11 (tr. Gregor Smith). 
3. The novel by Graham Greene. 
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is more than eccentric. It is certain enough, historically 
speaking, that Jesus existed once and certain enough that 
he was there for others. For is this latter point not 
proved by Dodd's observationl that between the Messianic 
conception of late JUdaism and that of early Christianity 
there is a difference which can only be explained by a~ 
historical career, ~nlessit be supposed that predications 
of the pre-existent fell down from above. 
But lest this emphasis on historical facts should be 
thought to lead away from the centre of the Gospel into 
2 
what Kierkegaard called the 'parenthesis', the 
labyrinthical byways of historical evaluation, that have -
alas - already given so much 'occasion for the writing of 
folios') it should be insisted that what it meant on any 
particular occasion for Jesus to have lived 'under the 
.. 4 
conditions of existence' of first-century Judaism is 
neither here nor there. What matters is that, historically, 
Jesus was there for others tin the humble figure of a 
servant',5 but that even if there was no evidence to prove 
1. History and the Gospel, p. 48. 
2. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 29. 
3. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 129. 
4. The phrase occurs in Tillich passim, e.g. Systematic 
Theology, 2, p. 126. 
5. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 1)0. 
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this, faith would have to assert it, as Mhistorical fact, 
and that, paradoxically, Jesus' historical existence was, 
in some sense, the historicity of God. The way in which 
love is at any time realised belongs to the ethical' 
commonplace of mankind, that there are at no time any limits 
that I can place to what love may demand of me, and this can 
1 be studied as well from the Sage Mo as from Jesus. The 
Gospel consists not merely in that anything may be demanded 
but also, and primarily, in that everything is given. 
Disputationes 
What has been written above is a.n attempt to set out 
a series of categories, on the basis of which an adequate 
and consistent theology might be constructed. And this 
has been done, if not with the aim, certainly with the 
result not of solving difficulties, but of indicating where 
they lie. The next step will be, on this basis and with 
the aim of illuminating the concept of kerygma, .to sketch 
a critique of the theologies of Dodd a.nd Bultmann, again in 
such a way that criticisms will merely be indicated which 
only a fuller treatment could demonstrate. 
1. Bouquet, The Christian Faith and Non-Christia.n Religions, 
P .• 91, wri tes: .. 'Anyone can see that 'graded love' as 
practised by the Confucians is incompatible with the 
... practice of Christian a.ya.?Cf), but it is by no means 
impossible to argue successfully that the jienai of Mo 
comes very close to it.' 
First the work of Dodd requires examination in the 
f 
light of the question in what sense the theologian is 
interested in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. Of 
fundamental importance here is the distinction between 
what is historically necessary and what is historically 
interesting. The danger, if the distinction is not made, 
is the 'parenthesis', of entering upon a multiplic;tty of facts 
no less numerous than it was promised to the children of 
Israel to become, whose certainty ebbs and flows with the 
It 
tide of dissertations under the moving moon of the 
contemporary Zeitgeist. On the presupposition that only 
f tofJ1 
the purity of the 'that' can saveAthe wilderness of the 
'how', it might be pertinent to ask to what extent History 
in the Fourth Gospel, for example, is historically 
interesting, to what extent theologically relevant. 
Secondly, if the theologian is concerned on the one 
hand with history and on the other hand with the paradoxical 
interpretation of this history,i.e. eschatology, it is all 
important where the line is drawn' between them. \ilien Dodd 
I Speaks of the 'facts of the life and ministry of Jesus' he 
has a certain estimation of what those facts are, which 
varies-from what is merely conservative to what is 
2 dangerously, but not scandalously, absurd. 
1. The .. Apostolic Preaching, p. 30. 
Two quotations 
2. Etymologised, of course, from Kierkegaard's understanding 
of the 'skandalon' or 'offence'. 
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should suffice: •• so Jesus heals the blind and the 
deaf, and restores strength to the palsied and life to the 
1 dead' • That Jesus healed is anhistorical fact, but it 
could neverthe~ess with justification be maintained that 
the above statement, not only in its conclusion but in its 
length, is, on one level, totally legendary and, on another, 
purely eschatological. (2) 'They ••• insisted upon the 
crude actuality of the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus. sub Pontio Pilato while affirming that in these 
historical facts the eternal God Himself . . . had acted for 
2 the salvation of man.' To include the resurrection as M 
historical fact is to fall into Paul's error of 1 Cor. lS.3 
The implication :for New Testament scholarship of the 
distinction between the directness of paganism and the 
inwardness of Christianity4 needs examination. 
Thirdly, how does Dodd understand eschatology? If 
Eliade is rightS in maintaining that mythological thinking 
is essentially circular and that the genius of Hebrew 
1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 49. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
,,' 
S. 
History and the Gospel, p. 14. 
I"am assuming the justice of Bultmannts criticism, 
Glauben und Verstehen, 1, pp. 38ff., 'Karl Barth, "Die 
Auferstehung der Toten It •• 
For the distinction v. Kierkegaard, ConcludinR 
Unscientific Postscript, pp. 218-20. 
op.cit. 
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thinking was to break out of the bonds of the paradigmatic, 
atemporal situation into the unpatterned historical moment 
as the place l'lhere reali ty is met, then the Christian 
philosophy can only be adequately expressed in terms of 
the temporaltty of Godl or the historicity of man. And 
what is true of mythology is no less true of philosophical 
idealism, in which existence slips back~ard into the 
timeless abyss of anamnesis. 2 It is relevant to ask 
whether Dodd does not in fact work wi thin a form of Plat,onic 
" idealism with the result 'that he understands the concept 
of eschatolo6Y in the sense of timelessness, and 
consequently his 'realised eschatology' contradicts the 
nature both of eschatology and of a present that is, without 
the future, unintelligible. To that extent it is neither 
,'eschatology' nor 'realised', but rather a dogmatically 
asserted dialectic of time and eternity which makes use of 
paradox as its basis and hermeneutic too1.,3 
Lastly there is the problem common to both Dodd and 
Bultmann of the relation of kerygma and kerygmata. 
1. The allusion is to Ogden's essay in Zeit und Geschichte 
(Dank~sgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag), 
ed. DinkIer, pp. 381ff., 'The Temporality of God'. 
2. v.' Kierkegaard, 'Philosophica1 Fragments • 
... . 
3. JHngel, Paulus und Jesus, pp. 115f. (my tr.). 
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Contemporary scholarship works with fourl sociological 
units, namely Jesus and the disciples, the Palestinian, 
the Je\vish-Hellenistic and the heathen-Hellenistic 
communities. Each'of these had its own distinctive 
kerygma and theology. In what s'ense are they identical? 
Or, working on the other hand with particular authors, in 
what sense is the theology of Mark, for example, identical 
with that of Paul or John? A hydra-headed complex of 
problems of this magni tude, a complex perhaps tradi tional,ly 
It 
subsumed under the title, 'Scripture and Tradition', but 
which, with the refinement of Traditionsgeschichte, can no 
longer be regarded as occurring between the canon and what 
follows it, but as a process taking place within the New 
Testament itself, can only be solved by, a method of 
'divide et imperate But, on the most general level, the 
problem is to do justice to both elements ,of the dialectic 
of change and continuity within the New Testament and, 
mutatis mutandis, beyond it. The problem of the relation 
between Chalcedon'and the Westminster Confession is a 
palpable one. Quite as acute is the relation between, say, 
the ?-1are-Kyriology of the Palestinian communi ty and the 
Kyrios-cult of the Hellenistic community.2 Is adequate 
1. I .. should, perhaps, have saiq.: 'some contemporary 
~.scholarship •• , The matter is taken ~p again in Essay 
IV, .. where I cite Hahn Christologische H~heitstitel, pp. 
llf., and Fuller, The NT in Current Study, p. 84. 
2~ e.g. Hahn, op.cit., pp. 67ff., chap. entitled: 'Kyrios'. 
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justice done to the element of change by speaking of the 
continuity of eschatological self-understanding (Bultmann),l 
by regarding the formulation as variable, and the self-
understanding of faith as constant {Braun)2 or by speaking, 
as Dodd, of the one kerygma which is decisively 
reinterpreted3 - how does it then remain the one kerygma? 
Implied here is that two questions must be clearly 
distinguished: (1) the past-historical question: What did 
Mark, for example, consider to be the centre of the GospelJ 
~ (2) the present-historical question: What does the exegete 
consider to be the centre of the Gospel? The question of 
1. This is, I hope, fair comment on ~, 1960, but it 
somewhat misses the point. For Bultmann's aim is so to 
stress the discontinuity between the preaching of Jesus 
and the preaching of the early church, that Jesus remains 
a Jew (pp. Bf.) and his message the presupposition of 
Christian theology (not denied:p. B. For the original 
statement v. Theology of the NT, tr. Grobel, p. 3: 'The 
message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of 
the New Testament rather than a part of that theology 
itself.'). As for the relation between subsequent 
kerygmata (a term which Bultmann does not use) his 
practice is (e.g. Glauben und Verstehen, Ill, pp. 131ff., 
'Die Wandlung des SelbstverstAndnisses der Kirche im 
Urchristentum') to use the theology (a) of the Palestinian 
community and (b) of Paul (with the possible addition of 
John) as a norm by which Luke and subsequent 'early 
Catholicism' are measured' and found wanting. ~ut the 
question whether the norm itself can be said to change 
is, ~s~ far as I know, not discussed by Bultmann. 
2. S fitOHdisch-hAretischer und frffhchristlicher 
Radikalismus, 11; 115-136 cit. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, 
p. 22). Cf. also the important latter essays in 
Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt. 
3. The argument of The Apostolic PreaChing. v. ,esp. Dodd's 
summary: pp. 74f. 
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the unity of the New Testament, or the kerygma of the New 
Testament, is in itself meaningless. It can only be 
answered by a process of scientific abstraction, by reducing 
a series of unharmonisable centres to a lowest common 
denominator. The only sense in which it could have meaning 
is to ask the past-historical question: what did those who 
formed the canon consider to be the centre of the Gospel? 
The question of how then kerygma is formed can be 
answered only by asking on the one hand what the preacher 
~ 
understands of his tradition and on the other by asking 
what he understands of his situation and thirdly by asking 
what he then says. If he merely repeats the tradition or 
merely adapts himself to the situation,he will be 
executing the movements of a foreshortened understanding of 
~is historicity. Thus it could be demonstrated that 
neither Luther nor Barth on Romans, nor Dodd nor Bultmann 
on eschatology are merely repeating their original sources, 
but what each on the basis of a dialogue with the past 
considers to be the answer to his own situation. 
Thus if the historicity of the kerygma is to be taken 
seriously, continuity can never be asserted without 
asserting~discontinuity nor kerygma without asserting 
kerygmata. Or, in ~ther words the assertion of identity 
is ~lways a paradoxical assertion. For the kerygma can 
never remain the same without becoming something else. 
And further as a new kerygma can never be simply derived 
42. 
either· from tradition or from the situation in which it 
comes to be, the only possible criterion that can be had 
1 is by a duly reflective recourse to the Holy Ghost. 
And then Gamaliel's caution is salutary. 2 
Of solutions to what Ogden mi'ght call 'the main 
theological problem of our time,3 Bultmann's is the least 
quickly intelligible, the most quickly misunderstood and 
the most worth understanding. For Barth speaks of God, 
biblical theology offers an archaelogy, redesigned, it is 
It 
true, for high-Mach numbers, and Dodd remains swound in the 
ideal clothes of the emperor Plato. But the question 
relevant to Bultmann's theology is whether the paradox, 
which Hasenhftttl4 alleges is not radically sustained in 
ecclesiology, is in the right manner sustained at the 
,church's origin. 
"-
The desiderandum is a theology with, on the one hand, 
as firm a grasp on history as Pannenberg or Richardson, and 
on the other hand on an eschatology which flies firmly 
under the banner of an ontological analysis of temporality, 
1. Ebeling, Theologie und VerldlndigunB', p. 38 (my tr.), 
adapte.d • 
2. Ac. 5:39. 
3. "op.cit., p. 20. 
4. Der Glaubensvollzug, pp. 323ff. 
conducted on phenomenological principles. l 
But what Bultmann has done in order to quit himself of 
the interminable parenthesis of Jesus-research, which is, 
to be sure, nothing more than·the miserable subterfuge of 
those who cannot face the present, is to shift the paradox 
from Jesus to the kerygma, so that the curious post-
Schweitzer situation arises in which Dodd realised 
eschatology in the life of Jesus and Bultmann in the kerygma. 
It is tempting to suppose that the problem can only 
If 
adequately be solved by positing the paradoxical identity of 
Dodd's and Bultmann's theologies. Or, more simply, to ask 
how Bultmann's theology would appear after a structural 
transposition of the paradox into the life of Jesus. 
But does not Bultmann already say this? The danger of 
attempting to criticise Bultmann is that on the whole the 
critic finds himself wrestling not with reality but with a' 
mythical river deity,2 wrestling with his own illusions 
about what Bultmann has neither said nor implied or offering 
1. This phrase is modelled on the terminology of K6rner, 
Eschatologie und Geschichte, pp. 69ff., where he describes, 
briefly, the position of Heidegger and, more or less, 
Bultmann. I say 'more or less', because I ••• nun 
vollzieht Bltm. den Schritt von der Philosophie zur 
Theologie, indem er an die Stelle des Nichts Gott, an 
die Stelle des Todes das Hberempirische Leben bzw. 
Christus setzt.I ... (K6rner, .!.!2.!!!., p. 71) . 
... 
2. Gen •. 32:22ff. 
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objections which were already answered in the rosy-£ingered 
dawn o£ demythologising. And were one to appeal to the 
existence o£ the New Quest, as an indication o£ structural 
inconsistency in Bultmann's thought,l it would be replied 
that as a phenomenon this is no less ambiguous than any 
other 'vor£indliches Phdnomen', phenomenon that one comes 
across. It could merely be the cries o£ those tormented 
by their inability to exist in Bultmann's thinking. However, 
i£ it were to be done it were well that it were done without 
either £alling foul o£ historicism or o£ the attempt to 
restitute a mythology now so thread-bare that it a££ords 
what has traditionally been called salvation only to the 
vanishing island o£ adherents who are unwilling to or unable 
to understand the ontological analysis of temporality 
qonducted on phenomenological principles. As Paul said, 
and rightly, 
., 2 
'not all have.yvOaL~'. 
With the above preliminaries in mind the attempt will 
now be made £irst to make the problem more precise, secondly 
to o££er some remarks in the direction of historical 
clari£ication and thirdly to discuss in what sense the life 
of Jesus, his existence and preaching might have theological 
legitimati~n. 
1. ~. the reply o£ Ogden and Harvey, ZThK, 59 (1962), 46-87, 
to Robinson, The New Quest of the Historical Jesus •. 
2. 1 Cor. 8:7. 
The problem might be put in either of two ways. 
(1) Why are the words of Jesus no~ kerygma? (2) When did 
Christianity begin? Ebelingl defines Bultmann's under-
standing of kerygma as 'the preaching that Jesus was the 
Christ which arose after the death of Jesus'. With this 
post-mortem kerygma the preaching of Jesus shares three 
characteristics in common: it is address, it demands 
decision, it is eschatological. But it differs from the 
kerygma in the strict sense at two points: (a) Jesus' 
eschatology is futurist;2 (b) Jesus' preaching is non-
Christological. 3 Consequently Jesus was a Jew and not a 
Christian and his preaching belongs to the presuppositions 
of New Testament theology. 
The two problems requiring consideration here are, 
first,the investigation of Jesus' understanding.of time: 
what is the difference in the understanding of time between, 
for example: [Po, ~cpea.oey ecp' ~J.1rt<; T} l3o.ol,AeCa. 'toO 6eoO 4 and: 
B'te 6e ~Aeev 'to ~A~pW~a. 'toO Xp6vou e~a.~eo'teI,Aey 6 eeo<; ••• ?5 
1. Theologie und Verkftndigung, p. 33 (my tr.). 
2. ' ••• that which for Jesus is future Paul sees as present, 
. or:~s a present that took its start in the past.' . 
{nultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 201 (my tr.». 
3. 
4. 
5. 
'Concerning 
teaching • , 
... 
Nt. 12:28. 
Gal. 4:4. 
his own person Jesus gave no express 
{ibid., p. 174 {my tr.}}. 
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Secondly, what is the function of Christological 
statements? Christological statements, it will be 
maintained here~represent an historical, not a theolmgical 
transition. 
At the least it is curious that the founder does not 
belong within his religion. lvas Luther, one might ask, a 
Catholic or a Protestant, or is Protestantism the 'preaching 
of justification which arose after the death of Luther'? 
By radicalising Occam, Tauler; Augustine and the 
Nominalists, Luther did not purify, but break Catholicism. 
And Bultmann implies so much himsel~ in contending that the 
inexpliciifimplication o~ the Sermon on the Nount is 
1 and that in this respect Jesus and 
Paul need not, as Paul and Peter, quarrel. (Unless the 
terms 'founder' and 'religion'are inapplicable and so 
inadmissable in a religion that 'ends' history?) Noreover 
without becoming entangled in the mortal coils of 
Diothelitism or biographical irrelevancies, it is surely 
true that, at least qua man, Jesus ·was a man of faith, 
however absurd, if it is so, it would be to say 'a man of 
Christian faith'. 
. 2 
Unless we know him now so no more? 
1. 'Nevertheless I am of the opinion and conviction that 
the situation, in which the hearer of the Sermon on the 
NOlintis in fact placed, is the same situation which 
Paul's theology makes explicit.' (Bultmann, Glauben und 
Verst·ehen, 1, p. 199, f.n.l (my tr.». 
2. 2 Cor. 5:16. 
Did Jesus exist authentically? Under authentic 
existence is understood a correct orientation within the 
three temporal modes, sc. of past, present and future. 
And of the present, theologically speaking, the praesentia 
salutis is a constitutive element, 'that is, that a man is 
not only 'one who is waiting for' but 'one who receives,.1 
Then it is surely true that as little as Paul can be 
excluded from the centre of the Gospel by the remnants in 
his thinking of a futurist~ apocalyptic, with as little 
M justification can it be denied that Jesus was a Christian. 
Though here belongs the characteristic theological 
qualification, namely that the contention that Jesus existed 
authentically belongs within theological discourse as a 
necessary affirmation and not as a demonstrable fact of 
qistory. Such a contention only God who sees more than we 
do, and thus consequently has more evidence at his disposal, 
could demonstrate. 
The second difference that distinguishes 'Verkftndigung' , 
or preaching, from kerygma was the Christological factor. 
The point of view to be adopted here is that Christological 
statements do not characterise a change in theological 
significan~e, but refer to a change in historical 
1. !But because Jesus is only waiting, his preaching reveals 
man's .. situation as the situation of one who is waiting, 
while Paul reveals it as the situation of one who 
receives ••• ' {Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, 
. p. 201 {my tr.}}. 
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circumstances. When Jesus was there, he qualified the 
present by his existence; when Jesus was no longer there 
(or, as even the most hardened champion of the resurrection 
could not deny, no longer there in the same sense) the 
present of the early church was qualified by Christological 
statements. That is, the function of Christological 
statements is to make present or, perhaps better, to qualify 
the present, that is, a new historical situation, by Jesus 
and his message. Thus the discontinuity between the 
preacher and the preached is not the discontinuity between: 
Christianity to. begin-Christianity begun, but the dis-
continuity of historical events: Jesus there with 
followers - followers there after his death. To 
characterise the difference as: implicit~ Christology -
e~plicit~ Christology is misl~ading. More accurately, more 
historically, Jesus' message implies the message of the 
Urgemeinde in precisely the same way as the message of the 
Urgemeinde implies Chalcedon and Chalcedon the Scots' 
Confession. 
Were this hypothesis tenable, Jesus' message would be 
kerygma. 
And "this is not to say that one must then drop the 
.. 
,nbermalung', or theological embroideries, of the Urgemeinde 
1 
as 'superfluous' and return to the pure milk of God's 
kindness as expounded by Jesus. It is not that the kerygma 
becomes superfluous - this is a misunderstanding - but that 
the historical Jesus cannot be fully understood historically. 
The God in time is the paradox, but the actor does not 
become the paradox after the performance. Jesus' theology 
and the theologies of the early church represent merely 
different stages in the development of the understanding. 
As little as the Urgemeinde remained content with repetition -
this would be to ignore the phenomena of addition and 
alteration of the tradition (for the kerygma of the 
Urgemeinde is a message that does not merely repeat, but 
corresponds to Jesus' kerygma) - so little can we be content 
with the revelation of Jeremias 2 that is punctually frozen 
1. I refer to Bultmann's sentence, SAH, 1960, tr. Gregor 
Smith, p. 23: ' ••• if authentic historical interpreta~ion 
makes the Now of that time into the Now of today, if 
therefore the historian, on the basis of his existential 
encounter with the history of Jesus can lead his hearer 
(or reader) into the situation of decision in face of 
Jesus, has the kerygma concerning Christ in that case not 
lost its meaning, has it not in that case become 
superfluous?' And cf. Fuller's sentence from his review 
of Robinson, The New Quest of the Historical Jesus, ATR, 
41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bu1tmann, ad 10c.): 'The 
effo~t to demonstrate the continuity between Jesus and 
the kerygma may so blur the difference between them that 
in effect it will make the kerygma unnecessary.' 
2. Das '~rob1em des hl~torischen Jesus (Ca1wer Heft, 32) -
also printed in Der historische Jesus und der 
kerygmatische Christus, pp. 12ff. 
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1 
circa A.D. 29. Neither Jesus' kerygma nor the Urgemeinde 
kerygmata for that matter can simply be repeated. All 
are, in that sense, 'superfluous', or past-historical 
phenomena. The moving finger writes, but is no copyist. 
Arising from the discussion above there is one 
theological question that remains outstanding and as its 
scope is as wide-ranging as to comprise what is called the 
Gospel, it can only be put here as a question. 
Were one to ask: 'Vhat is the centre of the Go~pel~-
one might with some justification assert that· the doctrine 
of justification has to do with it - though to assert it 
tOday in the Reformation form requires almost as much 
1. 
... 
Jeremias, ibid., p. 12, ·to illustrate the position he is 
attacking, summarises Ebeling, Die Geschichtlichkeit der 
Kirche und ihrer Verkfindigung als theologisches Problem 
1954, as follows: 'Die Offenbarung ist 'kein 
historisches Faktum' (Ebeling, ~., p. 59), sie 
begegnet nicht als 'geschichtliches Geschehen' (ibid., 
Pp. 59ff.); sie ist nicht in den Jahren 1-30 eingrenzbar 
abgeschlossen, sondern sie findet jeweils da statt, wo 
das kerygma gepredigt wird. Im Ereignis des G~aubens 
geschieht die Offenbarung (ibid., p. 63).' Then at the 
end of his essay (P. 23) Jeremias continues: 'Nach dem 
Zeugnis des Neuen Testaments ist der fleischgewordene 
Logos die Offenbarung Gottes, nur ere Di~ Verkftndigung 
der Urkirche dagegen ist das geistgewirkte Zeugnis von 
der Offenbarung. Die Verkftndigung der Kirche is nicht 
selbst Offenbarung. Offenbarung geschicht, wenn eine 
-ftberspitzte Formulierung erlaubt ist, nicht am Sonntag 
Von 10 bis 11 Uhr. Golgatha ist nicht ftberall, sondern 
es" gibt nur ein Golgatha, und es liegt vor den Toren 
Jerusalems. 'Die Lehre von der revelatio continua, der 
fortdauernden Offenbarung, 'ist eine gnostische Irrlehre.' 
I would, myself, here support what Ebeling says and reply 
to Jeremias' accusation of heresy by accusing him of 
unbalancing trinitarian Christianity at the expense of 
the Spirit and of, as it were, a 'Docetism of history', 
whereby the present.is drained of all but a derivative 
significance. 
tnz 
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forsaking of one's own time as the assertion of apocalyptic 
eschatology. The key Reformation question is the 
antithesis of Law and Gospel and the right understanding of 
their relation to one another. There seems little doubt 
that Bultmann understands the relation of history and 
eschatology as the relation of Law and Gospel. As Law, so 
history is brought to its end. Everything however hangs 
on how history is brought to its end. 
In this context the question to Bultmann is to ask 
.. 
what relation the XpLo~d~ xa~d oapxa bears to the Christ of 
faith, or, in other terms, l-That relation his Jesus bears to 
the Theologie des Neuen Testaments.' And any shorter way 
here than the length of existence would draw implacably in 
its train that failure to relate to nature and to history, 
u,nder which, if a statement of Bonhoeffer may be hyper-
bolically tortured by an illegitimate Procrustes, the whole 
of Protestant theology suffers. 'The concept of the 
natural', he writes, 'has fallen into discredit in Protestant 
1 
ethics'. A theology that fails to relate to the living 
2 
room on :f\10nday, and a walk. in the Deer Park on Wednesday 
has failed where it most needs to succeed. As the idiot 
1. Ethics," tr. Horton Smith, p. 101. 
2. An ~rea rif woodland north of Copenhagen. v. Kierkegaard's 
r'emarks,Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 386ff., 
and e~p. p. 430: 'Where then do the difficult tasks 
arise? In the living-room and on the Shore Road leading 
to the Deer Park.' 
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Prince pointed out: II cannot understand how anyone can 
pass by a green tree, and not fee1 happy on1y to 100k 
at it!,1 
1 •. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, Everyman edn., p. 535. 
53. 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE RESURRECTION 
It was said in Essay II that the history of modern 
Protestant theology is the history of its engagement with 
history. The purpose of the following chapter is to 
explore and clarify what Dodd means by calling the 
resurrection an historical fact. Clarity gained at this 
point should throw light on other historical facts which, 
it is said, the Gospels contain. 
(sc. The Christians), according to Dodd, 'insisted 
upon the crude actuality of the life, death and resurrection 
of Jesus sub Pontio Pilato, while affirming that in these 
historical facts the eternal God Himself ••• had acted for 
the salvation of man. ,2 
This statement is an interpretation. For 'historical 
facts' is a phrase' which did not belong to the vocabulary 
of the early Christians. And to say that, whatever ~ 
think, at any rate they thought they were talking about 
historical facts is ~gain to make an assumption, this time 
that ~ know what they were thinking, or rather what they 
would have said, had they been asked this pa.rticular 
question which they themselves did not in fact ask. It is 
true, of course, that.without making this assumption, that 
1. p. 1. 
2. History and the Gospel, p. 14. 
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~ know what they were'thinking, no interpretation is 
possible at all. The object o~ this inquiry is not to 
throw doubt on whether we can know what they thought, but 
to question ,,,hether it was in ~act this, sc. historical 
factuality, that they were thinking. In view o~ the kind 
o~ literature the early Christians wrote - and in this 
respect the Old Testament is no dif~erent - if this is what 
they were trying to do, they did not do it very well. 
Paul, too, apparently, shared this vie,oJ, ~or his 
preaching 'was centred in the ~acts o~ the death and 
resurre~tion o~ Christ,.l And by '~acts' it is historical 
£acts that are meant, for Dodd himsel~ speaks of 'the brief 
recital o~ historical facts in 1 Cor. l5:lsqq.,2 And, 
interestingly enough, it is also the view taken by, the NEB 
translators of this passage, where 6 ~apt~a~oy iS,rendered 
.. 
by 'the facts which had been imparted to me'. 
For the resurrection, i~ it is an historical ~act, is 
an historical ~~ct of a very peculiar kind. And the 
question is whether it is not so peculiar that it cannot be 
regarded as an historical fact at all, or, at least, as an 
historical fact in the simple sense. For it is certainly 
easier to understand what is meant by talking of the 'crude 
actuali:t;y' of the li~e and death of Jesus than it is to 
,,' 
.. 
1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 42. 
2. ibid., p. 29. 
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understand the "crude actuali ty' of the resurrection. It 
1 is significant that Kierkegaard in his famous sentence 
says only that 'he (sc. the God) lived and taught in our 
community and finally died.' This was 2 'more than enough'. 
And, moreover, leaving the resurrection on one side, it is 
a further question to ask in what sense the theologian is 
interested in the life and death of Jesus. Are these of 
interest to him qua 'crude actuality' or historical fact? 
Or do they interest him in some other way? That is, to '. 
anticipate, in so far as they are eschatological - a word 
about which we must say more later. 
At this point I wish to turn from a further discussion· 
of Dodd's views and to recapitulate, perhaps with greater 
precision, some definitions that were given above in 
Essay I. 
The term history I wish to reserve for the inquiry into 
what men have done in the past; the term eschatology or 
theology (the two I take to b~ synonymous) for the inquiry, 
into what God has done in the past.~ (The present and the 
future aspects of eschatology can for the moment be on 
methodological grounds ignored.) To say what God has done, 
1. Philosophical Fragments, p. 130: 'We have believed that 
in ~uch and such 'a year the God appeared among us in the 
humble figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in 
our c(:nnmuni ty, and finally died. I 
2, ibid. 
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to speak of God's acts, is to use historical language of 
God. But this is not to speak straightforwardly, for God 
1 is neither a green pa~rot, as Kierkegaard regretted, nor 
a man. And to speak of the 'God-man', as Kierkegaard and, 
perhaps, Chalcedon, is to speak not simply, but 
paradoxically. The language of God's acts is therefore 
analogical; God is spoken of as acting by analogy from 
human acts. 
In order, however, to make a lucid differentiation 
between history and eschatology as distinguishable sciences, 
it is necessary to define in what respect God is 
unhistorical. To return to an earlier definition, 
theological language was analysed as either anthropo-
logical, that is, the understanding of oneself as totally 
free and totally responsible, or analogical, that is, the 
understanding of God as radical giver and radical demander, 
or, to preserve a unitary terminology, of God as radically 
free and radically responsible. 'Total' and 'radical' 
were however left undefined. For it was not said in what 
respect responsibility before God differs from responsibility 
before a natural object or a man, before nature or history. 
1. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 219. Although I 
cannot compare it with the original, I like better 
Lowrie's version op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 304): 'Suppose, for 
example, that God should take upon Himself the form of'a 
rare and prodigiously big green bird with a red beak, 
perching on a tree upon the city rampart, and perhaps 
chirping in a way totally unheard of ••• ' 
'. 
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It may be, of course, that on many, or most, occasions the 
two responsibilities coincide. But, where they coincide, 
what is it that is coinciding? And where they do not 
coincide, what is it that is not coinciding? God, that 
is, must.be defined. 
By God I mean the name for that which keeps me 
absolutely safe. 
This definition is based on a saying of Wittgenstein, 
that 'he sometimes also had "the experience of feeling 
absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which one is 
inclined_ to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever 
. 1 happens''''. And Malcolm there-gives two illustrations 
of this experience. He writes 2 that 'in, Vienna he (sc. 
Wittgenstein) saw a play that was mediocre drama, but in 
it one of the characters expressed the thought that no 
matter what happened in the world, nothing bad could happen 
to him - he was independent of fate and circumstances.' 
And, secondly,3 'he praised one of Dickens' sketches - an 
account of the latter's visit on board a passenger ship 
crowded with English converts to Mormonism, about to sail 
for America. Wittgenstein was impressed by the calm 
resolution of those people, as portrayed by Dickens.' 
1. ~alcolm, op.cit., f.n. to p. 70. 
2. ibid., p. 70. 
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The purpose of these quotations is to illustrate 
what is meant by absolute safety, what is meant by God 
and the believer as responsible and free. This is how 
the eschatology is here defined. But the point in 
question here is the consequence of the doctrine of absolute 
safety for the understanding of nature and history. 
For by this doctrine nature and history are 
relativised. For no natural event nor historical action 
could count against the idea. Not only a.m I free for 
history, but free from it, even from the ending of my own 
history,.death. Not that I can make any intelligible 
utterance about the other side of my own history, about 
what will happen then, if anything, but that that problem 
I can ignore. It is in safe hands. As far as history is 
~oncerned, there is set up a dialectical relationship to it, 
which is for Bultmann the special characteristic of 
Christian existence. That is, this dialectical relation-
ship is how Bultmann interprets Paul, the W, ~~ of 1 Cor. 
1 7:29-31. 
Again to anticip~te, the resurrection is not the basis 
for this conviction; the resurrection is this conviction 
itself ~ to omit for the moment the relation of this 
conviction to Jesus of Nazareth. 
But what is an historical fact? 
1. Bultmann uses these verses of Paul passim. An example 
is Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 104. 
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The first principle of successful science is asking 
the right questions. 'In unscientific thinking our 
thoughts areooagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up 
a thought out of our minds like an anchor fouled of its own 
cable, hanging upside-down and draped in seaweed with 
shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole think on deck, 
quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all. 
Thinking scientifically means disentangling.all this mess, 
and reducing a knot of thoughts in which everything sticks 
together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which 
thinking-the thoughts is at the same time thinking the 
. I 
connexions between them! 
To ask what is an historical fact is to commit the 
fallacy of many questions. The question resolves itself 
,on examination into many, each of which can only be asked 
singly, each of which requires different methods for its 
answer. 
In History and the Gospel. 2 Dodd defines an historical 
event as follows: 'We might indeed say that an historical 
"event" is an occurrence plus the interest and meaning which 
the occurrence possessed for the persons involved in it, and 
by which the record is determined.' The word 'occurrence' 
seems to be used by Dodd as a synonym for what he elsewhere 
,,' 
1. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 22f. 
2. p. 20. 
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calls a 'fact'. For (sc. the Christian philosophy of 
history) 'starts from the Christian valuation of a 
I particular set of facts'; or: 'the aim of this 
part16ular method (Dodd is speaking here of a kind of form-
critical method) is to recover-the purest and most original 
form of tradition, which inevitably includes both fact and 
interpretation ••• In this primitive tradition the facts 
are given from a particular point of view, and with a 
2 particular meaning.' 
If I read Dodd aright, 'occurrence' and 'meaning' are 
a parallel pair to and synonymous in meaning with 'fact' 
and 'interpretation'. 
But what is an occurrence? What is an historical 
fact? Leaving aside the question of the appropriateness 
of the terms, occurrence and event, for they are words 
devoid of intentionality and belong on that account more 
properly to the language of natural science, the word fact 
refers in its origin (Lat. facio: I make or do) to, and 
within historical discourse properly should mean, ruhuman 
action. (That this is the proper sense of fact in 
historical discourse I shall not here argue. I shall 
.. 
assume it ,on the basis of Collingwood.) But, following 
Collingwood further, "an action has two sides. There is 
1. ibid., p. 19. 
2. ibid., p. '72f. 
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on the one hand the question 'What did so-and-so do?' 
And on the other the question "Vhat did so-and-so mean by 
doing what he did? Thus from the standpoint of the agent 
an action has two distinguishable aspects, called by 
Collingwwdrespective1y the 'outside' and the 'inside' of 
t o 1 an ac loon. Thus, Brutus knifed Caesar ('outside') in 
order to prevent, as he hoped, the supersession of a 
republican by a monarchka1 system of government ('inside'). 
But these two distinguishable aspects, are aspects of· 
the one action. Thus the word 'fact' includes the agent's 
deed and his thought of that deed. No-one does anything 
without meaning to do something by it, whether his knowledge 
be explicit or remain implicit. That is, rather than 
analysing an historical event a.s 'occurrence plus meaning', 
.or as fact and interpretation, an historical fact is here 
being analysed as "inside' and 'outside', or as deed and 
the thought of that deed. 
To be clearly distinguished from the agent's inter-
pretation of his o'vn action - and I do not find this 
distinction clearly made by Dodd - is the interpretation of 
that agent's action by some other person. If interpretation 
is spoken ,of, the question at once arises: 'Whose 
interpretation?' 
ft At this point three ,further questions arise: (1) Why 
1., The Idea of History, p. 213. 
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should anyone want to interpret anyone else's action? 
I mean/ the question implied by Dodd when he defines an 
historical event as 'an occurrence plus the interest . . . 
which the occurrence possessed for the persons involved in 
it' .' (2) How is theological, or, in current terminology, 
es~hatological, interpretation to be distinguished from 
other interpretations, such as the political, the economic, 
etc.? (3) What was the 'outside' of the event which is 
called the resurrection? 
I will take these questions in reverse order. 
The third question is one that Dodd himself asks. 
1 
'What was the Resurrection, as mere, occurrence?' In 
accordance with his terminology elsewhere, he could as well 
say 'as bare fact', or even as 'fact' simpliciter. 
This is an important question. It may not be the most 
'important quest~on which the historian has to answer, but if 
his investigation is to be more than a 'creation of his own 
fantasies',2 it forms an indispensable part of his task. 
I 
Unless the historian can ascertain, in Collingwood's terms, 
the 'outside' of an event - for example, that Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon, that he was stabbed by Brutus - unless he can 
ascertain !the simple facts of the deeds and events ••• and, 
1. History and the Gospel, p. 75. 
2. I am thinking of Bultmann's word, 'Phantasie-Gebilde' 
(Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 23). For the complete 
. quotation v. infra, .. ~r.6 tr) f, n. 1 , 
1 in this sense determine "how it was"', then the historian 
has no means of distinguishing history from tradition. 
History is not history because it is handed down, but 
because the historian reconstructs a coherent picture of 
the past in his own mind. 2 This relation between 'outside' 
and 'inside', between Historie and Geschichte, between 
occurrence and meaning, between fact and interpretation is 
dialectical, 'in so far as in actual fact the one does not 
occur without the other. ,3 
But the establishing of facts in this sense, that is, 
the establishing of the 'outside' of an event, depends on 
whether any evidence is available or not. The question 
arises as to whether history could still be written if no 
facts at all could be established. l{hat of the case 'where 
. 4 
the element of mere occurrence is evanescent'? 'But it 
1. ibid., p. 22 (my tr.): so sehr kann und muss er 
doch die einfachen Fakten der Taten und Ereignisse zu 
erkennen suchen und in ~iesem Sinne feststellen, "wie 
es gewesen ist".' 
2. I am thinking of Collingwood's discussionof' the work of 
the 'a priori imagination' (The Idea of History, pp. 
241ff. ) • 
3. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 23: 'Man wird 
das Verh~ltnis der beiden Weisen des Selbstverst~ndnisses 
(sc. 'die existentiale Interpr~tation der Geschichte und 
die objecktivier~nde Darstellung der Geschichte') als 
eirt dia.lektisches bezeichnen'mtissen, insofern es das 
~ine ohne das andere faktisch nicht gibt.' 
4. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75. 
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is plain that an interpretation is no mere creation of the 
historian's own fantasies, but that an interpretation 
interprets something and that what is to be interpreted is 
the "facts", which, with whatever degree of approximation, 
are available to the objectifying view of the historian. ,1 
. But is 'approximation' always possible? To what 
degree must it be possible if the distinction between history 
and fantasy is to be drawn? Could interpretation stand by 
itself without any facts to interpret? 
I answer no. Why? 
There are two historical questions that may be asked 
of the resurrection: 
the twelve 2 do? 
(1) What did Jesus do? (2) What did 
Each of these questions can be divided into two more 
precise questions: (1) What did Jesus/the twelve do, in 
the sense of deed? (2) lVhat did Jesus/the twelve mean by 
1. Bultmann, Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1. p. 23 (my tr.): 
'Aber eine Interpretation ist doch offenbar kein 
Phantasie-Gebilde, sondern durch sie wird etwas inter-
pretiert, und dieses zu Interpretierende sind doch'die 
"Tatsachen", die dem objektivierenden Blick des 
Historikers (in welcherAnn~herung immer) zuga~glich 
sind. ' 
2. I am' using the 'twelve' in the sense of the closed group 
of twe~ve men that was called into existence by Peter 
after the crucifixion. Conzelmann, RGG, Ill, art. 'Jesus 
Chr:lstus', Sp. 628f., cites b.oth the theory that this 
group already existed before the crucifixion and the 
theory that it came into existence after it and does not 
there make up his mind either way. However, in Ev. 
Theol., Jan./Feb. (1965), 'Zur Analyse der Bekenntnis-
formell Cor. 15, 3-5', he decides for the latter theory. 
doing what he/they did? These questions are respectively 
'historisch' and 'geschichtlich' - this being not all that 
is meant by these terms, but at least this being meant. 
The answers to both questions would together constitute 
the historical fact. 
Besides these two historical questions, there is a 
third question, the theological or eschatological question, 
namely, in its two aspects: (1) 'What did God do?' and 
(2) 'What did God mean by doing 1vhat he did? I This 
language is analogical, the analogies being drawn from the 
historical acts of men. 
Each of these three questions, that is, the historical 
question about Jesus, the historical question about the 
twelve and the theological question about God, has two 
.. aspects: the 'historisch' and the 'geschichtlich', the 
deed aspect and the word aspect - in the third question, of 
course, 'historisch' and 'geschichtlich', deed and word, 
being used analogically. The two aspects are 
distinguishable but not separable. There can be no deed 
without word, nor word without deed. The former is 
meaningless, for without a word the deed has not been 
understood. The latter is speculation or fantasy. 
Another way of ~aying this would be to say that to 
to exist is ·to exist in one's own thinking or that to 
think is to think in one's own existence. Or, to use 
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Nacmurray's language in his Gifford Lectures l (but, again, 
without following him in his preference of action before 
thought) the self as agent is identical with the sel:f as 
thinker, and vice versa. (And by 'identical' is meant not 
that the two questions are the same question, but that both 
questions are asked about man as a whole and that not one 
alone, but both questions together must be asked.) 
The assumption, then, that I wish to make is this: it 
is meaningless to speak o:f an interpretation when you cannot 
say what fact you are interpreting. In other words, there 
cannot be 'an action which has an 'inside' but no 'outside', 
nor 'Geschichte' without 'Historie,.2 
Similarly it is meaningless to speak of an act of God, ' 
i:f you cannot at the same time speak o:f an act o:f man. 
Just as 'Geschichte' is meaningless without 'Historie', so 
is a theological statement meaningless if unaccompanied by 
an historical statement. 
1. op.cit. 
2. But does this then mean, for example, that, if Plato's 
Republic is an interpretation o:f the :facts of Greek 
politics, the 'inside' can belong to one person, Plato, 
and the 'outside' to others, as, for example, Alcibiades? 
Or do we learn of the 'inside' of Alcibiades' actions 
from his own statements, supplemented, perhaps, by Plato's 
explicit statemen~.of ideas that Alcibiades implicitly 
had?" But what of the 'outside" o:f Plato's actions? Ar~ 
Plato's abortive activities with Dionysius of Syracuse 
the 'outside', of which his political thought is the, 
'inside'? In other words, do a thinker's actions have no 
'outside'? 
With these presuppositions in view, what of the 
resurrection? 
If one asks, what did Jesus do (in the sense of 
'outside'), the answer is, he died. 
At the least, it is obvious that the logic of the 
language whereby a man goes through doors by opening them 
(historical logic) differs from that logic whereby a man 
goes through them when they are closed (fabulation logic?). 
If one asks, 'What did Jesus mean by doing what he did 
(or by having that done to him which he suffered)?' the 
answer is· more difficult, because the Passion narratives, 
according to the scholars I am following, are considerably 
infected with 'Gemeindetheologie' and legendary features of 
various kinds. 'The most embarrassing point for this 
attempt to reconstruct a portrait of the character of Jesus 
is the fact that we cannot know how Jesus regarded his end, 
his death.' 1 
But perhaps one can get some guidance from such sayings 
elaCv. Now whether this is a saying of Jesus himself, or 
1. Bultmann, SAH, 1960, p. 11 (tr.Gregor Smith). Cf. 
Conzelmann's judg~ment, RGG, Ill, art. 'Jesus Christus', 
Spa ··646 (cit. Bu1tmann,. ibid." f.n. 18) (my tr.): 'It 
'sc. the Passion narrati;;r-is shaped from beginning 
to end from the perspective ·of the Easter faith.' 
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something he p1agiarised from the Jewish Wisdom tradition,l 
or indeed something said subsequently by his followers, yet 
I am not at all sure that this saying does not with 
sufficient probability represent his mind on the subject. 
It is possible that Jesus, too, was not unaware that men in 
his day suffered, as our own contemporaries, from· acts of 
God and died.' Yet he too seemed convinced of the point of 
uttering absurdities of this kind. 
To sum up, the resurrection stories do not recount the 
historical acts of Jesus., 
This view rests on the presuppositions (1) that Jesus 
really died; and that the biological law which states that 
corpses are not resuscitated2 is statistically valid; and 
(2) that the resurrection fabulation of the Gospels betrays 
1. At any rate) to Mt. 10:29 ('Are not two sparrows sold 
for a penny? And not one of them will fall to the 
ground without your Father's will. t ) there is a 
parallel which is frequently quoted by the rabbis 
(Bultmann, Geschichte der s no tischen Tradition, 
p. 112, refers to Bi1lerbeck, 1, 582f. 'No bird 
meets its end without your heavenly Father. How 
much less then does man.' (My tr.) 
2. Dodq, History and the Gospel, p. 76, cites this as a 
theor~ which is not 'entirely satisfying'. 
a particular logic. l 
To ask what occurred at the resurrection, in the sense 
of the question "¥hat did the twelve do?' (or 'What was 
done to them?') is to ask for an answer that can only be 
given in terms of the activities of the early church, such 
as that they spoke to others, ate together, healed perhaps, 
and quarrelled, as theologians will, over the meaning of 
the history they were engaged in. This is the truth which 
is commonly stated in such terms as: the proof of the 
resurrection is the existence of the church. 
1. Dodd, in'Studies in the Gospels, ed. Nineham, 'An Essay 
in Form-Criticism of' the Gospels', differentiates the 
resurrection stories from 'the stuff of apocalyptic. 
visions' and from myth. He concedes (p. 34, f.n.) that 
'It is, of course, true that the risen Christ is visible 
or invisible at will, and that closed doors are no bar to 
His entrance. This feature is a necessary datum of the 
situation (Why?), -and though it is, no doubt, abnormal 
or praeternatural, it has little in common with the stuff 
of apocalyptic visions ••• ' He further concedes (p. 35) 
that 'The more circumstantial (Why only that1.) narratives 
certainly include traits properly described as legendary, 
but 'legend' and 'myth' are different categories, and 
should not be confused.' And in his f.n. there he 
continues: 'The term 'legend', as a formal category, does 
not carry any necessary judgement about the factual truth 
of the story. It refers to a manner of telling the 
story. The relation of legend to fact is different from 
that of (let us say) a chronicle or a letter from someone 
conc~rned, but the relation exists, and should be 
investigated.' Slightly less cautiously, Conzelmann, 
RGG, 11'1, art. t Auferstehung, Christi', Sp. 700, wri tes : 
'Die Form der Erz~hlung ist die der Legende (nicht des 
My thus; wenn im einzelnen mythische Motive eingewirkt 
haben, so geben sie doch fHr eine motivgeschichtliche 
ErklArung wenig her).' By 'a particular logic', then, I 
mean negatively a logic that is not historical, as 
Collingwood understands the term, and positively a logic 
.which there is sufficient agreement to call legendary. 
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But it does not prove that which it is commonly taken 
to do. For those who make this statement usually imply 
that something else happened, but they do not say what it 
was. 
But this is an ens praeter necessitatem multiplicatum. 
No other occurrence is necessary than their present memory 
of the man that had been and what they now did in view of 
,1 
what they were remembering. 
2 Of the three theories which Dodd mentions, 
resuscitation, mediumistic experience and hallucination, 
only the'third deserves any consideration. Resuscitation 
was remarked on above. As for mediumistic experience, the 
Gospel stories are neither trivial in content nor is the 
man of whom they speak the mere vestiges of a personality 
"in fragments. But hallucination, or, as I should prefer 
1. To make this assertion is to take up, I think, a 
Zwinglian position where the Eucharist is concerned and 
implies that the category of memory is capable of bearing 
the weight of what has, 'in aristotelian and thomistic 
language' (Henderson, op.cit., p. 47), been called Real 
Presence. Cf. Henderson's remarks (~.) on Bultmann's 
statement (SAH, 1960, p. 27) that 'Jesus ins Kerygma 
suferstanden sei!' I do not think it necessary to 
discuss, at this point, the difference betw'een 'what I 
remember' and 'what I say in,a sermon', between, that is, 
memory and kerygma. I will merely observe that I do not 
think 'it wise to discuss memory, or tradition, in 
abstraction fromnsituation, or either of these in 
abstraction from the Spirit.' But more is said on these 
~roblems throughout what follows. 
2. History and the Gospel, p. 75. 
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to say, visionary experience of some kind, is a tenable 
hypothesis. But not on that account either necessary or 
demonstrable. 
For it is not theologically necessary to suppose that 
their memory took the particular form of a vision. It 
might not be true to say that the question is proper1y 
speaking not an historical question at all, but of interest 
only to the psychologist, though it is certainly true to say 
that the important question is not how they remembered, .but 
II 
whether they remembered and, if so, then what they 
remembered. 
The difficulty with the vision hypothesis is that it 
attempts to find in the resurrection stories either 
psychological or historical evidence, call it what you will. 
The real question is whether that can be done. For it may 
be a profound error in method to ask either psychological 
or historical questions of stories which, if they are written 
1 in the language of objective epiphany, offer/no evidence of 
that kind for their answer. The resurrection stories ·offer 
1. Cf. Braun in Zeit und Geschichte, tGottes Existenz und 
meine Gesc~ichtlichkeit im Neuen Testament', pp. 399f.: 
'Jesu Auferstehung wird Mon einem Teil der Tradition als 
welthaftes Ereignis gefasst: die Augenzeugen sind 
daraufhin befragb.ar (1 I(or 15, 6); er demons tri ert durch 
Essen, . dass er Fleisch und Kn·ochen besi tzt (Lk 24, 39-42) 
••• Die Texte meinen ••• Wirklichkeiten, die sich in der 
Sphfire welthafter Vorfindlichkeit ereignen oder ereignen 
werden. Die Texte reden also in der Tat von einer 
Gegensttlndlichkeit im Sinne dinglich-objektiver 
. Gegebenhei t. ' 
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no more evidence for the fact that the apostles had visions 
than the Baptism pericopel for the fact that Jesus did. 
Thus 'the element of occurrence' may indeed by 
2 -
'evanescent' if the question is asked, did they see visions, 
or did they simply think something; or were there 
particular occasions on which they had visions or when they 
remembered with particular intensity. 
But we have in fact left the first question behind, 
sc.-what was the 'outside' of the event which is called the 
resurrection, and have moved imperceptibly to the second, 
how is theological to be distinguished from othe~ inter-
pretations. And I say moved, because, if one asks, what 
the early Christians remembered, their answer would have 
been given by means of such a theological statement as: 
·6 6ed, ~ye~pev 'I~ooOY, as Kramer3 reconstructs one at 
least of their early formulations. 
But before explicitly considering this second question, 
it will be well to sum up the results ofexamM.dng the first 
question. 
As far as Jesus is concerned the question 'What was 
the 'outside' of the event which is called the resurrection?' 
can only be answered negatively. As far as the twelve are 
1. ~Bultmann, Geschichte der sy~optischen Tradition, pp. 263f. 
2. -Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75. 
3,- Christos Kyrios Gottessohn, p. 30. 
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concerned, the question can be answered with the same 
accuracy with which the earliest history of the church can 
be' reconstructed. And, on this point, whereas it is 
possible that the very first action of all was then 'he 
(sc. Peter) collected the group of twelve representatives 
of the people of God',l it is perhaps safer to be content 
with the impreciser generalities of preaching, baptising 
and the like, that can be reconstructed from the Gospels, 
2 Acts and elsewhere. 
Does this, however, contradict a statement that was 
made earlier, namel~ that it· is meaningless to speak of an 
interpretation when you cannot say what fact you are 
interpreting? I do not think so. For it is historically 
certain that the church came into existence and it is 
'further possible to speak with some approximation of the 
church's earliest activities. 
It is then, of course, still quite possible to say that 
'the element of mere occurrence is ev~cent,,3 but this is 
1. Conzelmann, 'Zur Analyse der Bekenntnisformel 1. Kor. 
15, 3-S.~, Ev.Theol., Jan./Feb. (1965), p. 9 (my tr.). 
And Conzelmann continues (ibid.): 'Die Idee des 
escbatologischen Gottesvolkes ist also fundamental. Und 
sie ist unl~sbar mit Person und Stellung des Petrus 
verknfipft. Das ist das einzige~ was wir fiber seine 
Theologie sicher"wissen.' 
2. ~As e.g. Kfimmel reconstructs them, RGG, 111, arts. 
'Urgemeinde (PalHstina), arid 'Jude~istentum'. v. also 
Haenchen, op.cit. 
3. Dodd, History and the Gospel, p. 75. 
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,only to put the resurrection as an occurrence in the early 
church more or less on a par with occurrences in the life 
of Jesus. Such ignorance or such incomplete knowledge has 
little significance for faith, if, the Philosophical 
Fragments of Kierkegaard are to be believed. 
lVhat it is not possible to say is what Dodd seems to be 
saying in History and the Gospel,l where he is writing not 
of the resurrection alone, but of the Gospel 'facts' in 
general. Dodd writes: tEithe~ the interpretation through 
which the facts are presented was imposed upon them 
mistakenly - and in that case few facts remain which we can 
regard as strictly ascertained - or the interpretation was 
imposed by the facts themselves, as they were experienced 
in an historical situation,' and gave rise to historical 
eonsequences - and in that case we do' know, in the main, 
what the facts were.' This, in its simplest terms, 
apparently means that if Christians are wrong, the historical 
facts that can be ascertained are less, but that if 
Christians are right, more historical facts can be 
ascertained. Now either Dodd is using 'facts' here to mean 
something different from what he means e1se~here, or he is 
not talking sense. The Christian may ask different 
questio.~s of the facts, but if h~ asks what the facts are 
1. p. 77. 
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,he cannot get a different answer from anyone else who may 
be asking the same question. The suspicion arises that 
Dodd is eager to paint as convincing fact what already 
convinces as legend and legends make such facts as cannot 
be'rescued by the· scholar's ink. 
Let us now turn explicit~y to the second question. 
The same uncertainty attaches itself to the place and 
time at which it occurred to Peter, if it was he, that 
But Peter's decision to make this 
" 
statement is no darker than many historical decisions. 
For example, we know, if indeed we know it, that what John 
the Baptist said was something like: 'Repentance is the 
precondition of salvation'; and we know that Jesus, 
belonging, as he did, to the Baptist's movement, must at 
'one time have held much the same view, else why did he in 
the first place join the Baptist~ We know, too, that 
subsequently Jesus stood the Baptist's message on its head, 
preaching that salvation is the precondition of repentance. 
But when, where and why he did this, we do not know, or 
clearly know. All we know is that Jesus joined ~he 
Baptist's movement and that he broke away from it, that he 
joined John, who preached one thing, and that he left it, 
. 1 
himself preaching another. 
1. The evidence for this paragraph is my recollection of a 
paper by an American professor to the 'AuslHnderseminar' 
of Prof. KHsemann, who described it as 'the unwritten 
Gospel', by which I took him to mean a Gospel written in 
terms not of story; but of the historical critical 
method. I ,do not remember the author's name. 
76. 
Concerning the occurrence of the formula to Peter all 
we can be reasonably sure of is that the normal process of 
telescoping and stereotyping that is elsewhere character-
istic of the pre-critical historiography of the Gospel 
writers has been active here also and that what is described 
as a punctual flash was in all probability no more, than a 
fitful dawning of awareness, and 'ttl -I}!J.tpq. 'ttl 'tpC't'lJ no more 
than a dogmatic echo of Hosea 6:21 - which reconstruction 
is not so much based on reading the" epiphany stories of the 
It 
resurrection as historical evidence as on interpolating by 
the fa priori imagination' the missing link between the 
death of a man and the subsequent occurrence of a widely 
used formula. 
But why should the 'pistis-formula,2 have occurred to 
Peter, or why should he have chosen to use this formula? 
The resurrection notion held by the early church 
derives from Judaism, itself a combination of Old Testament 
and Iranian elements, and from there it passed into 
Pharisaic circles and so to the early church. The genesis 
1. Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte, p. ,138, writes: 
'Unsere Analyse hat eine starke Wahrscheinlichkeit 
dafUr ergeben, dass das "am drittenTage" als eine 
dogma'tische Setzung mi t Hilfe des urchristlichen 
Schriftbeweisesnentstanden ist und zwar durch christo-
l~gi~che Deutung der bereit~ im JUdentum auf die 
... allgemeine Auferstehung bezogenen Stelle Hos 6,2. t ' 
~. , . 
2. Kramer's term, op.cit., p. 17, is 'Pistisformel': 'So 
fUhren wir den Terminus "Pistisformel" als Bezeichnung 
fUr die Formel ei~, welche die Heilsakte Sterben und 
Auferwecktwerden beinhaltet.' 
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of the idea is not in doubt. l 
Only two matters remain obscure:' (1) that resurrection 
should be predicated of Jesus and (2) what it means to 
predicate resurrection of anyone. 
In Iranian religion and Pharisaic Judaism the 
resurrection notion belongs to a complex of ideas called 
eschatological (the word here being used in its past sense, 
that is, in the sense in which it refers to the first 
century phenomenon known as apocalyptic eschatology). 
" 
That i~, it appears together with a number of other ideas, 
such as final judgement and abolition or reconstitution of 
the world. 
But is there within this complex one central idea, from' 
which all the others follow, such that if the central idea 
should be expressed the others would be implied? Is 
there the eschatological statement, of which resurrection 
is an implicate? If it were said, to choose- one expression 
for the sake of brevity, not clarity, that 'Jesus is the 
last man', would it follow of necessity that he is raised? 
Could to say that Jesus is raised be merely one way of 
saying, or a mere consequence of saying, that Jesus is the L4Jt 
1. Lohse, RGG, lll,art. tAuferstehung IV. Im Judentumt: 
tUm die-W;nde vom 3. zum 2. ·Jh. vChr findet sich im 
ft Judentum zuerst die Hoffnung auf eine A(uferstehung) 
verstorbener Israeliten. Diese Erwartung kann nicht 
allein aus der Weiterentwicklung von Ansfitzen innerhalb 
des AT ••• erkl~rt werden. Vielmehr werden iranische 
EinflHsse auf das JUdentum eingewirkt haben ••• ' 
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man and belief in the resurrection be not the statement of 
faith, but one way of stating it among others? 
Having adumbrated this as a possibility, I shall now 
simply assume that this is so. That is, I shall assume 
that the resurrection statement," Jesus is raised, is a 
part-implicate of the eschatological statement, 'Jesus is 
the last man'. Within an apocalyptic eschatological con-
text Jesus' death was, as it were, the Pavlovian stimulus 
that called forth, as it had to, the idea· of resurrection'. 
fI 
To say that God raised Jesus is one way, and only one, of 
saying that Jesus is the t ,last man and, further, the right 
way of saying it when he died. 
Leaving aside the question whether Jesus knew himself 
to be the last man, though I should myself say that 
. something of the" sort is implied by el 06 €V 1CVE;UJ..I,a.'tL 6£01:1 
lyw €~~AAW 'td 6aL~6vLa., ••• 1 if genuine, if it were proved 
that to the apostles this awareness first appeared not in 
a Messianic form, be it at Caesarea Philippi or after the 
crucifixion, but in a resurrection form after Jesus' death, 
that would in no other way alter the fundamental assertion 
that the resurrection is merely one mode of making the 
eschatological statement. Even if the resurrection form 
were temporally prior, it need not on that account be 
logically so. 
1." Mt. 12:28 (& II). 
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Now that this assumption is made, two problems remain 
outstanding: (I) What does it mean to say that Jesus is 
the last man? For to say 'the last man' is to repeat the 
language of apocalyptic eschatology - and it is fundamental 
to hermeneutics as a science that what is simply repeated 
is neither relevant nor understood. l However, as 
eschatology has already been defined above, the question to 
be asked resolves itself into the question how talk about 
Jesus must lead to a more precise definition of eschatology, 
It 
or, in other words, 'What is Christian eschatology!' And 
(2) what did it mean to the early church and what does it 
mean now to use the present tense of Jesus?2 This is the 
1. Cf. Braun in Zeit und Geschichte, IGottes Existenz und 
meine Geschichtlichkeit im Neuen Testament', p. 404: 
'Sie (se 'die Texte von Gen 1 bis Apk 22') sind Offen-
barung ••• derart, dass sie seIber dem geschulten Leser 
deutlich machen, wie ihre Aussagen sich wandeln. Dieser 
Wandel ist ein 1vandel im geistigen Aspekt der damaligen 
Menschen, ein Wandel secundum hominem recipientem. Der 
heutige Interpret braucht das nur wahrzunehmen und 
fortzusetzen.' Cf. also Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 
p. 292: 'Nun gingen wir von der Erkenntnis aus, dass auch 
das in den Geisteswissenschaften ge6bte Verstehen eiri 
wesenhaft geschichtliches ist, d.h. dass aueh dort' ein 
Text nur verstanden wird, wenn er jeweils anders 
verstanden wird.' 
2. For the early church, e.g. I~ooU~ Kup~o, (Rom. 10:9 -
although lo~Cv is not expressed, I do not think one need 
dispu£e that ~ present tense is, or, at any rate, is also 
being understood) and to~ yap etoLv QUO ~ ~per, ••• exet 
eltLL ev ~tocp a.-6~mv.' (Mt. 18:20 - with Bultmann's comment, 
Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, p. 160 (my tr.): 
"', It has already been said more than once that in many of 
these sayings it is the resurrected Jesus who is 
speaking ••• ' 
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problem o£ the presentness o£ the past. 
Christian eschatology is stated by Bultmann in the 
doctrine o£ 'paradoxical identity,.l That is, to be £ree 
and responsible be£ore Jesus is paradoxically identical with 
being £ree and responsible be£ore God. By this doctrine 
what Jesus did ,,,as what God did and what Jesus said was 
what God said. Jesus' acts were God's acts and his words 
God's words. As a doctrine this is not something to be 
proved, but something assumed. 
Thus what was said on eschatology above, that man is 
radically responsible and radically £ree, that is, 
responsible and £ree be£ore that wh~ch keeps him absolutely 
sa£e, sa£e, that is, £rom nature and history - and, o£ 
course, £ree £or nature and history - was a statement o£ 
-Jewish eschatology. Christian eschatology equa~es, para-
doxically, £reedom and responsibility be£ore God with that 
be£ore Jesus. 
But the doctrine has, I think, a £urther extension, 
which I shall call the 'doctrine o£ the absolute 
1. The idea o£ I paradoxical identi ty', even ,,,here the term 
does, not occur, turns up in Bultmann's writing passim, 
e.g. Theologie des Neuen Testaments, p. 402: 'Die 
historische Gestalt Jesu, seine menschliche Geschichte, 
••• ist das eschatologische Ereignis.' and Kerygma und 
Mythos, VI, 1 p. 26: 'So aber enth!ll t der Satz ( s,c. 
4von Gottes Sch6p£er - und Herrschertum') eine Paradoxie. 
Denn 'er behaupter die paradoxe Identi ttit des 
innerweltlichen Geschehens mit dem Handeln des 
jenseitigen Gottes.' 
1 
moment' • 
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It is, in effect, a doctrine of the church. 
By this I mean that responsibility and freedom before the 
natural objects that surround me and before my contem-
poraries is paradoxically identical with my responsibility 
and freedom before (a) God and (b) Jesus. And not only 
so, but my acts are, by paradoxical identity, God's acts 
and my words God's words. 
But between Jesus' acts and mine there is a difference, 
perhaps; namely the qualification introduced by sin; 
II 
and 
by sin I mean that to be confronted ~ow by what people say 
about Jesus or by what they do in the light of his having 
been is to become aware that I have been neither free nor 
responsible. But in so far as the question whether I'will 
be free or responsible is put to me or the question whether 
-I will receive these as a gift, the possibility is there 
that my acts be his. 2 
Despite, however, my unfreedom and irresponsiObility, 
the human si tuation '\vhich was threatened by the doctrine' of 
1. The idea is, of course, Bultmann's, who in turn derives 
it from Ki erkegaard. v. Has enhti ttl, op. ci t ., ., Der 
Augenblick des Glaubens', pp. 228ff., and his references 
there. 
2. Can I 'ever really'realise my freedom and responsibility, 
or really receive· them? I can, but I do not. cf. 
Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 199, f.n. 1: 'Die 
¥orderungen (sc. der Bergpredigt) sind aufgestellt, urn 
erfftl'lt zu werden ••• Die Frage, die Jesu Forderungen 
wie die des Gesetzes wecken, ist die, ob die Forderungen 
faktisch erftillt sind.' 
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absolute safety is by the doctrine of the absolute moment 
again made absolute. (Is this a logical contradiction, 
or a dialectic of existence?) 
As for the problem of the presentness of the past, my 
contention here is that this problem is not specifically 
theological, for it belongs to the past as such to be 
present, for this is the structure of time. Thus Jesus 
does not differ from Socrates (or from .' the soul of my 
granddam 1,1 for that matter) in that he is present wherea"s 
It 
Socrates is not, but in that he is present whose acts were 
and are," in so far as I now act, without qualification 
(that is, sin) paradoxically ~denti~al with God's acts. 
Thus Jesus' presence is 'real', not because it is historical,' 
which it also is, but because it is eschatological. 
1. The phrase is from ShakespeanB, Twelfth Night, ,IV, 11, 
.s6f.: ' ••• that the soul of our granddam might haply 
inhabit a bird~' Prof. Gregor Smith reminds me that the 
view that the way that Jesus·is present does not differ 
from the way that any other historical figure is present 
is al~ri the view he expresses in Secular Christianity, 
p. 86: ' ••• there is no formal" difference between the 
way in which we apprehend, or are encountered by, the 
~ast of Jesus and any other past person or event in 
history. I"'
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THE ORIGIN OF THE KERYG:t-1A 
The former chapter was concerned with the relation of 
the kerygma to historical facts. The present chapter will 
be concerned with the question, when did the kerygma begin. 
Jesus of Nazareth, between the years, let us say, 
1 4 B.C. and 30 A.D., made certain statements; and the 
early church made certain statements after his execution. 
lfere the things that Jesus said while he was alive, 
supposing we still had them, kerygma, or should that t-erm 
be restricted to lvhat was said by others after he had died? 
And, if so, why? 
But, first, let us leave aside the, question as to how 
the category kerygma ought properly to be used and ask, on 
the one hand, how Bultmann uses the term and, on the other, 
why he uses it in this way. 
Host terms of moment, as, 'for example, parliament or 
prehistory, win prominence by degrees. The term kerygma 
is no -twentieth century neologism, but has nonetheless 
attained in recent years a peculiar status, which genetical 
1. Neither of these dates is more than a good guess. 
Braun, gQQ, 111, art. 'Christentum 1, Entstehungt, Sp. 
l693,·,vrites: tNur dass die Tradition von der noch zu 
Lebzei~en Herodes- d.Gr., also bis 4 vChr, erfolgten 
Geburt Jesu ~utrifft (Mt 2,1; Lk 1,5), wird aus_der 
EnfstehungsmBglichkeit jener Legende gefolgert werden 
tltirfen.' and Conzelmann, RGG, 111, art. t Jesus Christus t , 
Sp. 626, summarises the Chronology by remarking: 'Nach 
alledem fHllt also Jesu Auftreten in die Zeit urn 30 
nChr. Eine solche Fixierung ist ftir die Zwecke des 
Historikers hinreichend genau.' 
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probings in Paul, Semler and Herder do little more than 
1 
obscure. 
As for many of the terms that Bultmann uses, it is not 
the writer who supplies, but the reader who must supply a 
definition. To define at all, it is true, is to risk 
movement in that light 'where all cats are grey'. 
One reader, however, has already carried out this task. 
Ebeling2 has defined Bultmann's use of kerygma 'at any rate 
in most instances' as ' •• the ~reaching that Jesus is the 
Christ, which arose after the death of Jesus. It is the 
message·of God's eschatological act of salvation in Jesus 
Christ, the message that constitutes the church, the message 
which has from that point on been continually handed down 
and proclaimed, though without being restricted to anyone 
formula, but with th~ one Christological meaning which is 
the same for all formulations.' 
1. v. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkfindigung, 'Zum Gebrauch 
des 'fortes "Kerygma" in der neueren Theologie', p. 109. 
Both terminology and the discussion are a 'novum', which 
the prehistory of the word 'kerygma' does little to 
illuminate. 
2. ibid., pp. JJf. In Ebeling's own words: 'Jedenfalls in 
den meisten Ffillen versteht er (sc. Bultmann) darunter 
die C~ristusverkftndigung, wie sie nach dem Tode Jesu als 
die die Kirche konstituierende Botschaft von der 
eschatologischenHeilstat Gottes in Jesus Christus 
entstanden und von daher in ·fortdauender Verkftndigung 
~weitergegeben worden ist, freilich nicht eingegrenzt auf 
eine.bestimmte Formel, aber als der identische 
christologische Verldlndigungssinn kerygmatischer 
Formulierungen. ' 
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I~ we suppose that Ebeling is correctly reproducing 
what Bultmann says, the answer to the question: when did 
the kerygma begin, is ansl.,ered by the phrase: ' ••• which 
arose after the death of Jesus'. The term, kerygma, that 
is, is improperly applied to what Jesus said, but is 
reserved ~or what was said by the early church after his 
death. 
It is true, o~ course, that the literature that we 
possess was written after the d~ath of Jesus, even i~ it 
does contain the memory o~ what the authors had ~orgotten. 
But the time the literature was. written does not answer the 
question, when did the kerygma begin. 
Ebeling's de~inition above is, however Ebeling's 
definition and the question is justi~ied which asks whether 
. or not he reproduces.,correctly what BuLtmann says. 
This question, as indeed, this whole study, will be 
examined in the light of only one document, namely the 
Heidelberg Academy essay of 1962, entitled: The relation 
of the early Christian'message o~ Christ to the historical 
1 Jesus. And the present question, whether or not kerygma 
is a category which is properly used only of what was said 
after the-crucifixion, is answered,in the first paragraph 
of that essay. It reads: 'In the period of study of the 
1. i.e. §!g, 1960 (tr. Gregor Smith). I have chosen to 
concentrate on this essay, but not, o~ course, in 
abstraction from what he has written elsewhere. 
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life of Jesus (the time of so-called liberal theology) the 
question was controlled by the desire to free the portrait 
of the historical Jesus of the overpainting it had suffered 
in the early Christian message, i,n the "kerygma". The 
emphasis was therefore laid on establishing the difference 
1 between Jesus and the kerygma'. And, later in the same 
paragraph, ' ••• it is the question of the historical con-
tinuity of the work of the historical Jesus, especially 
what he proclaimed (Verktlndigung), 'vi th the early Christian 
kerygma of Christ.' That is, whatever other differences 
there may be, there is, at least, a chronological difference 
bet'veen Jesus and the kerygma. 
It is, then, for Bultmann normal usage to name what 
Jesus said 'Jesus' preaching (Verktlndigung), and kerygma 
"what the early churcl?: said. 
But why should this be so? In ans,,,ering this question 
Bultmann first of all concedes certain similarities between 
what Jesus said and what the early church said. Indeed, 
he goes so far as to speak of 'the relation of his (sc. 
Jesus') kerygma to the church's kerygma concerning Christ ,2 , 
and, in slightly vaguer terms, to say 'that the proclamation 
of Jesus has kerygmatic character'" 3 though both these 
1. "'ibid." p. 5. 
2. ibid., p. 15. 
3. ibid. 
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usages are deviations from his norm. What, ho'vever, 
persuades him to deviate from the norm is that, like the 
kerygma in the strict sense, Jesus' 'kerygma' is 
eschatological. l That is, in speaking of the coming 
kingdom, it uses the mythological eschatology of Jewish 
apocalyptic. And further, J~sus' 'kerygma' is christo-
2 logical. Or, rather, supposing the term 'Christ' to be 
a post-crucifixion formulation which has been retrojected, 
-. 
Jesus' 'kerygma' is, in all probability, 'not christological, 
.. 
but, in precise jargon, semeiological. 3 That is to say 
that Jesus drew a connection between what he was talking 
about and'the man, sc. himself, who was talking. And this 
connection is well enough described in terms of a~~etoy 
or sign. Jesus, that is, understood that what he did and 
what he said was a sign or indication of the arrival, 
sometime, of the Kingdom. 
1. 'It was not as a teacher or a rabbi that he appeared, 
but as a prophet with an eschatol~gical message.' 
(ibid. ) 
2. The necessary qualification, which I go on to call 
'semeiological', is made by Bul tmann in terms' of 
'implicit christology': 'Wohl aber kann man sagen, dass 
Jesu Auftreten und seine eine Christolo ie 
impliziert ••• ' ~. v. infra. 
3. I create the te:r:-.m from Bul tmann' s sentence , ibid., 
p ... 16 (my underlining): ' ••• - Jesus' eschatological 
~preaching proclaimed the imminent irruption of the rule 
of God, and he understood his-own public appearance 
clearly as a 'sign' of this ••• ' 
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Bultmann sums up this situation somewhat as follows. 
In view of such possibly genuine sayings as: 'if I by 
the finger of God cast out demons, then the kingdom of God 
1 has come upon you' he concludes not only that what Jesus 
said was eschatological, but 'that he regarded himself as, 
2 
so to speak, an eschatological phenomenon', or, again, 
'dass Jesu Auftreten und seine VerkHndigung eine Christologie 
impliziert, that Jesus' appearance and his message imply a 
Christology,.3 
To these two characteristics, the eschatological and 
the semeiological, to add such tautologies as 'claim to 
,authority,4 and 'directness'S would be no more than the 
unnecessary multiplication of somewhat clandestine entities. 
So much for.the similarities between Jesus' preaching 
. and the kerygma. But there is also a difference • 
In' Bultmann's opinion the difference is indicated by 
the following question: 6 'Does Jesus' claim to authority, 
1.' Lk. 11:20 II Mt. 12:28. In this context Bultmann, ibid., 
cites further:. Lk. 12:S4-S6, Mk. 3: 22-27, Mt. 11:11-131/ 
Lk. 16:16, Lk. 10:18. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid.~ .. 
4. ibid. and v. Bu1,tmann's references (f.n. 31) to Fuchs 
andBornkamm. 
S • ibid':, p. 17 and f. n. 32. 
6. ibid. 
seen an an historical phenomenon, extend beyond the time 
of his earthly work?' The question is,rhetorical. 
For with the remark that: 'this is precisely what 
does happen in the kerygma' Bultmann implies that without 
the kerygma what Jesus said and what he did would remain 
in the past and remain there beyond the possibility of 
recall. That is, the past is present because the kerygma 
makes it so. To the same effect Bultmann writes elsekhere: l 
'The proclamation is itself an ~schatological happening. 
In it qua address the event Jesus Christ is on each occasion 
present '- present as the event which on each occasion 
encounters my existence.' 
To make the present position somewhat more transparent, 
let us now combine in the argument four categories, two not 
'yet stated in this essay and two already stated; in the 
first place two ways of considering the past, 'Historie' and 
tGeschichte t , and two places in the past to be considered, 
the preaching of Jesus and the kerygma of the early ,church. 
{Because the concentration in the present essay is on 
kerygma, that is, on words spoken, the acts, or, perhaps, 
1. Kerygma und Mythos, VI, 1, p. 27 (my tr.). It is true 
that the word I have translated 'proclamati,on' is not 
'Kerygma', but 'yerktindigung'. But I would judge it no 
more than pedantic to point this out, for Bultmann's use 
",of his own terms is more flexible than unitary (as 
Hasenhtittl, op.cit., p. 24, also observes). By 
,'proclamation' (Verktindigung), that is, I take it that 
Bultmann means what he more regularly calls 'Kerygma'. 
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1 Verhalten, of Jesus and the early church are, by way of 
Augustus' maxim, 'divide et impera', being left out of 
account.) 
If there are two ways of studying the past, it follows 
that what Jesus said (the preaching of Jesus) can be 
studied not only 'historisch' (that is, to use Bultmann's 
words above, 'seen as an historical phenomenon'), but 
'geschichtlich', even as what the early church said, the 
early Christian kerygma, can beMstudied not only~ 
'geschichtlich' but 'historisch'. And the question at 
issue is this, whether, if studied 'geschichtlich' '''hat 
Jesus said need be any less present than what the early 
church said, or, in other· words, ;(hy the term kerygma should 
be denied to what Jesus said and reserved for the words of 
'the early church. 
In what sense, then, is kerygma to be distinguished 
from 'Geschichte'? And the answer I wish to give is this: 
it belongs to the nature of the past as such, in so far as 
it has at all left traces of itself, whether tumuli, 
potsherds, ink, or memory,to be present. Thus it is not 
in so far as the past is present that kerygma differs from 
'Geschicht.e' - no less communion is available 'vi th Socrates 
or Napqleon than with Jesus - bu:t, in so far as in the 
1. A term of Fuchs, ~, 1956, p. 220 (cit. Bultmann, 
§!g, 1960, p. 19). 
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kergyma he is present whose acts were, by the doctrine of 
paradoxical identity, the acts of God, that part of 
'Geschichte' is kerygmatic in a way that other parts are not, 
until that possibility is by the kerygma conferred upon them. 
To say that Jesus is present because Jesus is preached 
is Bultmannian orthodoxy. Thus Conzelmannl writes: 
'Therefore the theological question is then how an historical 
event ('~eschichlich') can be the eschatological event which, 
as such, can be encountered today.' And continues: -" 'The 
II 
answer must be given by reference to the proclamation: it 
can be present in preaching.' 
,But the problem is how what is said in lectures maybe 
said to differ, so far as the presence of what is spoken i's 
concerned, from what is said in sermons. lfhat is being 
said here is that the differentia lies not, as for 
2 Bultmannian orthodoxy, in the category of 'presence', which 
1. RGG, 111, art. 'Jesus Christus', Sp. 648 (cit. Bultmann, 
SAH, 1960, p. 25). 
2. If my account of Bultmannian orthodoxy is correct, then, in 
Glauben und Verstehen, 1, p. 157, Bultmann lapses into a 
heterodox statement by suggestion that the "past is present, 
not because it is preached, but because is is historical 
('geschichtlich'). He writes (concerning te~ching 
(Belehrung) on guilt, conscience, repentance, etc.): 'In 
such teaching I do not hear of repentance, gratitude, etc., 
as if I were hearing of interesting psychological facts in 
which I was not myself involved, but in which I am in-
volved; I understand only as one who is repentant and 
grateful.' And then {v. infra, f.n. l~he comments: 'No-one 
who understands'what is at "issue liould take it into his 
h~ad to say 'was' instead of 'is'. For if the experiences 
~ of repentance and gratitude, etc., are understood as 
historical ('geschichtlich) events in the proper sense, as, 
that is, experiences that on each occasion happen to me, 
then they cannot become mere past facts that one has 
happened to come across (vorfindlichen Fakten in der 
Vergangenheit).' (My tr.) 
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is common to the language-games of the scholar and the 
parson, though, certainly, because the language-games are 
different, the meanings of the same term in different 
1 
contexts will not be the same, but in the fact that the 
history spoken of in the sermon is claimed to be not only 
historical but also eschatological. And it is this 
simultaneity of history and eschatology and not the mono-
polising appropriation by the sermon of the category of 
'presence' that distinguishes tgesermon from the historical 
lecture. 
. 2 
So when Bultmann '¥rites: 'The earliest community 
understood the history of Jesus with increasing clarity as 
the decisive eschatological event, which as such can never 
become merely past, but remains present, and present more-
over in the proclamation\ the sentence from 'which as 
·such ••• ' could without loss be docked as the merest 
tautology. 
To put the matter succinctly, the history of Jesus is 
not present because it is preached, but the history of Jesus 
is kerygma because it is about Jesus, that is, about the 
man whose actions and whose words were, to speak ~alogically, 
God's actions and God's words. 
For what is in question as far as the kerygma is 
, .. 
1. "Cf. Luther, WA 39, 1; 231, .1-3 (Disp. 1537) (Cit. Ebeling, 
Wort"und Glaube, p. 257): 'Omnia vocabula fiunt nova, 
quando e suo foro in alienum transferuntur.' 
2. SAH, 1960, p. 25. 
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concerned is not the presence of the past; for the past, 
properly understood, whether ofboly, or merely secular, men, 
1 
whether of the crossing of the ~mpty Quarter or of the 
2 Reed Sea, is always present, but the presence of a certain 
man of the past, who, when he is present, God is too. 
Thus the main problem would cease to be, as it is for 
the New Questers, the working out of the particular kind of 
continui ty and discontinui ty between what must now' be defined 
as two kerygmata, that is, between what Jesus said and what 
It 
the early church said - hence the fear of FUller,3 reiterated 
4 by Bultmann, of the superfluity of the ~erygma would itself 
be superfluous - but the working out ever more precisely 
what is meant by speaking of the man whose actions were God's 
actions and thus evolving a criterion by which the documents 
1. The Empty Quarter, or Rub al Kha1i, in South Arabia, 
was first crossed by Bertram Thomas, author of Arabia 
Felix, in 1931 and again, a few months later, by 
St. John Phi1by (v. Wi1fred Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 
London, Longmans, 1959). 
2. Ex. l4:l9ff. 
4. 
ATR, 41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bultman, SAR, 1960, 
P:-24) • 
And cf'. Bul tmann t s own remarks, ibid., ,pP. 23f. 
,,' 
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1 
relating to him, whether Luke, whose claim no reasonable 
German would anyway entertain, or, as should be added, Paul 
and Luther, should be measured at the bar of guess or God 
and be found wanting. 
To summarise: Bultmann maintains that the kerygma 
began not with the preaching of Jesus but with the preaching 
of the early church. Despite similarities to the preaching 
of Jesus, which I have called the eschatological and the 
semeiological, the kerygma (sc. of the early church) differs 
from Jesus' preaching in so far as it makes present what 
would otherwise remain in the past. This view of Bultmann 
was countered by the suggestion that 'the question of presence 
is irrelevant if it is, in any case, true that not only that' 
historical phenomenon but all historical phenomena as such 
1. Luke has recently, in Germany at least, come in for strong 
criticism. As an example, I cite Kfisemann, Exegetische 
Versuche und Besinnungen, 'Neutestamentliehe Fragan von 
heute', pp. 29f.: 'Lukas ist nicht ••• ein sp~ter 
PaulusschHler, sondern der erste Reprfisentant des 
werdenden FrHhkatholizismus. Dass er die Gesehiehte des 
Christentums mit Einschluss d~rjenigen Jesu historisch zu 
betrachten unternimmt, beweist, wie sehr die 'Anft~nge 
schon zurHekliegen, ist andererseits nur mBglich, wenn die 
urchristliehe Eschatologie, die bewegende Kraft der neu-
testamentlichen Botsehaft, verblasst ist und einzig noch 
die Behandlung der letzten Dinge bestimmt.' K~semann 
concl~des the passage with both praise (1 ••• er (sc. Lukas) 
vertritt ••• eine profilierte und sehr ernst zu nehmende 
Theologie.') and qualification ('Das ist freilieh eine 
Theologie, welche sieh von dar urchristlichen wesentlich 
~unterscheidet und in ihrem Zentrum wie in vielen ihrer 
EinzelHusserungen als frHhkatholiseh bezeichnet werden 
muss.'). The important question of 'evolving a criterion' 
will be taken up again in Essay IV. 
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are present in the same way. What is relevant is that in 
this case there is present not an historical merely, but an 
eschatological phenomenon, in so far as it is ~upposed, by 
those who think it, that he is present whose acts and words 
were, by the doctrine of paradoxical identity, God's acts 
and words. 
But to return. The present essay is concerned with the 
question, 'When did the kerygma begin?'. Bultmann's answer, 
'With the early church', is being here sa.id to be less 
satisfactory than the answer, 'It began with Jesus'. Thus 
the endeavour is being made to transpose the Bu!~mannian 
centre from the kerygma of the early church to the kerygma 
,of Jesus. 
But certain caveats should first be entered. This is 
no simple return to the historical Jesus 'after the flesh' 
1 nor, it may be added, a withdrawal from what NcIntyre calls 
the 'historical scepticism' of Kierkegaard; but, because 
Bultmann's explanations appear to distinguish between the 
xp~a~d~ xa~d a6pxa and the xpLa~d, xa~d ~veU~a chronologically, 
as if Jesus, before the crucifixion, was 'after the flesh', 
until by the emergence of the kerygma the situation was meta-
morphosed, it is a complex return. But - and this, for a 
theology of the spir.~t, or for an existentialist theology, is 
not~unimportant - it is complex also in so far as this is no 
1. The Shape 'of Christology, pp. ll9ff. 
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atavistic shift to the corn pastures of Gennesaret, for no 
jot or titt1e wi11 either be added to or subtracted from 
the und~rstanding of the present as the axia1 phase of the 
modes of time. That is to say, this enquiry concerning the 
kerygma is a question of past kerygma. There is no question 
of transposing the centre of the gospe1, which is, and 
remains the present, or, as Bu1tmann might ca11 it, the 
1 
eschato1ogica1 'now', but on1y the question of the proper 
understanding of tradition. For whi1e the gospe1 is not 
unconcerned with tradition, the tradition is not its centre. 
But a further ''lord on Bu1 tmann' s post-resurrection 
chron010gY'.of the kerygma. His definition of kerygma 
imp1ies that the caesura between the absence of f.aith and its 
datab1e emergence lies between the crucifixion and the first 
sermon after it. As here defined the caesura of faith is 
retrojected at least one stage and 1ies between Jesus 
understood from outside and Jesus understood from within the 
circ1e of faith. Whether faith may be further retrojected 
as far as Abraham, or Adam, or, in other words, whether, and 
if so, in what sense, Jesus may be said to have been pre-
existent, I propose to discuss, however c1amant, as 1itt1e as 
the re1atton between tradition and gospel was discussed above. 
But, where answers 10pped off others, further questions 
1. eg.G1auben und Verstehen, 1, p. 209 (cit. Hasenhfttt1, 
op.cit., p. 95). And N.B. 2 Cor. 6:2, which Bu1tmann very 
often quotes in this connection. 
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grow on. For the above description of the caesura of 
faith is not precise. Did, for example, Jesus of Nazareth 
believe? Did twelve, or seventy, or some, of his con-
temporaries believe before the resurrection, or, conceding 
resurrection to be a confused category, before the 
crucifixion? If the caesura is not between pre- and post-
crucifixion, did that event or action alter, in any sense, 
the nature of faith? 
Yes, the form and content of faith ,is altered by 
historical actions. If faith is historical, it does not 
have a·nature. But the topic of the 'new' in history must 
remain in abeyance until it is resumed under the heading 
of 'Kerygma and Kerygmata'. Except· that it may be added 
that neither that action, the crucifixion, ~orothers, mean 
that the word, faith, may not be played with both before 
and after it had happened, for words, too, are historical. l 
Whether, to take the second question, the followers of 
Jesus of Nazareth had faith before the crucifixion cannot, 
I ~magine, be demonstrated by the evidence of sources which, 
apparently, had little interest in recording it. That the 
1. I ·ine~n here that a word mus't be, understood in the context 
in which it is used. In different contexts it will mean 
different things. But the same word may nevertheless be 
used in different contexts, because, although history is 
~ discontinuous, although the 'new' occurs, it is also 
continuous, or, to use Collingwood's word, it also 
contains 'incapsulations'. 
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historian should interpolate it is certain; historically 
certain, that is, or certain enough. 
As for Jesus himself the case is more complex. On the 
one hand there is no pressing ground for doubting that he 
believed in God, unless, perhaps, archaeology should pro-
vide the waiting world with further material. Whether, on 
the other hand, Jesus was a Christian is another matter. 
If. it is true that 'Christ' is a term of later pro-
venance, Jesus.was no christian. Supposing, however, as we 
have, that his self-understanding was semeiological, that he 
believed that he was himself a sign of the coming kingdom, 
then there is involved with his faith in God the relation of 
himself to himself which is analogous to what is commonly 
found in the self-conscious human animal. In simpler terms, 
a little less than precise perhaps, Jesus, like Kung-Fu-Tze, 
h d t
:· 1 knew e ha avoca lone 
1. I am struggling here with a question which I am now 
convinced is entirely misleading (v. infra, Essay V). 
However, if the question 'War Jesus - der historische 
Jesus! - denn ein Christ?' (sc. 'or a Jew?' - Bultmann, 
SAH, 1960, p. 8) is posed and if one replies 'No, Jesus 
was not a Christian, because a Christian is a man who 
believes in Jesus and how could Jesus believe in Jesus?' 
i~is, I think, just worth pointing out that that answer 
is not quite adequate, if it is true that Jesus did 
believe in Jesus in the 'sense 'that he believed that 
there was somet~ing to be done, that there was a 'mission', 
and that he was the man to do ito However na'1ve it may be 
... to enti tIe a book 'The Nind of Jesus' (Barclay), I 
nevertheless would follow'K~semann in contending that 
' ••• it may be deduced, say from Mt. 12:28, that the 
historical Jesus thought of himself as a spirit-filled 
personality/ (continued on following page) 
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Now, obviously, the relation of a man to himself is not 
the same as the relation of others to him, nor can a may say 
of himself all that others might say of him - which would be 
one a priori cri terion for denying the authentici ty of ,.,hat 
Jesus is said to say in the Fourth Gospel passim, partim"in 
',. 
the Synoptics. l But the question here is whether that 
difference is such as to preclude the term kerygma from what 
Jesus said on the grounds that kerygma is said of the object 
2 
of faith, but not ~ him. 
(continued from previous page) personality (Pneumatiker); 
and (that) this is in fact confirmed by the @eto, av~p 
stratum of tradition (KHsemann, Protokoll der Seminar-
sitzung vom 15:1:65 (my tr.» and that, therefore, that 
much of what Jesus thought may be 're-enacted'. I have 
described the relation of Jesus to. his mission in 
Kierkegaard's terms in The Sickness unto Death, p. 146: 
'Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. 
But what is the self? The self is a relation which re-
lates itself to its own self ••• ' 
1. Others might say of a man: 'He and the Father are one' 
(In. 10:30), but it would be un''lise, if not impossible, 
for a man to say it of himself. Such a criterion of the 
'a priori imagination' can be used to discriminate 
between authentic and inauthentic logia, e.g. Buber's 
phrase: ~Messianische Selbstmitteilung ist Zersprengung 
der Messiani tAt' (Die Chassidischen Btlcher, 1925,' p. 
XXVIII) and DinkIer's use of this phrase in Zeit und 
Geschichte, 'Petrusbekenntnis und Satanswort.', pp. l27f. 
and 152f. 
2. 'Was Jesus - the historical Jesus - a Christian? Now if 
Christian faith is faith in him as the Christ, then the 
answer is certainly no; and even if he knew himself as 
tl1e Chris t (Mes'siah) and asl<.ed for fai th in himself as 
the Christ, then he would still not be himself a 
~ Christian and could not be described as the sub "act of 
Christian faith, whose object in fact he is.' Bultmann, 
SAn, 1960, p. 8, my underlining). 
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But the prob1em whether Jesus was a Christian or a Jew 
is scarce1y to be so1ved by the question of the re1ation of 
a man to himse1f. May it not rather be that the prob1em 
is no prob1em at a11, because the question is posing 
'impossib1e a1ternatives? That question, however, wi11 be 
re1inquished for the present and I wi11 summarise these 
observations by denying that the kerygma is distinguished 
from other 'Sprachereignisse' by the fact that it makes 
present and by asserting that such differences as exist' 
between the words of Jesus and the words of the ear1y church 
are exp1icab1e in terms of the historica1 situation in which 
each of these kerygmata was proc1aimed. 
". 
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KERYGNA AND KERYGMATA 
Recapitulation 
The first essay in this series endeavoured to indicate 
,a context in which the question of kerygma arises. It 
would be hazardous, perhaps, to claim that that was the only 
proper context for contemporary theological thinking, but it 
1 
might be still more hazardous to deny it. lihether or no 
the former or the latter, it is the context, of the present 
study. 
The context was said to be history, first, in the sense 
"that history is the study of what men have done in the past; 
and, second, in the sense that lve, as men, are makers of 
2 history, so that, because we have to, or are free to, or 
1. HcIntyre" op. ci t., p. 172, wri tes: I Concerning the models 
it must'bY this time be fairly obvious that it would be 
wrong to attach·' a compulsive character to anyone of the 
models ••• ' Contrary to supposing what might be termed 
'the parity of all models' I should,myself, argue that 
in a particular historical situation one model may be-
come so dominant that to treat others as having an equal 
importance is uncritical - which is'not the same thing 
as saying that they are devoid of hermeneutic importance. 
2. And this is now common knowledge, e.g. Bernard Fergusson, 
The Black lvatch - A Short Histor , Intro., p. 9 {my 
underlining: 'Nobody knew on the eve of Ticonderoga in 
1758, or of Crete in 1941, that the fighting on the 
morrow, with all the casualties which it brought, was to 
shirie among the annals of British arms; nor did anybody 
realise as they fought at Waterloo or Alamein that they 
were having a direct influ~nce, every man-jack of them, 
on the history of the world. One never knows. But 
one can always be Sure that one is making history, 
whether on a big scale or a small, and lV'hether good or 
bad. I 
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are free not to, make it, we are interested in what has 
been made. 
It should be added, however, that I am further 
supposing that the second sense is primary and that the 
first sense, if it exists, or can exist at all, is the 
stage of preliminary ratiocination, which, if taken for the 
last stage, declines swiftly to the isolated speculation of 
the man who has found for himself a better employment than 
to exist. 
History is thus not, more than only preliminarily, 
'the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own 
1 
mind', nor is its task 'to interpret the phenomena of past 
history as possibilities of understanding of existence and 
thus make it clear that they are also contemporary 
possibilities', or to suggest, without qualification, that 
'tua res agitur,.2 History - this is, I take it, the 
burden of Gadamer's Wahreit und Methode - is not interpre-
.. 
tation, but re-interpretation. For it is not a man's job 
to jump out of his own skin, but, remaining in it, to put 
his questions to other men who are remaining in their's. 
1. 
2 • 
... 
Collingw'ood, The Idea of History, p. 215, and passim. 
Bultmann, Das Urchristentum, Einleitung, p. 8 (my tr.) 
(cit. Diem, Theologie als._kirkliche Wissenschaft, 11, 
p. 68). 
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History is not monological, but dialogical. l 
Before making a transition to the theme of the second 
essay, I would like to insert a short parenthesis on the 
question to what extent the kerygma offers information 
about the historical decisions of other men, or another man, 
and to what extent it offers what is variously termed 
'challenge', 'summons' or 'address' to make one's own 
historical decisions, and in what way these two questions 
1. The primary distinction to be grasped here is that 
between man as student of history and man as maker of 
history. I am here asserting (1) that man is interested 
in past history because he has ,to make history, but (2) 
that man does not find out how to make history from 
studying past history, because, by the 'logic of question 
and answer', the questions that men asked in the past are 
not the same questions that he is asking now - and that 
is why it is not entirely true to say: 'tua res agitur', 
or to say: 'past possibilities are also my contemporary 
possibilities.' The question then arises 'What, in that 
case, is the use of the past?' To that question I give 
two answers: (1) The past is relevant in so far as the 
past is 'incapsulated' in the present, though that use 
of the past is only of restricted value, in so far as 
we are still left with the problem of moving from the 
past into the future - which is, incidentally, the point 
where Collingwood's thinking breaks off, though he does 
say so!Uething about the matter, where he speaks of 
'acting without rule.s' (An Autobiography, pp. 103ff.); 
and (2).the past is' relevant in so far as a man who 
studies the questions an'd answers of men in 'the past in 
full consciousness of his own questions will answer his 
own questions more wisely by, as it were, a dialogue with 
t~epast (cf. Gadamer, op.cit., p. 359: 'Denn die 
nialektik von Frage und Antwort ••• llisst das Verhfiltnis 
des Verstehens .,als ein Wechselverhtl.l tnis von der Art 
e~nes Gesprfiches erscheinen. t ). For a fuller answer to 
these questions I refer'the reader to Gadamerts book and 
what he says of 'Wirkungsgeschichte', 'Verschmelzung der 
Horizonte' and 'die Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens'. 
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are related. This is, in Bultmann's terms, the problem 
of 'Anrede' (address) and 'Mitteilung' (information) and 
their relation. 
In Glauben und Verstehenl Bultmann writes: 
'Correspondingly the answer to the question how revelation 
is understood in the Ne,,, Testament cannot be understood as 
a simple giving of information (Mitteilung), but only as 
addres s '(Anrede) t • And later on the same page: 'That 
does not, of course, mean that in the New Testament there 
could not also be simple direct statements on revelation 
and the limitation of man, which could be reproduced by a 
descriptive account. But if one does that one must only 
take into consideration that such statements cannot really 
be understood if they are taken to be simple statements of 
information and if what they originally meant and the 
original speaker's understanding of himself, lvhich is the 
basis of their meaning, is not re-enacted (nachvollzogen).' 
Now, in so far as the Christian faith is historical, 
there can be no re-enactment without something historical, 
as deeds done and words spoken, to be re-enacted. Thus, 
suppose we take Wittgenstein's analogy of the boxer: 2 'Let 
us imagine a picture which shows a boxer in a particular 
fighting stance. "Now this picture c~ be used to inform 
1 • III , P • 7 ( my t r. ) . 
2. Schriften, 1, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1960, p. 299 
(my tr.). 
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someone how' he ought to stand, to hold himsel:f; or, how 
he ought not ·to hold himsel:f, or, how a certain man at 
such and such a place did stand; or, etc. etc.' 
So far as the Christian faith is concerned, the 'boxer' 
depicted is, to use a term, 'datierbar'. And ,.,ere there 
no 'Datierbarkeit' there would be no Christian faith. And 
of this boxer every Christian has his own individual, or 
personal, picture; and these pictures range :from the linear 
minima1ities of Kierkegaard and those historians for whom 
It 
the idea of Geschichte is dialectically related to 
Historie,l for whom, '.that is, historical_ thinking and 
historical truth involves sobriety and precision, and 
2 
extends, as for Ronan, to the eyelashes of Jesus' mule. 
And not only is the boxer anhistorical datum, something 
given to the historian, by which, if it does not stretch 
language too far to say it, the historian is accepted, but 
the boxer exerts a claim ('how he ought to stand, to hold 
himself'). And not only that, for, as eighteenth-century 
prize-fighting, let Us say, was a time-conditioned exercise, 
that is, as the style of boxing is not the same, though 
1. Bu1tmann, Kerygma. und ~1ythos, VI, 1, pp. 22f. 
2. Schweitzer, op.cit., chap. XIII, 'Renan' , p. 184: 'He 
(~c. Jesus) constantly rod~ about, even in Galilee, upon 
~ a mule, 'that favourite riding-animal of the East, which 
is 'so docile and sure-footed and whose great dark eyes, 
shaded by long lashes, are full of gentleness'.' 
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related, perhaps, to·what it once was, it is also a 
picture 'how he ought not to hold himself'. 
Thus all the alternatives Wittgenstein gets as far 
as stating are all distinguishable, but inseparable, 
moments, mutatis mutandis, within the science of the 
Christian fai th, called Hermeneutics •. 
However two things remain to be said more clearly. 
If it is true that the picture of the boxer is also a 
picture 'how he ought not to hold himself', then the word 
II 
Ire-enacted' 1 (nachvollzogen) in Bultmann's quotation above 
is inappropriate; it is subject to the same defects as 
were claimed for Ire-enactment' and 'tua res agitur' above. 
Perhaps this may be further illustrated. 
The primary aim of the theologian 1 s 2 interpretation is 
to interpret '\That ~he Spiri t is saying to the churches, and 
the world, but not what was said to the churches and has 
since been bound in one volume. The written witness to 
what the Spirit said once is relevant, and only relevant, 
in so far as it may be of help in articulating what the 
Spirit says. Where the present speaker uses the same 
words that were once said, it will invariably be found, 
1. i.e. Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 7. 
2: I do not think I can be allowed to mean here more than 
the dogmatic theologian or philosopher of religion (as 
opposed to students of the bible, church history and 
Dogmengeschichte). 
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I think, if analysis is sufficiently rigorous that the 
meaning of the words is different. No doubt, in this 
context, it would be instructive, for example, to compare 
Paul's OLxaLoauvn with Luther's 'Rechtfertigung', or Barth's 
Romans with Paul's or Bu1tmann's John with John's. 
1 F. C. Grant in -=T;.:.h.:..;e~..::::G~o::..::s:=...;p~e.:l;.:;s;:...:...: _...:T:..:h:.::.e.;::;..=i;.;;;r~O.;;..;:;:.r-=i;..i;g;;&.;l:;.;· n::.::......:a::,;:n~d::::......:;G::.::r:;,.o;;:.::w....:t::.:.:;h 
writes that: 'Whereas for many centuries the church main-
tained its claim to exercise a sole and exclusive authority 
in the interpretation of the N~wTestament, interpreting it 
in strict accordance with the later formularies of the 
fai th, 'and, in fact, not infrequently in terms of far later 
theologies, that right is now challenged, where it is not 
ignored, throughout the Protestant world ••• ' 
Now it is true that this quotation occurs in a context 
where it is maintai~ed that 'history still moves, always 
moves and that nothing, however sacred, ever continueth in 
2 one stay', but Grant does not make it clear, first, and 
less important, that there are now no pressing grounds, and 
from year to year, or monograph to monograph, there are less, 
to distinguish the New Testament from church int~rpreta.tion, 
for identica1s may not be distinguished; a.nd second, and 
more imp~rtant, that the interpretation of the New Testament 
is on~y relevant where it may be re-arranged, or transformed, 
1. p. 14. 
2~ ibid., p~ 15. 
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to interpret the Spirit. l 
For allegory was not wrong in what it tried to do, but 
in how it tried to do it. For 'to speculative minds it 
offered the only escape from the tyranny of the letter; 
despite its hopelessly unhistorical character it was thus in 
a sense an instrument· of progress Christians and pagans 
were alike schoolmen: they could not challenge the authority 
of ancient texts; they could only evade it by ~eading back 
2 their own thoughts into them.' 
" 
The problem, in the first 
instance, is not to interpret the past, but to interpret the 
present- through the past. 
But the question remains whether Bultmann is more than 
rhetorical and less than just in what he sometimes says on 
the relation between 'Mitteilung' (information) and 'Anrede' 
(address). Wittgenstein enumerates three ways in which the 
picture of the boxer may be understood and implies there are 
more. For the present purpose it is sufficient to point 
out that his picture contains both the possibility of 
'Mitteilung' and of 'Anrede'. 
Bultmann, however, sometimes speaks as if the possibility 
of I Anrede' excludes 'l-1i tteilung' • In the quotation above3 
1. Cf. Oman, Honest Religion, p. 104 (cit. T. M. Knox, JTS, 
Vol. XVII, Pt. 2; Oct. 1966, p. 549): 'Take the same 
l£berty with Paul as he veri freely did with Moses.' 
2. E. R.' Dodds, Pagan and Chr~stian in an Age of Anxiety, 
pp. l30f. 
3.' i.e. Glauben und Verstehen, 111, p. 7. 
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there is included the phrase: but only as address 
1 And, later in the same essay, he writes of 'die Predigt, 
die aber nicht vergegenw~rtigt in der Weise des Mitteilens 
von etwas Vergangenem, des Erinnerns daran, sondern als 
Anrede
J ~he sermon, lvhich however, does not make present by 
giving information about something in the past, by recalling 
it, but as addres~~' But he has written above, on the same 
page: 'In so far as the sermon gives information about 
something, it addresses at the same time ••• ' 
II 
I shall take 
this latter simultaneous possibility to be correct and for 
the reason that the man of faith is addressed by a reality, 
a concretion, by something done, so that both information 
and the claim on the man informed to decide are simply two 
distinguishable moments in an inseparable unity. 
In the following passage Ktlsemann describes the com-
plexity of this hermeneutic situation, in which information 
and address, or, in his own terms, narration and proclamation, 
are inseparably, if distinguishably, joined. And I quote 
the passage for the further reason that KHsemann is al~o 
aware that this-complex relation is f~rther comp~exified, in 
so far as the narration and the proclamation must change to 
cope wit~ new experience and new situat~ons, or, as Braun 
might" put it, 'secundum hominem recipientem'. ' ••• it was 
1. p. - 22. 
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Apocalyptic,' KAsemann writes,l 'that first made historical 
thinking within Christianity possible. For as in 
Apocalyptic the wor~d has a definite beginning and a def-
inite end, so too the course of history flows unrepeatably 
in a definite direction, divided into a sequence of clearly 
distinguished epochs. Accordingly each single thing has 
its fixed position, its uniqueness, its context and to 
these historical thinking returns. And from this too is 
derived the necessity not only of preaching the kerygma 
about Jesus, but of narrating it. Then there becomes 
possibie the unparalleled literary genre of the Gospels, 
which - despite all criticisms that have been with justice 
and ad nauseam levelled against understanding them as 
biographies - nevertheless provide a sort of life-history 
very much in their .?wn fashion, which is to say eschato-
logical in per~pective and interpretation. As the Passover 
Haggada of Judaism proves, Apocalyptic cannot dispense with 
recalling historical experiences of judgement and salvation, 
if it wishes to continue to encourage and to warn. ° 2 Nor 
1. Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 2, p. 95 (my tr.) 
2. I~ KAsemann's own words: '~ie (sc. Apok~lyptic) kann 
sich-auch nicht mit einer einfachen Fassung des 
Evangeliums be~ftftgen, weil sie die heilige Geschichte 
immer wieder in neue Situation hine!n und aus neuer 
Erfahrung heraus erzAhlen muss. Das Evangelium bleibt 
ohne die Evangeliennicht o ; was es ist. Kerygma wird, 
sofern es nicht auch erzAhlt wird, Proklamation einer 
Idee und, sofern es nicht immer neu erzAhlend gewonnen 
wird, historisches Dokument.' 
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can it be content with a simple conception of the Gospel, 
because it is always having to narrate the sacred history 
out of new experience to a new situation. The Gospel does 
not remain the Gospel without the Gospels. And in so far 
as the kerygma is not also narrated, it becomes the pro-
clamation of an idea and in so far as it is not always being 
recovered anew in narration; it becomes a mere historical 
document. t Kerygma, that is, is both proclamation and 
narration, information and address. 
.. 
It is both together, 
or it is neither. 
S~d redeamus ad rem. 
The second essay set out from Collingwoo~definition of 
1 history, that it is the science of res gestae, the attempt 
to answer questions about human actions done in the past. 
History may, of cou~se, be defined in other ways, as, for 
example, and, it is true, 'from the Christian standpoint', 
'the term by which we seek to understand the reality of God's 
2 
relation to man' 
However, it is llere presupposed that history and 
theology are distinct sciences and·that the theo~ogian, far 
from being allowed by the rules, .or mere presuppositions, of 
the game·· .. ~ played to introduce a definition that is private 
to one insti tu,tional' sector, must concede that the language 
1. The Idea of Historx, p. 9. 
2~ Gregor Smith, Secular Christianity, p. 68. 
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of Athenian science is universalisable even within the 
confines of Jerusalem. History, that is, means history, 
even within the policies of theology, even if anyone science 
be merely one pale within the to~al demesne, or, in 
1 Heidegger's terms, even if 'historiology ••• has Dasein's 
historicality as its presupposition in its own quite special 
way. ' It is, that is, here presupposed that there may be 
no scientific nostrum that is not also a vestrum, or, 'you 
2' 
must read your bible in the sawe way as you read Livy'. 
Thus, if the historical question, in this sense, is 
asked of the literature of the Gospels, to restrict our-
selves to these, then much of it falls to the ground, 
regarded as history. This does n'ot solve the problem, of 
course, but it reveals it 'in a way that is proper to our 
own questions. There is little use in exercising temerity 
by a critique of the historicity of virginal conception. 
1. Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. Macquarrie and Robinson, 
p. 444. 
2. A view of Lessing; v. Gregor Smith, op.cit., p. 70. I am 
here supposing that the theologian's history.belongs to 
the public discourse of all historians, in the same way 
as bioche~istry to all biochemists. To avoid another 
possible misunderstanding, I would not be thought to be 
crit~~ising Gregor Smith's definition above, although I 
think our empha~es are somewhat different. I begin from 
t~e supposition"of the 'paradoxical identity' of history 
and theology/eschatology, or in other terms, from the 
... supposition that history and theology are distinguishable, 
but inseparable. Gregor Smith, above, emphasises the 
inseparability of these sciences, while I am emphasising 
their distinguishability. 
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Accordingly the second essay took the resurrection £or its 
theme and concluded that 'it may well be that no images at 
1 
all can be utilized out o£ the traditional store', £or it 
was suggested that i£ the word '£act' is understood 
etymologically and historically, historically, that is, in 
the ordinary or secular sense of history, as something done 
by someone in the past, then resurrection cannot be said to 
be something that Jesus o£ Nazareth did. 
But this, I think, is sca..rcely to begin to practise 
theology, i£ interpretation is withheld and the rude re-
mainder eliminated. But if the development o£ one ' science 
has the consequence that the bthers be re-organised, then 
the approach that -theology has been making since the late 
eighteenth century, however negative and destructive o£ 
icons that have bee~ apotropaeic £or an 'incorrigible 
plurality,2 o£ Christian time, is one that, if it is not the 
beginning of theology, shows where it is proper to begin it. 
But it was £urther suggested that i£ what Jesus did is 
what God did and this past is understood as present, as, 
indeed, all past is, and i£ the word God implies, no less 
than £reedom to engage in it, an indi££erence to history, 
1. G~egor Smith, op.cit., p. 76. I did not there use these 
words, but it is what I meant. 
2. I have taken the phrase £rom a poem o£ Louis MacNeice 
(which I cannot now locate), where he speaks o£ 'the 
incorrigible plurality o£ things' in the world. 
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then the death of Jesus may be confronted as much without 
anxiety as without mythology. 
If, the third essay maintained, the things that Jesus 
did were the actions of God and .the words said by the early 
church were the words of God, then why should what Jesus 
said not be, any less than his deeds, the words of God? 
That is to say, both the words of Jesus and the words of the 
early church are kerygma. The two kerygmata are scarcely 
distinguished because one is present and'the other is not; 
for all history is present. The shift in formulation, from 
'the preacher to the preached', for example, depends on the 
shifted situation out of which the question is asked. The 
two kerygmata are distinguished by nothing that makes the 
term improper to either. 
The situation may be summed up as follows: the word 
'kerygma' has come to the fore in a post-eighteenth century 
context where history has come to the fore. The history 
that has come to the fore where kerygma has come to the fore 
is a record of words said and deeds done ,like any other piece 
of hi~tory and no special historical method applies, even if 
this history is also open to be understood theologically in 
a special way. The segment of history that is under 
examination is not only what was said and done after Jesus 
was executed, but what was said and done by him. 
It should also be pointed out that this summary, from 
115. 
the theological point of view, is incomplete. On the other 
hand, it poses the theological question in a way that is 
appropriate, it is suggested, to the current historical 
situation, or, in other words, God's contemporary acts. 
The Problem 
The problem under consideration in the present essay 
might be stated as follows: with what justification does the 
historian speak of kerygma when what confront him are 
kerygmata? With what justification may he speak of a 
1 
'common Gospel' when he is confronted by a plurality of 
'gospels? Moreover, if Scripture doth greatly err not only 
in matters of fact, such as Luke's transposition of Quirinius' 
2 
census to a date some ten years before it happened, but in 
theology, too, as the rigorism of Matthew3 or Luke's picture 
CJ Fro, v , W hIt:.. h h ~ r c.l. I '7 c- 0 , n C. ( e-l e...j w I l-h r &~ u I' f I' I c.f-v (' ~ 
1. So Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 14. 
2. v. Creed, St. Luke (Macmillan Commentaries), p. 29: 'These 
considerations point to the conclusion that Luke has 
transposed the well-known census of Quirinius to a date 
3. 
some ten or eleven years before it actually took place " 
KAsemann op.cit., 2, p. 84: 'Mit Recht hat ihn {sc. :r.latthAus~ A. Schlatter {Der Evangelist MatthAus, 2. Aufl., 
1933 (referred to by KAsemann ad loc.)) als ethischen 
Rigoristen und als Vertreter eines beginnenden christlichen 
Rabbinates beschrieben.' and, less pejoratively, Bornkamm, 
RGG, '111, art. 'Evangelien, synoptische', Sp. 763: 'Das 
Gesetz und seine Gt11tigkeit bis zum Jota und HAkchen 
(5,18f.) und die'Abwehr der.Gesetzlosigkeit sind das 
zentrale Thema und bestimmen das VerstAndnis der Reichs-
~predigt' Jesu, seiner MessianitAt und die eschatologishbe 
Erwartung. ' 
--------------------~---------------~.-- .. -----.--.---
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of himself;l that is, if not only 'Tats~dhenkritik' 
{criticism in matters of fact} but also 'Sachkritik' 
{theological criticism} is in order, by what criterion is 
the kerygma to be determined from amidst a cacophony of 
discrepant confessional voices? Has any New Testament 
author normative authority? Has any author anywhere? 
For the present essay let a statement of KHsemann serve 
as starting point, who writes: I ••• that the historical 
period that came before the writing of the gospels was 
filled with theological tensions of the strongest kind and 
knew what was more or less a strife of confessions, which in 
the positions they fought over boasted of possessing ~ the 
Spirit themselves and at the same time measured their 
opponents by their own cri'terion of what the Spiri twas. 1.2 
1. HHnchen, op.cit'., p. 100: 'das lukanische Pau1usbi1d 
stimmt nicht mit dem der paulinischen Briefe fiberein.' 
2. KHsemann, op.cit., 2, p., 83 {my tr.}. Since the 18th 
cent. and especially in recent years the historical-
critical method, working with the tools of source 
cri ticism, 'Formgeschichte' and'Redaktionsgeschichte', has 
made it possible to reconstruct with increasing refinement 
and sophistication the history of the actions and the 
ideas of Jesus and the early church. That history is com-
plex, pluralist and reveals competing and contradictory 
theologies. The critic is thus confronted by a plurality 
of what I call 'kerygmata' and thus with the question what 
each grouping and individual within the early church took 
the -Gospel to be and then with the question, whether he 
answers it or not, what the critic understands by the 
G.ospel. Accordingly, the Q,L6.XPLOC,J; 7CVeUllO,'twv becomes a 
question of the first importance. Which is the right 
ans~er': I Enthusiasmus I, the Hellenists, James, the 
'presentist' eschatology of John, the Gospel of Paul -
which he failed to demythologise (Bultmann}/which it is 
quite wrong to demythologise (KHsemann), and etc.? It is 
in/{continued on following page) 
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Early theology may only with difficulty be reconstrued. 
However, the evangelical strata are nowadays commonly, and, 
ve.t" be.'\-
perhaps, crudely, divided into ipsissima~ Palestinian, 
Jewish-Hellenistic and Hellenistic Christianity.l These 
four kerygmata, in whatever literary form they occur, are 
further augmented by the kerygmata of the authors in which 
the earlier kerygmata are embedded. And then there is Paul 
and John, to go no further. 
There is, of course, no need to infer that variation 
implies contradiction.' It is only a foolish man who will 
ask the same question in different situations and the heretic 
may only be hunted if to the same question different answers 
are being offered. 'What is the gospel?' is a question 
that has no location and it is part of wisdom to ask the 
right question. An historical man mus"t ask instead l-That 
t~e kerygma was for a Palestinian Christian, for Matthew, 
etc. ; and what the kerygma is for me. That is to say, the 
adequacy, or truth of a document must be measured by its 
ability to deal with the situation for which it was written. 
On the other hand, whe~e divergent answers are given to the 
same question, one, or both, must be in error. 
(continued from previous page) in this particular historical 
work that KHsemann excells '( though I should perhaps wish 
~ to criticise him for assuming, rather too hastily, that 
Paul - together, one might add, with Martin Luther -stands 
in the theological centre of the canon). . 
1. e.g. Hahn, op.cit. pp. llf., and 'Fuller, The New Testament 
in Current Study, 8P. 84. 
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It may be true that the Tfibingen school was misled 
by a philosophical theory to exaggerate divergencies within 
the early church but it is no solution either in life or 
the sciences which study it, t,o 'pour all the balm o:f 
Gilead on the least ripple of vinegar',l to deny, for 
example, the 'divergence of the kerygma of Peter, which 
summoned Gentiles to assume Jewry, :from the kerygma o:f 
Paul, which urged them, without the law, to 'put' on' Christ. 
And both these kerygmata are~extant, even i:f the :former 
must be inductively reconstrued. But to decide here for 
Paul need not, of course, imply that he is always right 
2 
elsewhere. 
That is the case of extant3 contradiction; but there 
1. I am indebted to a friend for this expression. The 
defect o:f the .. Ttlbingen school was to have wri tten history 
on the basis o:f a preconceived theory. Although Hahn is 
not working with a philosophical theory, as F. C. Baur 
with Hegel, it is a de:fect of his book that he over-
systematises the early theological developments. It is 
perhaps unnecessary to point out thatthe example which 
lies at the back of my mind in this paragraph is the dis-
agreement between Paul and Peter in Gal. 2 and the 
theological divergence that that disagreement implied. 
2. The fact o:f 'theological tensions of the strongest kind' 
and 'what was more or less a stri:fe o:f con:fessions' 
raises the question of 'the canon within the canon'. I 
ask here with what right Paul should occupy the centre 
of-.. the canon, as many Lutherans assume, and, further, 
even if Paul is granted that position, whether, even 
.. then, he is right in everything that he says ~ And the 
same question arises with the Synoptics, i:f Matthew was 
a .. rigorist, Luke a 'historiciser', etc. 
3. Extant, i.e. in,Gal. 2. 
are other instances where what is extant contradicts 
something else that is not, if, for example, it is true 
'that the fourth gospel mirrors the historical development 
which leads from the enthusiasts in Corinth and from 
2 Tim. 2:18 to Christian gnosticism, so that its inclusion 
in the church's canon was effected 'errorehominum et 
providentia Dei,.l How the critic concludes that John, 
I 
'let us call him that, has fouled the rules of the Johannine 
language-game is an importantwquestion. But here it is 
necessary nicely to distinguish and keep unconfused two 
criteria: one that belongs to John's history and one that 
is the critic's. If John presupposed what John presupposed, 
how should his game be judged right and wrong? I:f I pre-
suppose what I do, by what measure do I judge what I have 
written to be true .. or false? There ,is, that is, both a 
past historical and a present historical criterion. 2 By 
what process are they reached and, then, how are we to 
relate them when we have :found them? Are we to state the 
1. Kgsemann, Jesu Letzer Wille, p. 132 (my tr.). And c:f. 
ibid., pp. l29:f., and also the contrasting view o~ Dodd, 
~Apostolic Preaching, p. 75: 'It is in the Fourth 
Gospel, lv-hich in form and expression, as probably in 
date, stands :farthest from the original tradition o:f the 
teaching, that we have the most penetrating exposition of 
its (sc. the teaching of Jesus) central meaning.' 
2: I mean by this that i:f John presupposed certain things 
~»ere was a right solution to the questions raised by 
these. Our presuppositions are, however, di:f:ferent and 
we have to discover the right solution to the questions 
our presuppositions raise. 
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matter as 'the question as to the continuity of the gospel 
in the discontinuity of the times and the variation 6f the 
1 kerygma
'
? Is the problem to be stated in terms of con-
tinuity? In terms of identity? 
The starting point of the present observatio~is the 
three lectures, and suppl-ement, of Dodd, entitled: The 
Apostolic Preachine and its Developments. The question at 
issue is not whether what was said in public oration in the 
book of Acts reproduces what was said in early days by the 
Christians of Jerusalem, being translations, or not, from 
the Aramaic, or what was said by the Hellenistic Christians 
of 75 A.D., or merely the personal views of what is sometimes 
. t . .. 12 hI' 11 h ~ termed a Ih1s or1c1s1ng t eo og1an, ~r even a t ree o~ 
these in varied stratification or conglomeration. Whether 
or no 'scholarly op.inion has shiften sharply,3 and whether 
or no that opinion can be called knowledge, will not be 
discussed, even if I must confess the cogency of H~nchen's 
views,4 that the composition of the speeches in Acts are the 
1. 
2. 
KAsemann, Exe etische Versuche und Besinnun en~ 1, p. 213 
(cit. Robinson, op.cit., p. 13 Robinson's tr.}). 
e.g. K~semann, ~., 1, p. 215: ••• wAhrend Lukas 
historisierend und die Heilsgeschichte als Entwicklungr 
~prozess schildernd zum ersten Male ein sogenanntes 
Leben Jesu sch~eibt.' 
3.~ Robin~bn, op.cit., p. 58, -f.n. 1. 
4. HAnchen, op.cit. 
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work of Luke and that his book represents not so much the 
theology 'of the time of which he wrote, but of the time 
when he wrote. It is not Dodd's conclusions, but his pre-
suppositions that I wish, in the first instance, to examine. 
If what I am here proposing is not merely a wilful or 
uncomprehending misrepresentation, which is designed by the 
critic for the purpose of refuting what the author did not 
say, in crudest outline Dodd presupposes a kerygma that ''las 
fundamental and which was common to the Apostles. This 
1 
'Jerusalem kerygma', ex.tant in Acts and reconstrued out of 
Paul, was further developed by Mark and John, and from it 
Matthew and Luke diverge. 
Suppose we concede for a moment that embedded in the 
Acts speeches or in certain of them2 and in the Epistles of 
Paul, there is recoverable the Jerusalem kerygma, which is 
common to both (though whether this, in fact, so is a 
question that arises, but lv-hich I shall not consider) • 
And a further question whether, or to lv-hat extent, it is 
ever possible to speak of a 'common gospel', whether, ,that 
is, individual Christians, who were permanentlY'or tempor-
arilYMsettled in Jerusalem, would not, under an examination 
sufficiently Socratic, or Baconian, break dOlVll and confess 
to as many heterodoxies, or orthodoxies, if any human 
1. Dodd's term, e.g. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 25. 
2. v. Dodd's table, ~~., at the end of the book. 
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thinking deserves the name, each man interpreting as he 
was able, as there were interrogations, will, too, for a 
moment be shelved. 
And then two questions arise: how does what Luke 
thought relate to w·hat the Jerusalem Christians thought, 
and, second, how does what Paul thought relate to what he 
has included of the Jerusalem kerygma. And, indeed, how 
does any historically iso1ab1e kerygma relate to any other? 
My intention here is not to analyse such differences 
from the Jerusalem kerygma as the 'Enteschato1ogisierung,l 
('de~eschato1ogising') of Luke, or the OLXnLOO~Yn XWpC, 
2 v6~ou of Paul, but, assuming them, to discuss what they 
signify. 
By way of converging on the problem by negation, I will 
discuss; first, t~~ remarks of Dodd. In his conclusion to 
The Apostolic Preaching he writes: 3 'first that within the 
New Testament there is an immense range of variety in the 
interpretation that is given to the kerygma; and, secondly, 
that in all such interpretation the essential elements of 
the original kerygma are steadily kept in view.,' 
But, as Dodd concedes to be apparent in an extreme 
1. For the fact, not the wor~, v. KHsemann, Exegetische 
Versuche und Besinnungen, 2, pp. 29f. 
2 • Rom. 3: 21. 
3. p. 74. 
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case, the book of the Revelation of John is evidence of a 
1 
'relapse into a pre-Christian eschatology'. But, just as 
to concede that the predictions of the passion are vaticinia 
ex eventu is to set foot on that slippery slope which leads 
to a breathless retention of 'Abba', supplemented, with 
some good fortune, by 'Amen', so the man who makes a con-
cession here will be lucky if he escapes with his life and 
the succinct confession: 'I~aoU, KUpLO,. How, that is, 
do matters stand where we do not have the clarity of an 
.. 
2 
extreme? 
1. ibid., p. 40. 
2. The question at issue is 'How does one decide what a 
correct statement of the Gospel is?' Now Barth, for 
example, takes (I am told) In. 1:14 as his starting 
point. The interpreter is then faced with two questions, 
with what I have called 'the past historical criterion' 
and 'the present historical criterion' - or, in this case, 
perhaps rather three: John's, Barth's and the inter-
preter's. He must ask: 'Did John mean the right thing 
by In. 1:14, or does he interpret his remark, perhaps, 
docetically (cf. KHsemann, Jesu Letzter Wille, p. 129: 
' ••• die konsequente Darstellung Jesu als des fiber die 
Erde· schreitenden Gottes ••• ,)? And he must ask, second, 
'What does Barth make of what John says? Is Barth, 
perhaps, guilty of 'Offenbarungspositivismus' (v. Prenter 
in World Come of Age, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer .and Karl 
Barth's Positivism of Revelation', pp. 93ff.)? Thirdly, 
he must ask: 'By what criterion do I measure Barth? Now 
Dodd seems to be taking the kerygma as reconstructed out 
of Acts as his starting-point. He might argue that, 
chronologically, this is the earliest kerygma we have. 
This is far from proven (v. HHnchen, op.cit.), but, even 
'if he is right, is the theological question, 'What is 
the gospel:?' to be decided by chronology? As soon as he 
admits that any document, or even any view w'ithin any 
document, is divergent, he cannot avoid the question of 
what his theological criterion is,a quettion that I would 
judge he has neither raised nor solve~. ~Abba' and 'Amen' 
are judged to be ipsissima verba. Jeremias has made a 
special examination of theseJ 
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Throughout The Apostolic Preaching Dodd everywhere 
supposes that there is one kerygma or 'fundamental 
1 Christian mes~age', however much it be interpreted in 
I) 
'fresh and invigorating forms'.~ 
'fundamental message' to be found? 
But where is this 
The seat of the matter is, we are to understand, the 
Jerusalem kerygma. 
Dodd's aim is to move away from an 'analytical stage 
3 4, 
of criticism' to the construction of,a 'synthesis', or, 
if 'synthesis' is an inadequate term, to the exploration 
of 'the common faith,.5 The task is hard enough to warrant 
the question whether it is not misconceived; not totally 
misconceive~, perhaps, but misconceived in such a way tha~ 
the truth of the question is implicated in error. 
Despite the meagre advancement of the argument it may 
illuminate the matter further to take up the second remark 
of Dodd, where he, somewhat, or altogether, with Paul (Dodd 
quotes 1 Cor. 3:l0sqq.), compares the relation of the kerygma 
to its interpretation to that between 'foundation' and 
'superstructure'. 6 According to Dodd, then, there is a 
1. p. 75. 
2. ~. 
J. ~., p. 74. .. 
4 ... ~. 
5. ~. 
6. ~., p. 10. 
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clear distinction between 'what Paul was accustomed to 
preach as Gospel' and 'the theological superstructure of 
his thought',l or between 'the fundamental Gospel and the 
higher wisdom,.2 
Even if Dodd correctly recounts Paul's account, what 
Paul is doing may not be '-That he says he is doing. For, 
suppose Pier Luigi Nervi were commissioned to complete an 
unfinished Gothic foundation and he then completed it in 
his ow'n style, it would require no discerning archi tect to 
note a discrepancy between the foundation that was laid 
and what w:as buil t upon it. If unity is a criterion, an 
architect requires his own foundation. For if Nervi was 
asked to build in his own style, he would either have to 
design a foundation that was appropriate to his own building, 
or, if he was asked to complete an ancient building, of 
which the foundation was already laid, he would have not 
only to subordinate his own individual idiosyncrasies, but 
also to relinquish the historical stage that the art of 
architecture had reached in his own time. 
That is the obvious case. The matter is less clear 
where the phenomenon is in process, where identity to the 
untrained eye turns out on expert examination to be mistaken • 
.. 
Such as, for example, the flying buttress, which continues 
". 
1. ibid., p. 11. 
2. ibid., p. 10. 
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to be included no longer for structural, but fe)'r tradi tiona1 
reasons; and such as Davidic descent 'in which Paul does 
not seem to have been particularly interested,l - and this 
is the very means by which what is earlier and traditional 
can be detected. If such i'nstances do not already indicate 
a new foundation, they point to its future arrival, for a 
transition is a transition to something. 
The problem is, then: confronted by a plurality of 
kerygmata, in what sense may one speak of one kerygma? If 
It 
many foundations are unearthed', how are they to be related, 
or is that attempt impossible and illegitimate? 
Suppose one asks how many foundations, or kerygmata, 
there are, three may be cited, not because there are not 
more than three, but because three are sufficient for the 
present purpose. Once again it should be noted that what 
is so distinguished need not be separable, though much '\vill 
depend on hOlv what is inseparable, if it is, is joined. 
First, it would be 'possible to say that Jesus of 
Nazareth is the foundation; which formulation is chosen 
as being without the confusing overtones of 'Jesus Christ 
and him crucified'. 2 Second, it would be possible to say: 
1. i·6id., p. 14. Davidic desc'ent, which had been an 
important element in certain Palestinian theologies, is 
a mere relic "in Paul's theology, which he was not yet 
able to see fit to exclude. 
2. 1 Cor. 2:2. 
---
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the Jerusalem kerygma - that is on the assumption either 
that we have it or can assume it. The third foundation 
can be sta~ed in four ways.as (a) what I say, (b) what I do, 
with their paradoxically identical correlates: (c) what 
God says to me and (d) what God does to me. And this 
third possibility must be capable of statement without 
Montanist or Anabaptist l defects. 
A kerygma is its own foundation. There is not one 
foundation, one kerygma, be it what Jesus said, or what the 
It 
Jerusalem church said, or the like, to which all other 
analogous 'language-events' are related as 'interpretations'. 
These 'interpretations' are themselves kerygmata, directly, 
if the literary form is address; in other forms, 
indirectly. lfuat Jesus said and what the Jerusalem church 
said are past kerygmata and as such objects of the 
historian's study. What a Christian says nOlo[ is kerygma 
and has passed into history as soon as lyhat he was to say 
was said. 
Dodd's assertion that there is one kerygma in the New 
Testament which is interpreted in an immense variety of 
ways is a fundamentally unhistorical statement. For it 
1. If" these essays could be described as an attempt to lay 
the foundation of a theologia Spiritus, it would be 
"relevant, at some point, to clarify their relation to 
Montanism and Anabaptism, to mention no others. I 
content myself here with recognising the problem, but do 
not undertake to examine it. 
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presupposes that what has been presupposed by Christians 
has been the same 'semper, ubique, ab omnibus'. To speak 
of the kerygma simpliciter is an abstraction, where the 
answer to the question, ' lfuose kerygma? t is not. A casual 
comparison o:f Hi tschl and Calvin 'vi th. the Jerusalem kerygma, 
or, to remain by the same, or rather, changing literary 
. 
form, of Colet and Chrysostom with the Jerusalem kerygma 
should swiftly dispel the illusion of eternity. Or even 
of Paul and John. 
" Why Dodd is not thinking historically is a separate 
question, whether, that is, he is platonising, or some 
such, and will not be examined here. But not only in 
Essay II ,.,as Dodd shown to be thinking unhistorically about 
the resurrection, by failing to distinguish at the proper 
joint history from eschatology, as well as failing to 
distinguish a particular eschatology composed of deter-
minants quite alien to historical thinking from the kind of 
eschatology that belongs to a situation where historical 
thinking is the dominant scientific model, but here too 
Dodd is working with an unhistorical conception of identity 
in the ke_rygma. 
N For the kind of identity that Dodd presupposes is like 
that o£ the centre of the one circle, whereas the kind of 
,. -
identity that belongs to the kerygma, historically under-
stood", is the identi ty of a process where, in Collingwood's 
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1 term, w"hat is earlier is 'incapsulnted' in what is later, 
and is analogous to the way in which a man can look at a 
picture of himself as a child and still assert that that 
2 
was he. But only analogous, for history is not a person, 
but persons in community, some of these contemporary, to 
speak sarkically, some not. 
If the reader has been convinced, he and I have by now 
seen no need to refuse the appellation kerygma to what 
Jesus said,3 nor of canonisil1:g what was merely one moment 
It 
in the history of kerygma in such a way that other sermons 
should either be prescribed as heretical or relegated as 
interpretation. 
But, lastly, I wish to conclude these tentative 
adumbrations by asking about the transition from past 
kerygma to present kerygma, from 'what ,~as kerygma and has 
been handed dOwn"' to 'kerygma which happens in the present'. LJ 
Some other questions that range themselves in the penumbra 
of this question concern the crisis of authority and 
whether anything new can happen in history. 
1. An Autobiographx, p. 98. 
2. NI am indebted for this observation toa remark in 
conversation by, Prof. RUckert of Tfibingen. 
3. v. supra: Essay III. 
"'4. Ebeling's terms (Theologie und Verldlndigung, p. 40)" are 
'Uberliefertes, gewesenes Kerygma' and 'gegenwartig 
geschehendes Kerygma'. 
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Theologically speaking, the moment has a triple 
structure, as it consists of tradition, situation and the 
Spirit. It is, in the first place, important to be quite 
clear that the past cannot be more than an ancillary norm 
for the present; 
cannot be resolved other than by taking a risk or allowing 
the Spirit to do it. To remain content with previous 
norms in religion is like clinging, in questions of ethics, 
to 'the low-grade morality of custom .and precept,.2 
Suppose, by ,..ray of illustration, we take Collingwood IS 
analysis of a process into the stages PI, P2, P3. In P2 
not only is PI 'incapsulated' , but something else is added, 
if addition is an adequate term for a more subtle reaction. 
And so on. And addition may only be described in the 
dialectical categories of continuity and its opposite and 
may only be made "by guess or by God. 3 
1. 1 Cor. 12:10,,· 
2. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 106. 
3. These brief, concluding remarks are somewhat expanded 
in Essay V. 
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KERYGr-fA AND ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS 
The Presuppositions 
The purpose of this final essay is to clarify and 
expound; it is not to take the matter further, but to say 
more clearly what has been already said. What is to be 
. 1 
expounded is a set, or 'constellation', of absolute pre-
suppositions, expounded in some sort o~ order, and, it is 
hoped, 'consupponible,2 without undue strain. And these 
presuppositions are, I suggest, the necessary ones, for 
answering the question, ,.;hat kerygma is. 
After enquiry, three documents were eventually selected 
for concentration. They were The Apostolic Preaching and 
its Developments by Dodd (1936), The Relation of the Early 
Christian Message of Christ to the Historical Jesus by 
Bul tmann (1960), ··and Ebeling's Theology and Proclamation 
(1962) • 
1. 
2. 
Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 66: 'I speak of 
a set of absolute presuppositions, because if metaphysics 
is an historical science the things which it studies, 
namely absolute presuppositions, are historical facts; and 
anyone who is reasonably well acquainted with historical 
work knows that there is no such thing as.an historical 
fact which is not at the same time a complex of historical 
facts. Such a complex of historical facts I call a 
- 'constellation'.' 
.-
The relation bet,.;een these 'absolute presupposi tions I is 
not (~., p. 67) 'a relation of such a kind that a 
"" person supposing anyone" of them is logically commi tted to 
supposing all or indeed any of the others.' But (ihiQ., 
p. 66) 'since they are all suppositions, each must be 
consupponible with all the others; that it, it must be 
logically possible for a person who supposes anyone of 
them to suppose concurrently all the rest.' 
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But the method chosen was hot to expound what these 
men had already said, but, presupposing that, to reveal 
that which, on the basis of presuppositions different from 
theirs,l they had not said rightly. More exactly, then, 
the question that was being asked was not what another, but 
what I took kerygma to be. 
Nor did this consupponib1e constellation spring into 
existence fully grown. ' The roots, rather~ of the con-
ception were three. For ,it originated in an acquaintance 
with the New Testament studies, or, better, conclusions, of 
the, form-critics, with the existential philosophy of 
Heidegger and of Bultmann, in 50 far as I could understand 
it, and, before any other, perhaps, with the historiography 
1. By 'different from theirs' I mean: (1) that I disagree 
with Dodd on., where he distinguishes history from 
eschatology (this disagreement would, I think, be 
supported by Bultmann); (2) that I disagree with Bu1tmann 
by asserting Jesus' words to be kerygma (it is con-
ceivable that Dodd would be able to support this view); 
(3) although I have not undertaken any criticism of 
Ebeling, as what he is trying to say and w'hat T am trying 
to say is 'post-Bultmannian', so that properly he should 
not be included in 'different from theirs', yet perhaps 
I may be a110'\ved to say that I disagree wi th the promin-
ence he gives to 'the Word', which is a concept I do not 
follow, and refer, if I may, to Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. 
Oakeshott, Collier Classics, New York, The Crowell-Collier 
- Publishing Co., 1962, p.' 39: f And therefore you shall 
hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that 
is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman 
seldom hearS"our Saviour called by the name of parole, 
but by the name of verbe often; yet verbe and parole 
difter no more, but that one is Latin, the other French. ~ 
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of Collingwood. For if the inhabitants of Jerusalem have 
no alternative but to use the language of Canaan, and if it 
is true, as it may not be, that history is the appropriate 
model for scientific thinking, then here, in Collingwood's 
writing, was an accurate pellucidity, if, too, an orientation 
to history that was made, that relegated the making of it to 
1 the second place. 
The preceding pages have hinted at more questions than 
attempts have been made to answer them, so that this ··thesis 
represents rather a programme for thought than a finished 
performance. But in a subject, the invisibility of whose 
object gives the greater occasion for talking nonsense, even 
if it is not true that everything that can be said can be 
said simply, it is as well, at w~atever cost, be it only 
2 less than falsehood and provided the Spirit be not quenched, 
.. lxf"..-e 
to speak with the mind but five words, Aten thousand in a 
1. What Collingwood is writing about in The Idea of History 
is about the science of history. His questions are con-
cerned, primarily, with the history that has been made 
and our knowledge of it and he was only incidentally con-
cerned with the making of history in the present, which 
is, I think, Heidegger's primary concern, for whom 
'historio10gy' was only of incidental interest. In 
Heidegger's·terms, Collingwood was primarily concerned 
~with 'historiology', Heidegger with 'historicality' (cf. 
Heidegger, op.cit., p. 444: f ••• historiology ••• has 
Da·sein's historicali ty as its presupposi tion in its own 
quite specia~ way.' and cf. Bu1tmann f s criticism of 
... Collingwood, History and' Eschatology, Gifford Lectures, 
1957, p. 136). 
2. 1 Thess. 5:19. 
1 tongue. 
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At the least, kerygma is words spoken. And to say 
'words' is to exclude acts. But the exclusion of acts is 
not an exclusion on principle, but a methodological ex-
clusion. And this is. because the question I am asking is 
not about pragma' (act), but about kerygma. 
Not, however, that the two can be separated, although 
they may be distinguished. For they must al,,,,ays occur 
together, as distinguishable aspects of the one unity. 
It 
And this unity I call 'existence'; existence is the unity 
of word and act. But, if they do not occur together, then 
they are occurring as abstractions from the rich unity of 
. t 2 eX1S ence. 
If kerygma is words, are these words spoken by all men 
or just by some men? I answer: kerygma is the words of 
Christians. 
And ,,,,hat, then, is a Christian? 
1. 1 Cor. 14:19. 
2. Descartes: Cogito ergo sum; Hamann {Gregor Smith, ~. 
Hamann, p. 24; cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, p. 302 (cit. Gregor Smith, ibid., p. 45): 
' ••• the individual puts an end to the mere possibility 
and identifies himself with the content of his thought in 
order to exist in it.'): Sum ergo cogito; Macmurray (v. _ 
op.cit.): Ago ergo cogito; I am saying here: Ago et 
cogito: sci~icet sum {Ebeling, Luther, Einfllhrung in sein 
Denken, p. 71, might imply something similar with his 
term 'T~twort' (cf. the term he uses in common with Fuchs, 
" t Sprachereignis t ), but- his emphasis is' on the latter half 
of that word; cf. , ibid., p. 61: '... dass... die 
Reformation Sache a'ilein des 'vortes sei.') 
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The Christian man is one, whose existence (words and 
acts) is qualified by the existence (words and acts) of 
Jesus of Nazareth, in such a way that his responsibility for 
others is made radical; and this responsibility is freedom. 
To say 'qualified' means that on each occasion he is 
made the sort he is by a free and responsible relation to 
Jesus of Nazareth. And this relation is an historical 
relation, of the same kind as a man's relation to William 
Wallace, the only difference being that the words and acts 
It 
of William Wallace were the words and acts of God, but 
qualified by lack of freedom and responsibility. Qualified, 
that is, if you must have it so, by sin. But that is to 
anticipate, for we are, at present, arguing 'etsi deus non 
1 daretur' • 
To say that one is 'qualified by Jesus of Nazareth' is 
to say, in the first place, that one is qualified by the man 
who is ascertained by historical science to have been, and 
to have 'been for others,.2 And by science is meant both 
1. 
2. 
Bonhoeffer uses the phrase e.g. Letters and Papers from 
Prison, p. 195. The origin of the phrase, I am informed 
by Prof. Gregor Smith, is Grotius and no doubt occurs in 
the context of a discussion of 'natural law' (Elze, RGG, 
111, art. 'Grotius', Sp. l885f.: 'Dieses (sc. das Natur-
_ recht) ••• hAtte seine Geltung auch, wenn es Gott nicht 
gAbe.'), but I have not been able to locate the reference. 
The phrase is Bonhoeffer's, ibid., p. 209. His own words 
are (Widerstand und Erg~bung~ebenstern-Taschenbuch), 
p. 191: 'Begegnung mit Jesus Christus. Erfahrung, dass 
Jesus nur "ftir andare da ist". Das "Ftir-andere-da-sein" 
"jesu ist die Transzend~nzerfahrung.' 
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the kind that is practised by professors and the kind that 
is practised by servant-girls,l for, despite the fact that 
there are many who operate below the threshold of arti-
culateness, nevertheless to remember is human. 
By ~historical' is meant that history, which is defined 
by Collingwood as the study of the actions of human beings 
in the past. Not that the theologian, of course, has an 
object of study that is different from the actions of human 
beings - in the past, if he is a biblical scholar or 'church 
II 
historian; in the present, if he is a systematic theologian 
or,dogmatist - but that the theological facts are not only 
historical facts and involve not only the risk of imaginative 
2 
reconstruction, but faith. 
But, in the first place, by 'Jesus of Nazareth' is meant 
both the 'mere that', that he existed, and the 'mere how', 
., 
that he existed for others. 
The meaning of 'to exist for' is more precisely ex-
pressed in the categories of 'freedom' and 'responsibility'. 
And then the obvious polarity of these two categories is 
1. Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
p. 19: 'I Johannes Climacus, 'born in this city and now 
thirty years old, a common ordinary human being like most 
people, assume that there awaits me a highest good, an 
eternal happiness, in the same sense that such a good 
awaits a ssrvant-girl ~r a professor.' 
2. "I allude, again, to the 'a priori imagination' of 
Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 241. 
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further heightened to the point of paradox by their equation, 
sc. 'this responsibility is freedom'. This is deliberate, 
for it indicates a problem - or is it a solution? - along 
the lines of ' ••• whose service is perfect freedom,.l But 
as a problem, or a solution, I shall leave it, hot because 
nothing more need be said, but because the issue would per-
vert the direction of the present argument. 
God himself, if he is, and the word we use to call him 
that are much abused. . And there is a time, both for 
persons and, no doubt, for 6ultures, to speak of aphasia. 
But, at 'least for th,e thinker in his study, who is willing 
to suppose that when he talks of God he is neither un-
necessarily multiplying what is not, nor making the creature 
of his own despair, it will hardly be enough to season his 
humanism with a suggestion of something more. 2 What, then, 
is meant to say that 'the freedom and responsibility is made 
radical'? 
An age of rapid social change is an age of anxiety. 
What if God were one that suffered in and saved men for that 
world, enabling them, by leaving them alone, to suffer and 
enjoy it? Let us suppose that this is ~o. 
1: The phrase is found in the Sacramentaries of Gelasius and 
Gregory the Great:. '.e. cui servire est regnare.' 
2.·· I find myself sympathetic to the question of van Buren, 
op.cit., but not his solution. 
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By 'God', then, I will mean that which keeps.me 
absolutely safe. When the definition is introduced by a 
word no more pronominal than the word 'that', I mean that, 
if we go so far as to speak of God as 'person', we have no 
real need to suppose that in himself, he is one; though 
persons can hardly go less, in the same way as no-one would 
suppose· the language of horses to be less than equine, or of 
oxen less than bovine - though, for those horses that have 
experience of persons, it would be nice to enquire whether 
their equipment would be sufficient for them to speak of it. 1 
God-talk, in short, is analogical. 
By 'absolutely safe' is meant, merely, that no thing in 
life, nor one's leaving of it, could make that safety 
insecure, though, lest assertion should seem to run, more 
than need be, in advance of ignorance, the rest is silence. 
For if what we know of life convinces us of God's care, we 
may, perhaps, presume his sufficiency for what we do not. 
But what is the connection between this talk of God and 
what was said of Jesus? 
Now, if theological statements are, in Collingwood's 
1.I refer to the fragment of Xenophanes, , who remarks 'that 
if horses could reflect on the semblance of the gods, 
they would 'portray them as horses.' (Macquarrie, 
Twentieth Century Religious Thought, London, SCM Press 
.. Ltd., 1963, p. 57.) .. 
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sense, 'absolute presuppositions',l that is, do not depend 
on questions, but on them questions depend, then the question 
of the manner of their relation is banned at the bar of the 
Spirit as a pseudo-metaphysical anathema. For we have 
arrived at the paradox and conclude with, or begin from, the 
belief, the fact, the believed fact, the not-onlY-historical 
fact, ~ they are related. The question 'how' is solved 
and the Gordian knot is cut by proving the question to be 
2 
.illusory. 
To suppose the paradox is to suppose that what Jesus 
did was what God did and that what Jesus said God said. By 
what Jesus did and said is meant his historical acts and 
words as ascertained by historical science. And these· 
1. 
2. 
For the equation of metaphysics and theology v •. 
Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. lO;~~rites 
(paraphrasing Aristotle): 'The ordinary name for that 
which is the logical ground of everything else is God. 
The most adequate, explicit, and easily intelligible name 
for the science which in its relation to other sciences 
is alternatively called First Science or Wisdom, the name 
which tells us what it is about, is therefore Theology. ' 
But it is also, by implication (ibid., p. 46), his own 
view. Cf. An Essay on Philosophical Method, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1933, p. 126. For the doctrine of 
'absolute presuppositions', v. An Essay ~n Metaphysics, 
esp. chaps. IV and V. 
~ begin, that is, by presupposing the relation between 
infinite and finite, God and the world, God and Jesus. 
To debate whether that is, or is not, a datum is, within 
theologica1' discourse, .a fallacy of misplaced argument. 
Cf. the 'Wer-Frage' and the 'Wie-Frage l of Bonhoeffer, 
" Wer ist und wer war Jesus Christus, pp. llff. 
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historical activities of Jesus, his doing and speaking, at 
the same time as they are the historical activities of a 
man, are, to speak analogically, the historical activities 
of God, who ate with men when Jesus did. What may be 
called the 'analogia facti' is to believe, or presuppose, 
that 'the facts of the life and ministry of Jesus,l are the 
facts of God. 
If the reader has followed all things closely till now, 
he will see that he has been engaged, on the one hand, in 
a narrative of things that have been accomplished, and in a 
series of analogical assertions, on the other. He has been 
, 2 
asked to consider how it actually was and how what actually 
was was Ood's history. He has been asked to remember the 
past, but not yet to remind himself that he, too, exists in 
the present and faces a future. 
, Suppose,then,I say that I ask these questions of another, 
1. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 30. 
2. I have been persuaded by'Ranke's famous phrase 'wie es 
eigentlich gewesen ist· to write 'how it actually was ••• " 
etc. To avoid confusion with the rejection of the 'Wie-
Fragp.' above, it would be better if I explained that I 
meanjthis: 'who, historically speaking, Jesus actually 
was and who, 'historically (that is, analogically), God 
was',; or, in Collingwood's terms: 'what Jesus did and what 
~he meant by doing what he did and what God did ••• ' etc'. 
But I do not mean that, despite what I said above, I am 
after all faking up the question how God is related to 
Jesus, though it is legitimate to enquire what it means to 
'" assert that relation. 
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because I must anslver some questions of my own. I ask 
what he did, because I am also asking what I must do. If 
I am interested in what I remember, I am also interested 
that it is I that am remembering. 
Suppose, then, that the question I find myself having 
to answer is how I am to move "out of my past into the future 
that is appropriate to me, or, in slightly different terms, 
how .I am to make the future into my present. Thus for-
mulated, the question is general, structural, ontological; 
ontically, however, the q~estion will be defined by the 
situation in which I think I am standing. 
If it is true that the question arises in the situation 
and if it is true that situations are historical in the 
sense that present situations are not exhaustively explained 
by the situations of the past, if, that is, each situation 
is a new situation, then the question, what he did, cannot 
answer for me the question, what I must do. 
Now, if the past is 'incapsulated' in the present, 
there must have been a time when, in the first place, the 
past came to be. Rather paradoxically formulated, there 
must have been a time when the past became its present. 
And.things come into existence.by being created. If my 
present is to come into existence, it must be created and 
.. " , 
be created now, unless I recoil from the task, or suppose 
1 
there is none. 
1. v. supra, p.".9: respectively, the 'antinomian' and the 
'nomistic' error. 
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Thus the whole enquiry till now has been a preliminary 
enquiry concerning an ancillary norm, namely, the 
historical Jesus, or, by the doctrine or paradoxical 
identity," the historical God. But does he do anything now? 
Whatever is replied to that question, at any rate by 
ancillary norm I mean that what hd did orrers me a criterion 
ror what I must do, "but a criterion that does not answer my 
questions. For the questions ror which what he did is a 
criterion are not the questions I am asking. What he did 
is a norm, but it is an ancillary norm. 
And so, nOli that an answer has been suggested to the 
question of tradition and the scriptural and ecclesiastical 
past, the step is taken into the axial phase of the three 
modes or time, where the past is lert behind and a man 
presses for\iard into the arising si"tuation, where .the ruture 
becomes the p~esent; because 'for a man about to act, the 
" 11 
situation is his master, his oracle, his god. For 'history 
2 is now and Scotland' and now is the absolute" moment. 
Something was said, to speak analogically, of God the 
Father, above, and something, to speak historically, or 
1. Collingwood, The Idea of Hi"story, p. 316. 
2. " Ir I may so adapt T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, Faber & 
.. Faber, 1944, p. 43: 
t. " 
A people without history 
Is not redeemed from time, ror history is a pattern' 
Of timeless moments. So, while the light rails 
On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel 
History is no'". and England. 
Josephts son. But I am now compe11ed to add the third, to 
speak, that is, of the Spirit, to speak, that is, one must 
a1so say, of the church. 
It was a1so said above that the Christian man was 
qua1ified by the existence, of Jesus of Nazareth. That is 
true, of course, but not direct1y true. For, more precise1y, 
he is qua1ified by a discontinuous and continuous succession 
of those who have been thus qua1ified. Nor can the 
communio sanctorum be circumvented by a searching of the 
scriptures, for to search them is to enter the community of 
those who interpret them. 
The doctrine of paradoxical identi ty is no mere 'segment 
of the history of dogma, but a current dogma to exp1icate 
the abs01ute moment. As a matter of past history, what 
those who have been qua1ified by Jesus have said has been 
the words of God. And so, too, \.;hat Christians say, i:f, at 
the same time, w'hat they say is qua1ified by sin, as what 
Jesus said was not. Thus not on1y is it true that what 
Jesus did and said was what God did and said, but it is a1so 
true that what I do and say is what God does and says. Or, 
in short, with the qua1ification o:f sin, the doctrine o:f 
paradoxica1 identity app1ies now as then. 
'-.. Thus I, yet not I, but the Spiri t, regu1ated, it is true, 
but not confined by tradi t.ion, answer wi th freedom and 
responsibi1ity, in so far as I assume or receive these, the 
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questions that the situation poses, questions that follow, 
but do not repeat the questions that were a~ked in the past, 
but which by dialogue with these I answer with the greater 
wisdom. 
But lest the preaching of the Baptist should seem to 
supplant the place of Jesus, or Gospel be subordinate to 
L~w, all does not depend on how I answer, on whether I f1y 
from the question or deny there is one, but on the belief, 
or presupposition, that whether I answer or no, my safety 
is not touched. Demand~ and gift remain, but the greater 
of these is gift. 
The Criticisms 
The presuppositions that have now been expounded were 
found necessary to explain what is meant by saying that 
kerygma is what Christians say. And these presuppositions 
are involved not only in talk of Jesus, or God, or the 
Spirit, but in all that a Christian says, even if they are, 
for the most part, no more than implicit - as if he should 
say 'my pipe is out' and be implying that 'tobacco is God's 
gift to me'. 
But if it was these presuppositions that were being 
presupposed, then, it was suggested, the theologies of Dodd 
and Bultmann were in places vulnerable. 
". 
In the first place, to take the question of kerygma 
and the resurrection,l if the kerygma/ involves, on the one 
hand, historical statements and, on the other, what was 
called 'the analogia facti' or theological.statements, then 
it is important that the historical statements should be 
really historical. And that is important if Christian 
theology is to win emancipation from a metaphysics of 'the 
story says ••• ' and move to a metaphysics of 'history 
says , 2 • •• , or, to take more customary terms, from a faith 
that is mythological to a faith that is historical •. 
That is not, of course, to say that a metaphysics of 
the story is bad metaphysics; it is only to say that such 
metaphysics is untimely \vhen most people have given up that 
kind of thinking and do not have the time, and often the 
equipment, to immerse themselves in another age in order to 
understand the presuppositions of others far removed, which 
are neither their own nor need be. If servant-girls do 
not at any time take kindly to metaphysical analysis, it is 
1. 
2. 
Essay II. 
Cf. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 56: 
'History has its OlVll rubric (for the 'metaphysical rubric 
v. ibid., p. 55: 'In such and such a hase of scientific 
tho~ it is or was absolutel resu osed that ••• ' , 
namely 'the evidence at our disposal obliges us to con-
clude that' such and such an event happened. What I call 
scissors-and-paste history has the rubric 'we are told 
that' such and such an event happened. There is also a 
rubric for use in narrating legends, which in·some kinds 
of legendary literature is here and there explicitly 
inserted:' 'the story says that ••• ', or 'now the story 
goes on to say that ••• '. 
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still more unkind to burden them with two, their own and 
others', than saddle them with one. 
The notion of the resurrection belongs to that complex 
of notions, which is called apocalyptic eschatology. All 
these notions suppose that· history will have an end. But 
the notion that history will have an end is scarcely' one 
that the historian can countenance. Nor, I would further 
suppose, need it be a notion which the theologian need accept. 
It is true, of course, that the personal history of the 
historian, as of all men~ will, sooner or later, corne to an 
end in death. But death ceases to be a ppoblem, if one 
believes, or supposes, that as far as what we know is con-
cerned God keeps us safe, so that, accordingly, those 
questions that we have no means of answering, if there are 
any questions to be answered, may be entrusted to God's 
economy. Whether, that is, I survive the ending of my life, 
lies entirely in his hands, not mine. 
As far as the resurrection in the New Testament is con-
cerned, 'the evidence at our disposal obliges us to conclude 
that' Jesus died and that his followers, after his death, 
went on doing the kind of things he had done. So much for 
~he 'outside' of their actions. As for the 'inside',l the 
early Christians made use of the only metaphysical tools they 
,t· J 
.. possessed. In the terms of their mythology, whose rubric is 
1. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 213. 
'the story says they said that God had raised Jesus. 
In the terms, however, o£ an historical metaphysic, they 
would have outlined the 'constellation' o£ presuppositions, 
. which has been implicit in each o£ these essays and has been 
made explicit in this. Or i£ not these presuppositions, 
then something like them. 
In the second place, to take the question o£ the origin 
1 . +' J o£ the kerygma, 1.1. we suppose that what esus said was what 
2 God said and that what a Christian says is what God says; 
and i£ what a Christian" says is kerygma, then what Jesus 
said is kerygma. There is, however, between what Jesus 
said and what the early church said, i£ also continuity, 
undoubted discontinuity. But, one must also add, the 
relation o£ continuity and discontinuity between what Jesus 
said and what the early church said is no di££erent £rom the 
relation between anyone kerygma and any other, between, £or 
example, the Palestinian Mare-kyriology and the kyriology o£ 
Hellenistic Christianity. The question is, however, 
whether the discontinuity between what Jesus said and what 
his £ollowers said a£ter his death is di££erent in such a 
way that the term kerygma may not be used o£ what he said eLl-
_ all. Jesus' message would then be not kerygma, but its 
1. Essay III. 
2. This is quite orthodox Bultmannian doctrine, e.g. ~, 
1960, pp. 25££; In such a context it is Bultmann's wont 
to cite 2 Cor. 5:18-20. 
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. t o 1 presupposl lone 
The view I adopt here is to suppose that it was as much 
possible to become a Christian by hearing what Jesus said as 
2 by hearing what the early church said. The shift in what 
the early church said away from what Jesus said, in so far 
that is true, to 'preaching the preacher,3 is explained as 
in part by the f'act that a man may not say of' himself what 
others may say of' him, in part by the f'act that new 
historical circumstances necessitate new ways of' talking. 
At one point4 Bultmann asks why the apostolic preaching 
is not content to repeat the preaching of' Jesus. But the 
history of' Buddhism or Plato's treatment of Socrates or the 
development from Luther to Cal.vin or any movement of' thought 
one cares to mention are instances which suggest the contrary. 
1. 
2. 
Bu1 tmann " Theologie des Neuen Tes taments, p. 1: 'Die 
Verkfindigung Jesu gehBrt zu den Voraussetzungen dar 
Theo1ogie des NT und ist nicht ein Teil dieser selbst.' 
(In this quotation Jesus' preaching is, of' course, one 
presupposition among others, as .Jeremias points out, 
op.cit., p. 11.) 
Accordingly, I should wish to interpret In. 5:24f'. to 
ref'er also to the historical Jesus (though I do not, of' 
course, suppose that these are ipsissima verba); whereas 
Bultmann writes, §!g, 1960, p. 25: , ••.• es ist klar, dass 
Johannes nicht das Wort des historischen Jesus meint, 
sondern das Wort, da~ ihn werkfindigt. ' 
3." A f'requent formula of Bultmann, e.g. ~., p. 17: 
wie aus ~em Verkfindiger der Verkfindigte wurde.' 
. . . 
4. ibid., p. 23. 
-
And it would be unkind to add that Bultmann might have 
learnt from his own pupils that no apt puPil repeats his 
teacher. 
This is, of course, very far from suggesting that 
there was need to correct Jesus' teaching, but mere~y to 
say that no philosophy in history has eternal validity, for 
new situations, such as, for example, Jesus' death or the 
Gentile mission, demand that the new 'strains,l be taken up 
by a modified metaphysic; or, to put tho same point in 
theological terms, becadse the Spirit leads into all truth. 2 
Thus, in ans\ver to Bul tmann' s and Fuller's anxiety that 
'the effort to demonstrate the continuity between Jesus and 
Kerygma may so blur the difference between them, that in 
effect it will make the Kerygma unnecessary,3 one must point 
out that not only did Jesus' message become 'unnecessary' 
to Paul and John, but that the messages of Paul and John 
themselves became unnecessary as they in turn were super-
seded by early Catholicism. 
It was further pointed out above 4 that if all history 
is present history, discussion of the presentness of the 
1. 
2. 
4. 
Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 48, Note to 
Chapter V, and cf. pp. 74ff. 
In. 16:13. 
. .. 
Fuller, !IE, 41 (1959), pp. 272-275 (cit. Bultmann, ~, 
1960, p. 24). 
Essay III. 
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kerygma is beside the point. The right question is not 
how the 'Christ-event' is present, but who Christ is. And 
here Bul tmann' s dichotomy between Je'sus the Jew and Jesus' 
the Christianl is false, for neither ca~egory applie~. 
Jesus was no Jew, in so far as, being the ~1essiah, he ended 
Judaism; nor·was he a Christian, in so far as what God 
said and did may be predicated of what he said and did in a 
way that may be predicated of no other. For such a pre-
dication may only be made of another, if it is made with 
the qualification introduced by sin. 
In short, the kerygma of Jesus differs from the kerygma 
of the early church in so far as the former is without that 
qualification. Any other differences are to be explained 
by the movement of history, which the thought of men must 
move to meet or the Spirit of God move over2 to pacify. 
In the third place,J it was alleged that'the New 
Testament critic is confronted by the phenomenon not of 
kerygma, but of kerygmata. Analogous problems occur, of 
course, in the field of church history; and the dogmatist, 
too, knows that others are declaring other dogmata. The 
concentration, however in these essays, is primarily on the 
l~ ~,1960, p. 8 • 
.. ' 
2~ I am thinking of Gen. If. and the 'pacific' symbOlism of 
the dove, but not supposing that pacification is the 
only 'work' of the'·Spirit. 
J. Essay IV. 
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New Testament and the analogous situations are used merely 
for the purposes of allusion or illustration. 
What was happening in the fourth essay w·as, qui te 
simply, playing off the factual historical insights of 
Kasemann and the theoretical insights of Collingwood against 
Dodd's theory of the development of ~he apostolic preaching. 
Dodd speaks of one kerygma which is proclaimed in 'fresh 
.. t· f ,1 and 1nv1gora 1ng orms • This is Dodd's synthetic 
approach or his unearthing of 'the common faith,2 or 'the 
fundamental Christian fuessage,.J- But Kasemann would reply: 
'What common faith?' 4 In Kasemann's own words, 'a theo-
logical problem is already implicit in the fact that the 
canon presents us with four Gospels instead of one and that 
even the first three reveal important divergences in order, 
selection and presentation.'. And, a little later in the 
same essay,S he declares that the Gospels (to content our-
selves with these), ••• take divergent roads. The pattern 
is as follows: Mark, by means of his many miracle stories, 
depicts the secret epiphany of him who receives his full 
1. The Apostolic Preaching, p. 75. 
2. ~., p. 74 . 
3. ~., p. 75. 
4. Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, 1, 'Begrfindet der 
neutestamentliche Kanon die Einheit der Kirche?' 
5. ~., p. 215. 
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glory at Easter, ~Iatthew points to the bringer of the 
Messianic Torah, John to the ever-present Christ, while 
Luke, historicizing and portraying salvation history as a 
process of development, composes the first 'Life of Jesus'.' 
And Ktlsemann concludesl'that ' ••• the question 'What is the 
Gospel?' cannot be settled by the historian according to 
the resu1ts of his investigations but only by the believer 
who is led by the Spirit and listens obediently to the 
Scripture. ' 
.1 
If one applies Collingwood's 'logic of question and 
answer,2 and his theory of 'historical process,3 to what 
Ktlsemann is doing; and what Dodd has not done, then certain 
questions arise and certain answers may be, must be ,attempted, 
First, let it be assumed that 'a fresh and invigorating 
form,4 is not the 'superstructure' on a 'foundation',5 but, 
to retain the metaphor, a new building, which, certainly, 
stands in an architectural tradition, but is not simply 
traditional. st. Paul's; in a word, is not simply the 
Parthenon built by an architect who did not know his' job. 
1. ~., p. 223. 
2. Collingwood, An Autobiography, chap. V, 'Question and 
Answer', pp. 29ff. 
3. 
'" 4. 
ibid. , 'pp. 97ff. 
-
Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching, p. 75. 
5. ~., p. 10. 
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As far as kerygma is concerned, a 'fresh and invigorating 
form' is not a development or interpretation of the kerygma, 
but is itself kerygma. 
Second, let it be assumed, that no science may be said 
to deal with 'eternal' problems, in the sense that all 
philosophers and all theologians have everywhere and always 
asked the same question and have given different answers. 
Let it be, on the contrary, assumed that, if different 
answers are given to the same question, then one or both are 
.t 
mistaken - and I ask, en passant, the question whether, at 
least in theology and relition, anyone man, after careful 
analysis of his question, asks the same question as any 
other, and so whether contradiction occurs, though it is 
perhaps possible to say that one man may rightly evaluate 
his question as more important or relevant than the question 
·'1 
of another. 
'And let it be further assumed that the correct answer 
to one question gives rise to new questions and that, 
therefore, a theology that is correct for one set of questions 
will scarcely be correct for the new questions which those 
answers raised. 
1. Suppose, for example, that one man is asking a question 
about mission and another about ecumenism. It would still 
be possible for the first to assert that his question was 
the more important and so invite the other, not to ask the 
~ question, but to ask his own question about mission. 
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So much for the 'logic of question and answer'. 
When this logic is applied to the problems of kerygma, 
it is clear that there is no eternal kerygma, but a 
plurality of kerygmata proclaimed in a plurality of 
situations. Suppose that one kerygma conflicts, or appears 
to conflict with another, then we must ask whether they are 
different answers to the same questions or different 
answers to different questions. lfuere they are different 
answers to the same question, one must risk a judgment, or 
.t 
be led by the Spirit, or be confused ,by anti-Christ, as to 
which is right. Where they are different answers to 
different questions one must risk a judgement or be led by 
the Spirit or be confused by anti-Christ as to which is the 
right question to ask, and then as to whether the question 
one has chosen has b~en rightly answered. lvhere one 
., 
judges, or is led to think, or is deceived, to think, that 
correct answers have been given, one must go out after the 
new questions that now arise, even if one does not know 
i . 1 whither one s gOlng. 
Next arises the problem of what is called in theo-
logical circles 'tradition' and of what is called by 
Collingw'ood 'historical process'. 
2 He writes that: 
.. ' 
1. Heb. 11: 8. 
2. An Autobiography, pp. 97f. 
I quote him in extenso~ 
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••• history is concerned not with 'events' but 
with 'processes'; that 'processes' are things 
which do not begin and end but turn into one 
another; and that if a process PI turns into a 
process P2, there is no dividing line at '\vhich 
PI stops and P2 begins; Pi never stop~, it goes 
on in the changed form P2, and P2 never begins, 
it has previously been going on in the earlier 
form Pl. There are in history no beginnings and 
no endings. History books begin and end, but 
the events they describe do not. 
'If Pi has left traces of itself in P2 so 
that an historian living in P2 can discover by 
the interpretation of evidence that what is now 
P2 was once Pl,' it follows that the 'traces' of 
Pl in the present are not, so to speak, the 
corpse of a dead Pi but rather the real Pl itself, 
living and acti~e though incapsulated within the 
other form of itself P2. And P2 is not opaque, 
it is transparent, so that Pl shines through it 
and th~ir colours combine into one. Therefore, 
if the symbol Pi stands for a characteristic of 
a certain historical period and the symbol P2 
for the corresponding but different (and there-
fore contradictory or incompatible) character-
istic of its successor, that successor is never 
characterized by P2 pure and simple, but always 
by a P2 tinged w~th a survival of Pl. ' 
Mutatis mutandis for kerygma, it is plain that a man 
may find himself confronted by a new situation, by new 
queitions, but he dbes not come to it destitute of what I 
have called 'ancillary norms'. In Collingwood's terms, if 
he finds himse·l f moving from P2 to PJ, both Pl and P2. are 
there to guide his steps. So much is transparent. But 
where the matter is not transparent is that the actual move 
"from P2 to PJ mus~ be taken into the dark, where his only 
.. ' 
light will be his own 'judgement or God's. 
The historical Jesus, to call him that, is just such 
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an ancillary norm. But the present norm is the Christ of 
Faith, to call him that; or (what is the same thing) the 
Spirit. And lvho he is may not be known wi thout deciding 
anew.whenever a new question arises. And what a Christian 
then does is pragma, or not; and lvhat a Christian then 
says is kerygma, or not. 
These pages, though concise, must be concluded; but 
not without a word on their genesis. For they took their 
origin in a persistent, but incoherent dissatisfaction with 
what Dodd and Bultmann had said about kerygma. The problem 
was to express thi~ dissatisfaction. And this could only 
be done by asking what I took kerygma to be and "asking why 
Dodd and Bultmann should take it to be something else. And 
that could only be done by asking not only what kerygma was, 
but asking·· a great many other questions as well. What, in 
short, was involved was, willy-nilly, an essay in theo-
logical method. 
No doubt, if these speculations are true, or, if not 
true, then tenable, they have implications for further 
criticisms of Dodd and Bultmann and almost certainly for 
other areas of theological concern. But to divide was to 
conquer; and the immediate problem was to examine lvhat I 
,,' 
took to be three central problems: the resurrection, the 
'historical Jesus' and the problem of the plurality of 
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tSprachereignisse' to which that Jew or Christian gave 
rise. 
Progress here or clarity here might mean progress and 
illumination at other points as well. But only by making 
these presupposi tions on '\'tThat I took kerygma to be and by 
examining what they took kerygma to be was it possible to 
conclude wi th a defini tion and to know '\'tThat was meant by 
it. 
Kerygma, then, is what a Christian says, if he has 
1 
not been deceived by the father of lies; and not only 
.1 
that, but, if he has been led by the Spirit, what God says, 
too. 
, .. 
1. In. 8: 44 • 
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